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Cherney, David Neil (Ph.D., Environmental Studies Program) 
 
Environmental Saviors? 
The Effectiveness of Nonprofit Organizations in Greater Yellowstone. 
 
Thesis directed by Professor Roger A. Pielke Jr. 
ABSTRACT 
 
Over the last ten years, environmentalists have levied serious critiques of environmental 
nonprofits—specifically that environmental groups are struggling to make an impact. Critiques 
include accusations of dubious behavior on the part of environmental groups in developing 
countries, charges that the environmental elite are more interested in maintaining an affluent 
lifestyle than achieving organizational goals, and allegations that environmental nonprofits lack 
the strategies necessary to meet their purposes. This dissertation looks at the Greater 
Yellowstone Ecosystem as a case study to answer the question: How can environmental 
nonprofits do better? 
The Greater Yellowstone environmental nonprofit community consists of 183 
conservation nonprofits that command a combined annual budget of $150 million, have 500 
employees, and are overseen by 700 board members. Despite these tremendous resources, the 
status quo performance of Greater Yellowstone’s environmental nonprofits falls short in many 
ways. These organizations have the potential to drastically improve the realization of 
conservation outcomes. To understand why performance is lacking, this analysis first looks to 
experienced conservation practitioners. The resulting four explanatory factors are called ‘the 
holy trinity (plus one) of environmental nonprofit failure.’ While useful in explaining some 
failures to achieve conservation goals, conventional wisdom is insufficient to leverage greater 
performance alone. Six alternative explanations are presented by analyzing the role of nonprofits 
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in bison, elk, grizzly bear, pronghorn migration, snowmobile, and wolf management. The central 
finding is that environmental nonprofits artificially and unnecessarily restrict the scope of 
choices available to them. By doing so, these nonprofits miss important opportunities and are 
less likely to achieve their current and future goals.  
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PREFACE 
 
I come before you tonight both as a lover and a critic of the conservation movement, as 
one who is at once proud of our past accomplishments and disappointed by them, 
troubled about the future of the movement and hopeful for it. I stand here….with great 
pride, and yet my pride is tempered by my concern for the future of this fine movement. I 
catch myself wondering if future historians will say that our time was the beginning or 
the beginning of the end of the environmental cause.  
                   Morris K. Udall, 1974 
 
America has run a 40-year experiment on whether…mainstream environmentalism can 
succeed, and the results are now in. 
James Gustav Speth, 2008 
 
 
This dissertation is motivated by a simple question. How can environmental nonprofits 
do better? 
Over the last ten years, I worked for and with a diverse group of nonprofits. These 
organizations varied in strategy (e.g. advocacy, litigation, research, education, direct services) 
and in topical expertise (e.g. health care, homeless, disabled citizens, environmental 
conservation). The sundry of organizations I worked with share more than the legal designation 
of nonprofit within the United States. Each organization represents a coalition of individual 
citizens—no different than you and me—voluntarily banding together towards a common cause.  
A central challenge for nonprofits and their funders is the attribution of nonprofit success. 
How do we know these organizations are effectively pursuing outcomes they purport to care 
about? Often simple quantitative metrics cannot measure the outcomes these organizations claim 
to seek. Yet, this challenge is more important today than ever. Over 1.4 million nonprofits 
currently register with the United States Internal Revenue Service declaring combined annual 
revenue of $1.4 trillion. These organizations permeate virtually every aspect of our lives: 
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education, healthcare, religious, and more. We need to learn how these organizations can do 
better.  
One of my earliest professional experiences in the environmental movement was as an 
intern for the Santa Monica Baykeeper, an enforcement and research based environmental 
nonprofit in southern California. One of the projects I worked on entailed creating proposals for 
new marine protected areas through California’s Marine Life Protection Act. As part of our 
strategic process, we held closed door meetings with six other environmental nonprofits to 
discuss our collective strategy in advancing our coalition’s agenda. I remember being incredibly 
excited for my first meeting. I was a recent college graduate, finally part of the professional 
environmental club. The actual meeting shocked me. In fact, I was sickened.  I left with a 
visceral distaste for the reality of my new found profession.  
 The coalition’s meeting focused on one thing: how to destroy the recreational fishermen’s 
agenda. Some of my colleagues spent hours discussing—with great distain—about the vile 
nature of people who viewed fishing as a legitimate pursuit, let alone a sport. The policy 
objectives of the recreational fishing industry were never discussed in that meeting. However, 
one thing was clear. We must not let them win.  
 I sat in that first meeting conflicted. I was an environmentalist. I still am. I was also a 
recreational fisherman. I still am. I saw no conflict between the two identities. For many of my 
colleagues, the division could not be more distinct. In that meeting, I nervously (and perhaps 
foolishly) asked why we had not tried working with the recreational fishing industry to advance 
our collective agendas. After all, recreational fishermen were not completely opposed to new 
marine protected areas. Our respective coalitions differed in the proposed locations of new 
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protected areas. Perhaps a compromise would make our public positions stronger? I was laughed 
out of the room.  
 In 2004, Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger’s essay “The Death of 
Environmentalism” sent a ripple through the environmental movement. Nordhaus and 
Shellenberger and argued that “today environmentalism is just another special interest.” They 
contend that environmentalists have arbitrarily determined what issues should be legitimate 
‘environmental’ topics, and in the process ignored pertinent issues that could help secure lasting 
environmental outcomes. Lasting outcomes need broad, long-term public support. The failure for 
natural allies to work together, such as environmental marine nonprofits and recreational 
fishermen in southern California, is problematic for long term conservation success. The frequent 
divisive interactions between mainstream environmental nonprofits and the hook-and-bullet 
clubs is just one example of lost opportunity for improved environmental outcomes.  
When I tell most people that my dissertation focuses on nonprofit effectiveness, the first 
question most people ask is, “Well…what organizations are effective?” Of course, this is a 
reasonable question. As I push these individuals in conversation to why they want to know the 
answer, the most frequent response is these individuals want to know where their limited 
resources (personal donations) will do the most good. Again, this is a rational response. 
Individuals looking for a scorecard of which organizations are “effective” or “ineffective” will 
be disappointed by this dissertation. This dissertation demands more of the reader than simply 
dispensing information.  
In 1971, Harold D. Lasswell declared that the purpose of scientific inquiry is “freedom 
through insight.” Rather than using science to restrict the scope of choices we have in decision 
making, scientific thought should be used to expand the available choices to us. In the spirit of 
x 
 
Lasswell, the central purpose of this dissertation is to expand the range of choices nonprofits 
have in realizing their goals. This dissertation is intended to help nonprofit organizations, 
particularly environmental nonprofits, better understand the challenges and choice they face. 
I owe a large intellectual debt to a number of individuals. First, I must thank my 
committee chair Roger A. Pielke Jr. who sharpened my critical thinking skills beyond what I 
thought possible. His invaluable guidance helped me streamline and clarify my arguments for 
application to the widest possible audience. Committee member Susan G. Clark introduced me to 
the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, and has served as a professor, mentor and good friend for 
the past eight years. My other committee members deserve special thanks for the time and effort 
they generously contributed to my graduate development: Sam Fitch, Krister Andersson, and Bill 
Travis. I would be remiss if I failed to thank Bill Ascher for introducing me to the policy 
sciences. Ron Brunner and Garry Brewer provided valuable insight from the inception of this 
project. I am also indebted to colleges who helped shape my understanding of conservation in 
Greater Yellowstone, including Jason Wilmot, Dave Mattson, Murray Rutherford, Rich Wallace, 
Doug Clark, Michael DelloBuono, Justin Westrum, Lydia Dixon, Jonathan Schechter, and 
Christina Cromley Bruner. Jason Vogel and Shali Mohleji also graciously served as a sounding 
board for many of the ideas in this manuscript.  
 I would also like to recognize the generous support of a number of organizations. The 
Northern Rockies Conservation Cooperative (NRCC) served as a regional host for my research. 
NRCC’s ability to convene and facilitate high level discussions on conservation topics is unlike 
any other organization I have encountered. The Morris K. Udall foundation provided generous 
financial assistance for my final year of writing. Additional financial assistance and in kind 
support were provided by The University of Colorado’s Center for Science and Technology 
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Policy Research, Center for Humanities and Arts, and Cooperative Institute for Research in 
Environmental Sciences. 
I owe the greatest debt and thanks to my parents James and Linda Cherney for their 
understanding and encouragement in helping me pursue my dreams. I would not be here today 
without their support. Lastly, but certainly not least, my brother Michael’s friendship, humor, 
and continued encouragement help push me through the difficult times of this project.  
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Chapter 1: Environmental Saviors? 
 
 
Do environmental outcomes matter to conservation nonprofits?  
While an emphatic ‘yes’ is the answer we might expect, numerous examples suggest 
otherwise. If environmental outcomes mattered to conservation nonprofits, why would: 
• The Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defense Council support the Kerry-
Lieberman Climate Bill, which increases subsidies to the fossil fuel industry by more 
than $100 billion? (Anda 2010).  
• The Nature Conservancy engage in land deals that increases natural gas and housing 
development in ecologically sensitive areas? (Ottaway and Stephens 2003a). 
• The Audubon Society, Conservation International, and Environmental Defense Fund 
partner with major environmental polluters such BP (AWWI 2010)? And, why would 
such organizations actively defend these partnerships in the face of environmental 
disasters, such the Horizon Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico (e.g. Tereck 2010)? 
With such evidence, it is easy for us to rush to judgment and attribute sinister motivations to 
these environmental organizations. We do not need to look far to find examples of 
environmentalists casting stones at their own house. In 2008, Christine MacDonald’s Green, Inc. 
chastised major environmental groups for having “abandoned their missions” and “selling out” to 
corporate interests (236). Jeffery St. Clair (2007) accused the environmental movement of 
becoming “what it once despised: a risk-aversive, depersonalized, hyper-analytical, humorless, 
access-driven, intolerant, centralized, technocratic, dealmaking, passionless, direct-mailing, 
lawyer-laden monolith to mediocrity.” James “Gus” Speth (2008) charges that the environmental 
movement currently faces a deeply troubling paradox, arguing “our environmental organizations 
have grown in strength and sophistication, but the environment has continued to go downhill.” 
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He believes that the current strategies employed by environmental nonprofits are not sufficient to 
secure the environmental future these organizations seek.    
My opening question is intentionally inflammatory. Of course, conservation nonprofits 
care about environmental outcomes. It is almost unfathomable to argue otherwise. At first 
glance, the critiques of MacDonald, St. Clair, and Speth further fan the flames. However, we 
must consider these criticisms in context. There is an ongoing struggle in the environmental 
movement to answer two simple questions: What is a pro-environmental outcome? And, what 
are the most effective means to secure them?  
 I posed these two questions to the individuals I interviewed for this manuscript. A staff 
member of largest regional nonprofit in Greater Yellowstone responded with a representative 
answer. He stated, “If it walks like a duck, if it talks like duck, then it must be a duck.” To many 
people pro-environmental outcomes are hard to describe, but patently obvious. The walks-like-a-
duck argument implies that is not worth our time to think about these types of questions. 
Environmentalists simply know what is good for the environment. There is logic to this response. 
We do not need much information to understand that the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico 
or the Exxon Valdez disaster were environmentally destructive outcomes. More generally, we 
know that the extinction of a species is a far cry from the type of environmental results most 
conservationists desire. Likewise, it takes little thought to come to the conclusion that the 
passage of the 1970 National Environmental Protection Act was a pro-environmental victory.  
Similarly, we know that environmentalists tend to view the purchasing and protection of private 
lands to be pro-environmental outcomes. 
 There are many instances where environmental successes and failures are self-evident. 
However, environmental outcomes are more often muddled in shades of grey, rather than black 
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and white instances of victory and failure. Why might an environmental nonprofit, such as The 
Nature Conservancy, partner with a major environmental polluter? Many environmental 
organizations believe that changing corporate behavior is best achieved through educating and 
informing executives on environmentally responsible business practices rather than forcing such 
corporations into compliance. This rationale is similar to the old adage: keep your friends close 
and your enemies closer. Competing environmental priorities also cause environmental outcomes 
to be clouded in shades of grey. For example, what happens when a solar plant threatens the 
viability of endangered species (e.g. Woody 2009)? Which environmental outcome should take 
precedence: saving a species or decarbonizing our economy? You will likely receive very 
different answers from staff members of the environmental nonprofits Defenders of Wildlife and 
Clean Energy Now.  
Over the past 10 years, the effectiveness of environmental nonprofits have come under 
increased scrutiny. The most notable incident was a series of Washington Post articles, in 2003, 
highly critical of The Nature Conservancy. The Nature Conservancy is the largest environmental 
nonprofit in the world. The organization’s revenue in 2006 ($1.2 billion) was greater than the 
combined revenues of the five next largest environmental nonprofits. The Washington Post 
questioned the organization’s transparency in financial management, willingness to report 
organizational failures, and strategic oversight (Ottoway and Stephens 2003a; 2003b; Stephens 
2003; Stephens and Ottoway 2003a; 2003b). 
 More importantly from the perspective of this manuscript, numerous critiques of 
environmental organizations have also come from within the environmental movement. Mac 
Chapin (2004) highlighted dubious behavior on the part of environmental nonprofits in 
developing countries. Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger (2004; 2007) explicitly called 
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into doubt the ability of environmental nonprofits to achieve their desired outcomes. Jeffery St. 
Clair (2003; 2008) and Mark Dowie (1991; 1996) suggest that environmentalists are struggling 
to make an impact. Christine MacDonald (2008) argues that the environmental elite are more 
interested in maintaining an affluent lifestyle than achieving organizational goals. Gus Speth 
(2008) believes that modern environmental organizations have largely failed at meeting their 
purposes. The failure to clarify what constitutes an environmental outcome and what are 
effective organizational strategies are often central to such inquiries. 
Opponents of the environmental movement hoist these accounts as evidence 
environmentalism has gone wrong. Such interpretations twist the facts and intentions of these 
critics. In a 2004 speech at the Common Wealth Club in San Francisco, Adam Werbach, the 
youngest ever president of the Sierra Club, gave a chilling assessment of the environmental 
movement. In anticipation to the responses of detractors Werbach (2004) asserted, “My critique 
is not with those of us who have put our hearts into this thing we love—it’s with those who want 
to freeze environmentalism in the 1970s and not let it evolve.” In 1974, Senator Morris K. Udall 
gave a similar speech to the National Wildlife Federation entitled “The Environment at Valley 
Forge.” In his address, Udall asserted that American environmentalism needed more “critical 
lovers” of the environmental movement. By critical lovers he meant self-reflective and vocal 
individuals who are willing challenge mainstream environmentalism in pursuit of a simple goal: 
trying to find ways to do better.  
Consistent with the goal of being a critical lover, this dissertation explores why 
conservation nonprofits often have trouble securing the environmental outcomes they desire. I 
use the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem as a case study to understand two questions: 
• Why do conservation nonprofits often fail to meet their goals? 
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• And, how can these organizations do better? 
The purpose of this analysis is to encourage thoughtful reflection and strategic thinking on high 
order factors hindering the success of conservation nonprofits. This analysis is not intended to 
develop a causal model of why certain nonprofits have failed to achieve their organizational 
mission, determine what makes one nonprofit ‘better’ than another, or develop a theory of the 
‘perfect’ structure for a nonprofit or nonprofit community. Rather, this analysis is concerned 
with institutional barriers to environmental nonprofit success. Nonprofit scholar Stephen Block 
(2004: x) contends that “common problem-solving approaches may not always work and that we 
may need to use other frameworks to see problems in a different light.” He believes we need to 
expand our viewpoint to consider nontraditional explanations of why nonprofits fail. This 
viewpoint does not invalidate the work of other nonprofit scholars. Rather than dismiss past 
findings, the challenge for a nonprofit manager is finding the most applicable explanation for 
nonprofit failure within the context they are working. This manuscript continues Block’s call to 
expand our available choices by considering nontraditional explanations for organizational 
failure.  
1.1 Why care about (environmental) nonprofits? 
 
The last half century witnessed an explosion of nonprofits in both the United States and 
abroad. In 1940, less than 13,000 nonprofits registered with the United States’ Internal Revenue 
Service (Hall 2006). To date, more than 1.4 million nonprofit organizations register with the 
agency, declaring more than $1.4 trillion in revenue and $3.2 trillion in assets (Wing et al 2008). 
The American nonprofit community—often referred to as the third sector—equates to over one-
tenth of the United States’ gross domestic product. Political scientist and historian Akira Iriye 
(1999: 424) argues that to ignore the influence of NGOs [non-governmental organizing] in both 
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world and domestic politics “is to misread the history of the twentieth-century world.” Lester 
Salamon (1994: 109) agrees that “[t]he proliferations of these groups may be permanently 
altering the relationship between states and citizens.” 
Whereas the upsurge of non-governmental organizations is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, such associations have a deep rooted history in the United States. Alexis de 
Tocqueville (1901: 593-4) noted in his landmark study of democracy in America: 
Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form associations. 
They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but 
associations of a thousand other kinds—religious, moral, serious, futile, extensive or 
restricted, enormous or diminutive….I met with several kinds of associations in America, 
of which I confess I had no previous notion; and I have often admired the extreme skill 
with which the inhabitants of the United States succeed in proposing a common object to 
the exertions of a great many men, and in getting them voluntarily to pursue it. 
 
While some authors suggest de Tocqueville overstated his case (Hall, 2006), the role of non-
governmental organizations in the history of politics in the United States is undisputed. The 
Freemasons, a voluntary secret society, was instrumental in networking early American leaders 
during the Revolutionary War. The Underground Railroad and the American Anti-Slavery 
Society were critical in the abolition of slavery. The National Woman Suffrage Association and 
the American Woman Suffrage Association played important roles in securing women the right 
to vote. This is not to say the history of all non-governmental organizations in the United States 
is benevolent by today’s moral standards (Chambers and Kopstein, 2001). The formation and 
actions of groups such as the Ku Klux Clan, Hells Angels Motorcycle Club, and the World 
Church of the Creator have also had lasting impacts on American society. 
 The fundamental characteristics that define an organization or association as non-
governmental is contested. Interpreting the term at face value would describe just about any 
association of individuals outside of government; Environmental organizations such as The 
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Nature Conservancy, for-profit ventures such as Exxon Mobil, and political parties such as 
Democratic Party would all fall under the NGO umbrella. Most scholars of NGOs refine the term 
to include only nonprofit associations, but further consensus on distilling the term is lacking. 
Some researchers exclude non-international organizations (Werker and Ahmend, 2008), political 
parties (Iriye, 1999), violent associations (Beyer 2007), or other nonproprietary groups (Yamin 
2001). Peter Dobkin Hall (2006: 32) notes, “None of the contemporary definitions does justice to 
the complex historical development of these entities.” He asserts that a definition is “at best, of 
only temporary usefulness.” 
 For the purpose of this dissertation, the scope of analysis focuses on NGOs who register 
with the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as a charity or nonprofit. Nonprofits are 
organizations incorporated (formally recognized by the government) to pursue charitable goals 
without financial benefit. There are two major reasons for selectively targeting these 
organizations. First, nonprofits have an explicit contract with the American people to pursue 
objectives in the public good in exchange for their special status with the IRS. The special status 
a nonprofit may enjoy includes exception from taxation, the ability to accept public funding, 
protection of personal liability from the nonprofits debts and liabilities, and more depending on 
the nonprofit’s specific designation with the IRS. Second, nonprofits that register with the IRS 
are the most organized, well-funded, and influential environmental nongovernmental 
organizations in Greater Yellowstone. These organizations by definition are supported by more 
than one person—either through donations, staff, or board of directors. In other words, this 
analysis is concerned with organizations that are supported by a collection of likeminded citizens 
who are attempting to influence environmental outcomes in the public good.  
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 Learning how environmental nonprofits can improve their practices has significant 
implications for individuals with no interest in the environment. It is nearly impossible to name a 
major issue of social relevance in the United States that is not associated with multitude of 
nonprofits. There are approximately 78,000 nonprofits registered with the IRS that focused on 
education; 50,000 on healthcare related issues; 45,000 on community improvement and capacity 
building; 43,000 on arts, humanities in culture; and, the list goes on (Wing et al 2008).1  The 
lessons in the manuscript are not isolated to the environmental movement. In discussions with 
colleagues in other substantive fields, they recognize similar dynamics to what I highlight in this 
manuscript occurring in their areas of interest. The broad question is how can we better use civic 
groups (nonprofits) to reach democratic ideals? 
 The role nonprofits play in modern society is complex and nuanced. What is clear, 
however, is that nonprofits’ role in politics and democratic discourse is increasingly contested. It 
is routine across the political spectrum to dismiss opposing groups’ views as simply ‘narrow 
special interests.’ There is a general sentiment what we should limit the influence of special 
interest groups in democratic discourse. For example, in the 2010 mid-term elections, the Obama 
Administration’s Press Secretary Robert Gibbs stated that unnamed donations to nonprofits—
particular from foreign sources—is “a threat to our democracy” (Wagner 2010) The 
administration accused Republicans of improperly using such donations to influence the election  
(Lichtblau 2010). Similarly, in 2008, Senator Inhofe (R-OK) released a report entitled Political 
Activity of Environmental Groups and Their Supporting Foundations (USSEWPC 2008). The 
senator argued environmental nonprofits are illegitimate stealth advocates for the Democratic 
Party despite the fact environmental organizations claim to serve public interests. The 
implication of such arguments is that advocacy groups improperly impact political and policy 
                                                 
1 This list only includes nonprofits that reported more than $25,000 in annual revenue with the IRS in 2005.  
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outcomes. The contract that the American people have with nonprofit organizations, through the 
IRS, rightly limits the activities various activities that tax-exempt organizations can engage in. 
For example, the IRS has strict guidelines over what constitutes ‘lobbying.’ Nonprofits that fail 
to comply with IRS’ lobbying rules can find themselves in hot water. Social negotiations over 
such rules are expected and should be encouraged. The American public has the right to 
determine the terms of the social contract.  
While most nonprofits like to frame themselves as being “non-advocacy” or 
“nonpartisan,” all nonprofits are advocacy groups by definition. Individuals that band together in 
pursuit of a common cause are engaged in advocacy—they seek to effect political or policy 
outcomes. This includes nonprofits such as hospitals, schools, and community groups. For 
example, a nonprofit hospital is an advocate for improved health outcomes; a school is an 
advocate for educational outcomes. A hospital’s advocacy for improved health outcomes might 
share broader public support than a group in favor or opposed to Obamacare. However a hospital 
seeking to achieve its mission is engaged in advocacy. Advocacy does not necessarily mean 
attempting to influence the political process, although that is one strategy that some groups try to 
employee. Advocacy is an attempt to influence outcomes in the policy process. Such outcomes 
are possible outside of the confines of the political process.  How modern nonprofits aid or 
detract from democratic standards such as effective participation, voting equality, enlightened 
understanding, control of the public agenda, and inclusiveness is impacts us all. Learning the role 
that conservation nonprofits play in Greater Yellowstone’s policy process can help draw insight 
to how the rise of nonprofits is impacting the American democratic system. 
1.2 Environmental nonprofits 
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Many environmentalists consider the early 1970s as birth of the modern environmental 
movement, often declaring its inception on April 22, 1970—the first earth day. However, the 
history of environmental nonprofits in the United States is much richer.2 The Boone and Crocket 
Club, established in 1887, is the second oldest modern environmental nonprofit in the United 
States.3 President Theodore Roosevelt and fellow conservationists founded the organization to 
eliminate the unregulated killing of wildlife in North America, specifically hunting within 
Yellowstone’s boundaries. Conservationists continued to organize their efforts in subsequent 
years founding the National Audubon Society in 1886 and the Sierra Club in 1892.4 These 
nonprofits were instrumental in a number of major environmental victories including the creation 
of Kings Canyon National Park and the upholding of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.  
During this era, often referred to as the first wave of the environmental movement, most 
conservation nonprofits were founded by sportsmen and naturalists concerned about the future of 
wildlife in North America. Other modern conservation organizations founded in this period 
include the Izaak Walton League (1922), Wilderness Society (1935), Duck’s Unlimited (1936), 
and National Wildlife Federation (1936). Membership of these environmental nonprofits was 
highly skewed toward wealthy and well-educated white men, as conservation was largely 
                                                 
2 There are two general trends within the environmental movement that we must acknowledge. First, environmental 
nonprofits are often referred to as ‘environmental’ at the national and international levels and ‘conservation’ at the 
local. Second, nonprofits are often called ‘environmental’ when referring to liberal organizations and ‘conservation’ 
when referring to conservative. Rather than quibble which word label is the most appropriate and engage in a 
symbolic battle, I freely interchange use of these terms. Rather, I define a conservation/ environmental nonprofit as 
those organization whose self-defined purpose (e.g. mission) relates to the environment.   
3 The Appalachian Mountain Club (1876) is the oldest environmental nonprofit in the United States. However, I 
chose to highlight the Boone and Crocket Club, since it was the first environmental nonprofit to focus on 
Yellowstone—the subject of this analysis. 
4 Many environmental nonprofits have complex histories. The Audubon Society is a perfect example. The Audubon 
Society was first formed in 1886 by George Bird Grinnell, who wrote an editorial in the February edition of Forest 
and Stream calling on readers join him in creating the Audubon Society. Nearly 40,000 members joined, 
administratively over taking Grinnell’s capacity. Due to the inability to manage such a large following, the group 
disbanded in 1888. However, a number of individuals formed Audubon Societies at the State level. In 1905, the 
National Audubon Society was incorporated—the organization that has survived until today.  
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considered a gentleman’s pursuit (Taylor 2002). This era also marks the first major conflicts 
between environmental nonprofits over what constitutes a pro-environmental outcome, with 
wise-use conservationists such as Gifford Pinchot and Teddy Roosevelt battling preservationists 
such as John Muir and Henry Senger (Norton 1991). 
 The second wave of conservation nonprofits is marked by David Brower’ appointment as 
the first executive director of Sierra Club in 1952 (after serving as an active volunteer and board 
member since 1941). Brower was fierce advocate for environmental protection and transformed 
the Sierra Club into one of country’s most aggressive environmental nonprofits. In 1966, the 
Sierra Club took out full page ads in the New York Times and Washington Post advocating 
against the development of a new dam in the Grand Canyon (Long 2004). The following day, the 
IRS withdrew the Sierra Club’s tax exempt status for engaging in legislative advocacy (Fox 
1985). This action enraged many Americans, leading to the doubling of the Sierra Club’s 
membership in the following three years (Ostertag 2006).  
Brower’s tenure as executive director (1952-1969) coincides with a major shift in 
American environmentalism. Highly visible environmental disasters, such as the deadly smog 
episodes in St. Louis (1939), Donora (1948), and London (1952) and the Cuyahoga River Fire 
(1969) coupled with the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962), Stewart Udall’s 
The Quiet Crises (1963), Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed (1965), and Paul Ehrlich’s The 
Population Bomb (1968) helped expand the focus of environmental nonprofits beyond simple 
land and wildlife protection. Pollution and toxins became an important focus. However, the most 
notable innovation in the environmental nonprofit sector was the rise of both grassroots and 
litigation-based environmental nonprofits. Examples of grassroots organizations from the period 
include Friends of the Earth (1969) and Greenpeace (1971). Litigation-based nonprofits include 
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the Environmental Defense Fund (1967), Natural Resource Defense Council (1970), and Sierra 
Club Legal Defense Fund (1971; renamed Earthjustice in 1997). These organizations were major 
catalysts in the nationwide ban of the pesticide DDT, vital in networking international 
organization for the development of the Montreal Protocol, and the primary driver behind the 
Wilderness Act of 1964. The membership of conservation nonprofits in the 1950s through 1960s 
still consisted of mostly middle class white Americans (Taylor 2002). However, the membership 
base exploded during this time (Mackenzie and Weisbrot 2008). Between 1966 and 1979, the 
combined membership of eight of the most influential nonprofits grew from approximately 
439,000 members to more than 707,000 (Fox 1985).5 By 1975, the total membership in these 
eight organizations grew to more than 1.2 million people. 
The 1980s marks a third transformative period for environmental nonprofits. The 
movement began to diversity, with a drastic increase in the number of splinter groups focused on 
issues such as eco-feminism, bioregionalism, environmental justice, and deep ecology (Taylor 
2002). However, “wildlife, wilderness, and waterway protection dominated agendas” of 
mainstream environmental organizations “both in terms of importance of the issues to the 
organization and the percentage of the organizations resources spent on the issues” (Taylor 2002: 
12).  However, the sheer growth in size of the environmental nonprofit community is the most 
notable aspect of this period. The number of environmental nonprofits formally recognized by 
the Internal Revenue Service increased to more than 10,000 in 2007 (Wing, Pollak and 
Blackwood 2008). Paul Hawken (2007) estimates that one to two million environmental and 
social justice nonprofits operate worldwide. These environmental nonprofits actively work on 
issues such as climate change, energy use, environmental health, genetic engineering, invasive 
                                                 
5 Environmental Defense Fund, Izaak Walton League, Sierra Club, National Audubon Society, National Parks and 
Conservation Association, National Resources Defense Council, National Wildlife Federation, and The Wilderness 
Society. 
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species, land use change, nanotechnology, nuclear power, overpopulation, pollution and beyond. 
Learning how these organizations can do better has broad implications for the effectiveness of 
the environmental movement.   
1.3 Greater Yellowstone’s conservation organizations 
 
Yellowstone National Park—the world’s first national park—was established in 1872 by 
the United States’ Congress as a means to preserve the region’s wildlife and unique geological 
features for the enjoyment of the American people. The region is known for its geologic wonders 
such as the Old Faithful Geyser and the Grand Canyon of the Yellowstone River. Yellowstone is 
also highly prized for its flagship megafauna, such as bison, elk, grey wolves, and grizzly bears. 
Yellowstone, however, is much more than just a place and assemblage of wildlife. Yale 
University’s Susan Clark (2008: 1) asserts Yellowstone is also an “idea about nature and our 
relationship to it, as well as an ethic, calling to mind our responsibility for our world.” Noted 
Yellowstone historian Paul Schullery (1997: 5) agrees emphasizing, “While a lot of people still 
view it [Yellowstone] as a place where certain things are right to do and others are not, a 
growing number of people recognize that the park is the site of something much more dynamic 
in human culture, a kind of perpetual experiment that will never end.” 
 The Yellowstone experiment is a microcosm of the larger American conservation battle 
over what constitutes a pro-environmental outcome and what strategies are the best means to 
secure them. Pro-environmental outcomes within the Yellowstone system have varied 
substantially over time. Perhaps the starkest example is the treatment of predator species within 
Yellowstone’s borders. From 1916 to 1935, Yellowstone implemented a predator control policy 
to protect the park’s elk and bison herds. The result of Yellowstone’s policy was the complete 
extirpation of wolves within the park, with cougars nearly sharing the same fate (Craighead 
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1991). On January 14, 1995, 14 wolves were reintroduced in Yellowstone (Nystrom 2009). Sixty 
years had passed since the last wolf sighting in the region (Clark and Minta 1994). Secretary of 
the Interior Bruce Babbitt declared at the reintroduction, “At last the wolves are coming home, 
and Yellowstone will be a complete ecosystem....It’s an extraordinary achievement and it’s an 
important statement about who we are as Americans” (Milstein 1995). Yellowstone’s native 
ungulates (hoofed mammals) were no longer the defining characteristic of successful 
conservation; biodiversity was now considered a legitimate conservation target.  
 The unwritten social negotiation of what constitutes environmental success is primarily 
carried out through public and private organizations that manage and care about the region. In 
1872, Yellowstone National Park was managed by a civilian governmental agency that was 
authorized no funds by the federal government. As a result, the park’s first superintendent 
Nathaniel Langford was unable to hire a staff to enforce the park’s rules (DOI 1916). By today’s 
conservation standards Yellowstone was merely a ‘paper park;’ a region designed in name only. 
During this period poaching and other abuses to the landscape were rampant. In 1886, Congress 
sought to solve this problem by designating the United States Army at the park’s official 
administrator (Whittlesey and Watry 2008). The Army significantly increased law enforcement, 
helping remedy the challenges of the park’s early years. In 1916, the United Park Service was 
established and Yellowstone was transferred back to civilian management (Wagner 2006).  
 In the early 1880s, some conservationists believed that Yellowstone was insufficient in 
size to effectively protect the region’s wildlife.  In 1882, General Philip Sheridan proposed 
doubling the size of the park to protect many of the migrating species (Craighead 1991). While 
Sheridan’s proposal (and many others since then) failed to expand Yellowstone, much of the 
region’s landscape was protected by President Benjamin Harrison in 1891 through an executive 
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order creating the Yellowstone Timberland Reserve. The Timberland Reserve protected 
approximately an additional 1.2 million acres to the east and south of Yellowstone, in no small 
part to the effective advocacy of the Boone and Crocket Club (Brinkley 2009). In 1902, the 
reserve was expanded to 6.5 million acres (three times the size of Yellowstone) and renamed the 
Yellowstone Forest Reserve.  The Forest Service chose to administratively reorganize the land in 
1908 into several national forests including the Absaroka, Beartooth, Targhee, and Teton 
National Forests.  
 While the term Greater Yellowstone first occurred in print in 1919 to describe the public 
lands beyond Yellowstone’s borders, the region’s national forests and parks were largely viewed 
as separate administration until the 1960s (Schullery 2010). In 1964, the National Park Service 
signed a memorandum of understanding with the Forest Service establishing the Greater 
Yellowstone Coordinating Committee (GYCC), a collaborative body that seeks “to pursue 
opportunities of mutual cooperation and coordination in the management of core federal lands in 
the Greater Yellowstone.” Represented on the committee are the superintendents of two national 
parks (Yellowstone and Grand Teton), the forest supervisors of six national forests (Beaverhead-
Deerlodge, Bridger-Teton, Caribou-Targhee, Custer, Gallatin, and Shoshone), and the managers 
of two national wildlife refuges (Red Rock Lakes and the National Elk Refuge). The formation 
of this committee signified a major symbolic shift to manage the region as a single ecosystem. 
The GYCC calls this region the Greater Yellowstone Area. In 1986, the area encompassed 
approximately 14 million acres—compared to the mere 2.2 million acres of Yellowstone. Today, 
many conservationists view the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem as a system larger than the ten 
major federal landowners. While there is no precise definition, it is generally accepted that the 
Greater Yellowstone includes up to 20 million acres of federal, state, and private land. All told, 
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22 different federal and 12 different state organizations/agency units are authorized to make 
conservation decisions in the region. This figure does not include the 25 county governments and 
private landowners.  
The highly fragmented decision making structure makes it difficult for citizens to 
effectively engage in the policy process. For example, if you are interested in wolf conservation, 
one of the first questions you might ask is who is in charge of managing wolves? While you 
might hope for a simple answer, wolf management in Greater Yellowstone is heavily influenced 
by a vast array of government agencies. Federal agencies include the National Park Service 
(NPS), U.S. Animal and Plants Inspection Service (APHIS), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(USFWS), and U.S. National Forest Service (USFS). Major state agencies include Idaho Fish 
and Game (IFG), Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks (FWP), and the Wyoming Game and Fish 
Department (WGF). If you have a question regarding wolf conservation, it is often puzzling to 
determine which agency is appropriate to contact.  
In response to such complexity, conservation nonprofits have emerged as regional leaders 
to help solve Greater Yellowstone’s conservation failures. While conservation nonprofits have 
been active in Yellowstone since 1887, the size and scope of the nonprofit community has 
exploded over the past 25 years. Today there are at least 183 conservation nonprofits who claim 
to work in the Yellowstone region. Two-thirds of these organizations were founded after 1986 
(Figure 1.1).  The combined regional annual revenue of these organizations likely exceeds $150 
million per year.6 These organizations employ at least 267 full-time and 175 part-time employees 
who focus on the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. Additionally, there are at least 647 board of 
                                                 
6 A more detailed description of how I arrived at this figure can be found in Chapter 4 under the subheading “Lack 
of Resources.”   
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director positions.7 If we combined paid staff with board of directors, there are nearly 1,100 
conservation related positions in the GYE. In short, the mere size of Yellowstone environmental 
nonprofit community suggests it is a major force for conservation in the region.  
Despite the significant resources at the disposal of conservation nonprofits in Greater 
Yellowstone, these organizations have trouble meeting many of their formally designated goals. 
Chapter three makes the case that there is room for improvement in the Yellowstone 
environmental nonprofit community. Irrespective of this analysis, we do not need to look far to 
find members of the environmental nonprofit community who agree. A staff member at the 
Natural Resource Defense Council in Livingston, MT states, “A lot of conservation issues [in 
Greater Yellowstone] are stuck in the mud—they are derailed in their tracks. We need to find 
new ways to push these issues forwards.” An employee of Defenders of Wildlife agrees, “We 
need to find better ways to work together…our community could be much stronger.” A 
conservationist with the Greater Yellowstone Coalition perhaps says it best, “Over the last 35 
years, the players have changed but the issues have stayed the same.” Environmental nonprofits 
are having trouble securing the outcomes they desire.  
                                                 
7 Employee and founding data was drawn from the Greater Yellowstone Conservation Directory at 
http://www.gycoi.org 
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Figure 1.1. The cumulative total and yearly addition of environmental nonprofits operating in 
Greater Yellowstone. The data is limited to the 175 of 183 nonprofits for which founding data 
was available.  
 
1.4 Conclusion and overview 
 
Environmental nonprofits, ranging from the Sierra Club to the Rocky Mountain Elk 
Foundation, are uniquely suited to help our society achieve environmental outcomes in the public 
interest. These organizations do more than ‘speak for the trees.’ They represent the views of an 
important segment of the American public who believe that environmental protection and 
conservation is a necessity for our country. The fundamental premise of this manuscript is that 
(environmental) nonprofit organizations can do better at achieving their organizational goals. We 
can expect more, and deserve more, from these organizations.  
Chapter two presents an overview of the methodologies used for this analysis. I utilize 
the policy sciences framework as the primary research framework for my analysis. However, the 
use of these tools will not be evident beyond chapter two of this analysis to individuals 
unfamiliar with this style of research. In 1971, Harold Lasswell (82) suggested that “the policy 
scientist who desires an opportunity to serve a client must find ways of affecting the client's 
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cognitive map.” This means communicating research findings in language familiar to the 
intended audience. In the case of this dissertation, intended audience is nonprofit professionals 
and academics. As a whole, these communities do not have familiarity with the specialized 
jargon shared by policy scientists. Chapter two outlines my approach for those unfamiliar. 
Chapter three asks the question: does a problem exist for Greater Yellowstone’s 
conservation nonprofit organizations? The chapter explores various methodologies for evaluating 
nonprofits performance and concludes that measuring progress towards formal organizational 
goals (e.g. mission statements) is the most appropriate basis to understand the effectiveness of 
both individual organizations and the conservation nonprofit community in Greater Yellowstone. 
In this chapter, I survey the goals of Greater Yellowstone’s conservation nonprofits and evaluate 
progress towards four examples. The chapter concludes that progress towards formal 
organizational goals is mixed leaving room for better organizational performance. 
Chapter four explores conventional explanations for why nonprofits fail to achieve their 
organizational objectives. I identify four major factors that I call ‘the holy trinity (plus one) of 
environmental nonprofit failure:’ Lack of resources, lack of political will, a robust opposition, 
and poor management. I argue that these conditioning factors only partially explain the inability 
of Greater Yellowstone’s conservation nonprofits to meet formal organizational objectives. I 
conclude that the disproportionate focus on these four factors by nonprofit staff, funders and 
academics artificially restricts interventions to improve performance and that effective nonprofits 
must consider a range of other explanations. 
Chapters five and six highlight alternative explanations for nonprofits failure. Chapter 
five considers inter-organizational dynamics prevalent in Greater Yellowstone that hinders the 
realization nonprofit goals. Three broad challenges are identified: the homogenization of 
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organizational strategies, parasitic organizations, and communities of meaning. Chapter six 
narrows the unit of analysis to focus on specific challenges in organizational decision making. 
Three additional challenges are identified: identity augmentation, problem blind strategies, and 
foundation drag. The purpose of these two chapters is not to highlight every problem that a 
nonprofit might face or fully replace conventional explanations. Rather, these chapters serve to 
argue conventional wisdom is not sufficient to improve nonprofit performance.   
Chapter seven explores six solutions environmental nonprofits might utilize to leverage 
greater effectiveness. The first three alternatives explored are the most popular ideas advanced 
within the Greater Yellowstone nonprofit community. These solutions are improving efficiency, 
mergers and acquisitions, and collaboration. While useful in improving performance, these 
strategies do not effectively address the alternative explanations for nonprofit failure highlighted 
in chapters five and six.  To supplement these strategies, three additional alternatives are 
suggested for environmental nonprofits. These are encouraging innovation, community based 
initiatives, and goal modification.  
Chapter eight concludes that the primary reason for environmental nonprofit failure is the 
narrow perspectives of nonprofit managers and funders. In this chapter, I review implications of 
the Greater Yellowstone experience in the context of the critical lovers’ assessments of 
American Environmentalism. In addition, I discuss the implications of my finding for nonprofits 
more broadly. I provide several key implications of this study for the future of the environmental 
movement.  
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Chapter 2: Methods 
 
I selected the policy sciences framework to guide my inquiry. This well-established 
approach to policy analysis—also referred to as the New Haven School of Jurisprudence and 
Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence—is based in functional anthropology and John Dewey’s 
philosophy of Pragmatism (Lasswell 1971; Lasswell & Kaplan 1963; Lasswell & McDougal 
1992; Clark 2002). It was developed as a means to help understand and resolve public policy 
problems in response to reductionist methodologies that often ignored critical aspects of the 
policy process (Parsons 1995; Ascher 1986). Previous approaches to policy analysis tended 
towards developing specialized methods or fully generalizable theory versus the policy sciences 
embracement of all methods and knowledge that will help solve a particular problem (Brunner 
1985; 1991; 1997; Schneider and Ingram 1997).  There are several reasons for selecting this 
framework. First, it is contextual, multi-method, and problem-oriented (Lasswell 1971). This 
approach allows me to draw from different disciplines to gain an understanding how of 
participants with differing perspectives interact to make decisions in their individual and 
common interests. Second, this framework has been successfully applied to natural resource 
issues in Greater Yellowstone (e.g. Clark 1997; Clark 2008) and beyond (e.g. Brunner et al 2002; 
2005; Clark 1992). Third, the framework is conducive to investigating high order decision 
making where inductive reasoning must be applied versus positivistic methodology focused on 
reductionism.    
The three central tenants of the policy sciences are being problem oriented, contextual, 
and multi-method. Problem orientation refers to the underlying philosophy that the appropriate 
guiding force behind any knowledge based-inquiry should be the resolution of a problem. The 
policy sciences defined a problem is defined as a discrepancy between current or projected trends 
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and a desired outcome. Contextuality refers to the principle that every situation is unique and the 
fully generalizable theory likely does not exist. Multi-method refers to the need to utilize on 
multiple mid-level theories and methods to help ones understanding and resolution of a policy 
problem. The policy sciences recognize that most policy problems are not amenable to single 
disciplinary problem solving approaches. Wildavasky (1979: 15) argues that the content of any 
policy analysis “cannot be determined by disciplinary boundaries but by whatever appears 
appropriate to the circumstances of the time and nature of [a] problem.” He calls policy analysis 
and "art" with no set formula for success. The policy sciences framework seeks to remain 
versatile in the use of conceptual tools to allow the analysis a maximum amount of creativity in 
trying to solve a policy problem. (Lasswell 1971). If an analyst relies on a single methodology to 
resolve a problem in an open system, the result will likely be failure (Holland 1992; Clark 2002). 
In trying to learn how environmental nonprofits can do better, it is advantageous to explore the 
problem in a variety of different ways.     
Beyond the multi-method justification, the policy sciences framework has been 
successfully applied to a range of natural resources cases to elicit greater of how to improve 
policy. (E.g. Brewer 1995; Brewer and Clark 1994; Brunner 1991; Brunner and Lark 1996; Clark 
1992; 1997; Healy and Ascher; Primm and Clark 1996; McDougal and Schneider 1975). For 
example, Rich Wallace (2003; Wallace and Semmens 2010) utilized the policy sciences to learn 
how the U.S. Marine Mammal Commission can improve its effectiveness. Jason Vogel (2004; 
2005; 2006) elicited greater understanding on why it is so difficult to effectively regulate 
endocrine disrupting chemicals under U.S. law. Roger Pielke Jr. (2010) demonstrated how 
conventional understandings of climate change is unlikely to solve the problems society faces. 
Bill Ascher (1999) suggested that conventional explanations for government failures in 
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developing counties (wealth, ignorance, and greed) neglects to account for the destruction of 
natural resources in many countries. Garry Brewer and James Kakalik (1979) argued that the 
majority of federal spending on programs for handicapped children neglected strategies with the 
highest social payoffs. In addition to these examples, the policy sciences have been successfully 
applied to many cases in Greater Yellowstone. Susan Clark (1997) highlighted why science is 
often manipulated by government bureaucracies. Murray Rutherford (2003) described how the 
Bridger Teton National Forest symbolically incorporated the ecosystem management paradigm 
without substantively changing their practices. Christina Cromley (2000) illustrated why the 
killing of a single grizzly bear (209) sparked massive outrage. David Cherney (In press; Cherney 
and Clark 2009) explained why the conservation of a pronghorn antelope migration with broad 
public support erupted in controversy. This study continues the work of such analysts.  
Consistent with the principle of contextuality, the policy sciences is conductive to 
investigate high order decision making where inductive reasoning must be applied versus 
positivistic methodology focused on reductionism. The policy sciences framework distinguishes 
between two forms of decision makings: ordinary and constitutive (Cherney et al 2009; Clark 
2008; McDougal et al 1981). Ordinary decision making refers to day-to-day decisions. In 
contrast, constitutive decisions are higher-order and govern the dynamics of ordinary decisions. 
The constitutive process is decision making about how to make decisions. In other words, 
constitutive decision process sets the rules for the game. When problem solving it is usually 
more expedient to engage in ordinary decision making to elicit policy change, as constitutive 
change is more difficult in general. However, there are times when decision making is 
constrained by constitutive rules or there is a systemic problem in an open system. In such 
circumstances, changes to constitutive dynamics must occur. This manuscript argues that 
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nonprofit failure is systemic in the Greater Yellowstone system. As such, we must focus on these 
higher order tasks. The policy sciences framework provides a way to think about such dynamics.   
Despite these advantages, numerous policy scholars have criticized the policy sciences 
(E.g. Crick 1959; Davies 1973; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1993; Little 1974; Marvick 1980; 
Merelman 1981; Morgenthau 1952; Sabatier 1999; Horowitz 1962; Ross 1991; Rustow 1966; 
Falk 1995; 1995; Farr et al 2006). After reviewing all major critiques, Matt Auer (2007) 
classifies arguments into five factors he calls the linearity critiques, public expectations and the 
policy cycle, decision process as top-down and legalistic, the insufficient comprehensives of the 
decision process, and the decision process and causal theory. For example, Jenkins-Smith and 
Sabatier (1993) argue that the decision process framework implies linearity in the policy process, 
when the real world rarely operates this way. Falk (1995) claims that the policy sciences seeks 
elevate science as a means to discover unconditional truth in the policy process, despite his 
contention that the complexities of policy making construct significant barriers for how science 
can improve policy making. Similarly, Rustow (1966) argues that the policy sciences seek to find 
quantitative methodologies to predict a future on which action can be based. Such models are 
ultimately doomed to fail (Ascher 1978; Sarewitz et al 2000; Pilkey and Pilkey-Jarvis 2007). 
Others have criticized the writing (Marvick 1980) and conceptual (Davies 1973) style of 
Lasswell. Farr, Hacker and Kazee (2006) claim the works of Lasswell are rife with 
contradictions. However, Matt Auer’s (2007) analysis concludes that all major critics of the 
policy sciences stem from either a partial understanding or misinterpretation of policy sciences 
literature and thought. Ron Brunner (2008: 4) argues that such critics select “from Lasswell’s 
rich biography and voluminous published works pieces relevant to their own specialized purpose 
and perspectives. In doing so, they overlooked or misconstrued the main points of Lasswell’s 
25 
 
interdisciplinary career which spanned more than 50 years and produced approximately 50 
books, 1,000 published articles, and countless consultations on problems in public affairs with 
private citizens and public officials.”  For example, the policy sciences framework does not seek 
to develop universal theory as Falk suggests. Nor does the policy sciences seek to predict the 
future as Rustow claims. Jenkin-Smith and Sabatier’s critique of the decision process framework 
stem from a misunderstanding the framework as a theory.  
 I collected data through four primary methods. I reviewed scientific articles, management 
plans, environmental impact statements, local and national periodicals, technical reports, 
websites, organizational promotional material, and other sources regarding nonprofits in Greater 
Yellowstone. This included more than 400 scientific articles and reviewing over 300 newsletters 
from Greater Yellowstone nonprofits. Second, I conducted 77 semi-structured interviews with a 
diverse group of participants, including, but not limited to, individuals from the energy industry, 
environmental community, local and state governments, private landowners, ranching 
community, National Park Service, and US Forest Service. I engaged in over 200 informal 
conservations with staff and members of environmental nonprofits. Due to the sensitive nature of 
some of the topics discussed in my interviews and discussions, I do not quote anyone by name. 
Organizational affiliations are only referred to when they will not identify the person involved. 
This is also a condition of my approval from the University of Colorado’s Institutional Review 
Board for this research. Names are only attributed to quotes when there is a previous public 
record. Third, I attended 28 public meetings and presentations by Greater Yellowstone 
nonprofits. Fourth, I utilized participant observation during two meetings I co-organized on the 
effectiveness of environmental nonprofits in Yellowstone (Table 2.1).  
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Category of Data Number 
Interviews 77 
Informal Conversations  200+ 
Nonprofits Represented in interviews 72 
Agencies Represented in interviews 12 
Public Meetings Attended 28 
Websites Reviewed 151 
Nonprofit Newsletters 300+ 
Scientific Articles 400+ 
Organized Workshops 2 
 
Table 2.1. Summary of data sources 
 
One of the major challenges with utilizing the policy sciences framework is 
communicating findings to a conventional audience. As Lasswell (1971) articulated, the astute 
policy scientist will utilize the framework in ways invisible to those unfamiliar with the 
specialized jargon of the field. This chapter serves to outline how the methodology was used in 
this analysis from a broad scale perspective. Finer scale methodological descriptions are 
integrated in the text.  
2.1 Overall structure 
 
This dissertation is structured around problem orientation. Problem orientation is both a 
philosophical outlook that practical problems should be the primary focus of any academic 
inquiry and a way to be procedurally rational when deconstructing a problem definition. At its 
most basic level, problem orientation guides us through understanding if there is a discrepancy 
between projected trends and a desired outcome. The five intellectual tasks of problem 
orientation are goals, trends, conditioning factors, projections and alternatives. The chapters 
follow the basic structure of problem orientation: 
• Chapter 1: General Overview: Initial characterization of the problem. 
• Chapter 2: Methods. 
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• Chapter 3: Goals/Trends/Projections: Does a problem exist? 
• Chapter 4: Conditioning Factors: Conventional explanations.  
• Chapter 5: Conditioning Factors: Constitutive social process analysis. 
• Chapter 6: Conditioning Factors: Selective decision process analysis. 
• Chapter 7: Alternatives. 
• Chapter 8: Conclusion and Implications.  
2.2 Problem definition (chapter 3)  
 
Chapter three assesses the effectiveness of conservation nonprofits in Greater 
Yellowstone. The purpose of chapter three is to make the case that there is room for 
environmental nonprofits to improve their effectiveness at meeting organizational goals. This 
chapter does not focus on conditioning factors. Rather, it compares organizational goals against 
relevant (projected) trends. This chapter is also not trying to generalize what proportion of goals 
is being met by conservation nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone. Such analysis is unnecessary for 
the pragmatic pursue of determining if further analysis is warranted in this case.  
The first major section of the chapter is a literature review on appraising the effectiveness 
of organizations. I highlight the five major methodologies for apprising nonprofit effectiveness: 
the goals, system resource, internal process, participant satisfaction, and program evaluation 
models. After surveying the literature, I come to the conclusion that the goals model of appraisal 
is the most appropriate for the purpose of this analysis. The second part of this chapter focuses 
on identifying and summarizing the formal goal statements made by Yellowstone’s conservation 
nonprofits. Data for this analysis is drawn from the Greater Yellowstone Conservation Directory, 
organizational websites and promotional material in the form of mission and vision statements. 
The primary methodology used to analyze goals statements was a content analysis. I used word 
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counting software to perform a basic analysis of counting the number of times each word was 
referenced by a mission statement. After the electronic analysis, I reviewed each statement for 
duplicates. To create a visual representation of the data I utilized the website 
http://www.worditout.com. The third section of the chapter selects four goals for appraisal as a 
means to judge the effectiveness of conservation nonprofits in Yellowstone. To conduct this 
analysis I modified mission and vision statements to remove any reference to specific 
organizations, divided the statements into simpler chunks when the missions/vision statements 
contained multiple goals, and slightly edited for readability when the previous changes created 
awkward phrasing. I then used excel to randomly select four goal statements for appraisal.  
I used the goals model for appraisal to judge success. In its simplest form, this model 
judges relevant trends against the goals an organization claims to be seeking. It is very similar to 
problem orientation in the policy sciences. All four goal statements lacked specificity to create 
single quantitative criteria. As a result, I selected multiple criteria for each goal to judge success 
or failure. These criteria were determined by interviewing nonprofit staff members and surveying 
the literature over possible metrics. The analysis of the first goal uses trends in environmental 
litigation, publications referencing conflict, and perceptions of conflict and cooperation by 
informed practitioners as a means to judge if all people in the region are working together to 
secure conservation outcomes. The analysis of the second goal uses trends in grizzly bear 
numbers and projected threats to those trends as a means for judging the long-term viability of 
grizzly bears in the region. The analysis of the third goal uses trends in the relevance of science 
to decision making and of the manipulation of science to judge how well conservation science is 
contributing to improve conservation decision making. The analysis of the fourth goal uses 
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trends in carnivore-livestock conflicts, carnivore-human conflicts, and social tolerance as a 
means to judge wildlife co-exists in the region.  
Success is defined as an organization’s ability to meet or make progress towards its 
formally defined goals. Such evaluation does not require that the organization has already met its 
desired outcome. Rather, this criterion conservatively defines success as making progress 
towards formal goals. Using such criteria creates three potential evaluative outcomes. First is 
unqualified success. In such a case, all indicators demonstrate progress towards formal goals (or 
that the goals have been met). Second is mixed results. This indicates nonprofits can still likely 
improve upon the current outcome. The final outcome is failure. In this case, trends indicate that 
trends are unaltered or, in the worst case scenario, moving in the wrong direction.  
2.3 Conventional explanations (chapter 4) 
 
Chapter four reviews conventional explanations for why nonprofits fail to meet their 
goals. There are two primary purposes to engage in this analysis. First is to survey Greater 
Yellowstone experts for why they believe conservation nonprofits often have trouble meeting 
their formally defined goals. This provides insight into the conventional wisdom in the region for 
improving nonprofit performance. This allows us to understand what nonprofit practitioners are 
currently trying to do to improve performance. Second—and more importantly— this survey of 
conventional wisdom creates as a baseline for further analysis. If these explanations are 
sufficient to understand failure, perhaps the nonprofits community is doing the best possible to 
improve performance. If conventional wisdom is insufficient, we can identify new ways of 
improving performance. 
Data was collected through interviews and a literature review of nonprofit management. I 
explore two types of cases. First, I asked every interviewee why specific formal goals of their 
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organization were not being met. Second, I reviewed six ordinary case studies (bison, elk, grizzly 
bear, pronghorn migration, snowmobile, and wolf management) and asked the same questions to 
individuals involved in those cases. I categorized different arguments for failure and counted the 
relative frequency of the arguments in my interviews. While a wide range of factors were cited, 
four explanatory factors dominated my interviews. I labeled these the holy trinity (plus one). The 
holy trinity were the dominate factors by nonprofit staff and plus one was the main explanatory 
factor by boards and donors.  In this chapter, I briefly outline each factor and then conduct a 
surface level analysis to determine the robustness of each explanation. I did this by outlining the 
claim each explanatory factor made and then reviewed a wide range of evidence to ask, does this 
explanation hold up in all cases? The general assessment is that all four factors have relatively 
weak explanatory power. This finding opened up the door to a broader analysis.  
One of the major values of the policy sciences’ logically comprehensive framework is the 
ability of a policy analyst to ask the question ‘what might have I missed?’ In the context of 
chapter four, I am asking the question: what are the Greater Yellowstone and nonprofit 
management communities missing from their self-assessments? I classified the holy trinity (plus 
one) in a variety of different ways using the policy sciences social and decision process 
frameworks (outlined in the next section of this chapter). I did this by creating a series of tables 
trying to deconstruct where the arguments fit in the policy sciences framework to see if the 
factors clustered around certain topics or were missing potentially key ideas. The most useful 
category proved to be the values category in the social process framework. Virtually all 
conventional conditioning factors primarily focus on the wealth and power categories (and skill 
to a lesser extent), which misses 75% of the other values at play in every social situation. 
Affection, respect, rectitude, enlightenment and well-being are major values at play in any policy 
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setting, yet the holy trinity (plus) ignore these factors. In chapters five and six, I conduct a more 
in depth social and decision process analysis with particular attention to the other six values 
ignored in the holy trinity (plus one). 
2.4 Alternative conditioning factors 
 
The analysis presented in chapters five and six attempts to identify major conditioning 
factors for conservation nonprofit failure that are overlooked by both nonprofit practitioners and 
academics. Chapter four provided the empirical basis identifying potential gaps in conventional 
conditioning factor arguments. Once I had identified the major conditioning factors identified in 
the literature and by my interview subjects, I contextually mapped these factors using the policy 
sciences’ decision and social process frameworks. These served as my baseline explanations for 
failure. Using the same cases and data in chapter four, I used a case study approach to identify 
alternative conditioning factors. I demonstrate how the alternative conditioning factors have 
more explanatory power than the conventional explanations by comparing them in specific cases.  
It is worth briefly outlining the policy sciences decision and social process frameworks. 
The decision process framework is a cognitive tool that allows the analyst to organize 
information about decisions and focus attention to the potentially relevant aspects. It is not a 
prescriptive model of the decision process, rather a functional guide to the types of tasks carried 
out in decision making. The seven functions are: 
Intelligence is the “gathering, processing, and dissemination of information for the use of 
all who participate in the decision process” (Lasswell 1971: 28-29). This function 
governs the use of information in decision making.  
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Promotion is "recommending and mobilizing support for policy alternatives (Clark 2002: 
61). This function accounts for ‘politics’ in decision making.    
 
Prescription is “the stabilization of expectations concerning the norms to be severely 
sanctioned if challenged in various contingencies.” (Lasswell 1971: 29). This function 
most easily understood as rulemaking.  
 
Invocation is the “provisional characterization of a concrete situation in terms of an 
alleged prescription” (Lasswell and McDougal 1992: 359). This function is often referred 
to as policing.  
 
Application is the “final characterization of concrete circumstances in terms of 
prescriptions” (Lasswell 1971: 29). This function refers to judging.  
 
Appraisal is “the assessment of the success and failure of policy” (Lasswell 1956: 2). In 
other words, this is the evaluation function.  
 
Termination is the “ending of prescriptions and of arrangements entered into within their 
framework” (Lasswell 1956: 2). This function can be thought of as the transition from 
one rule to the next.   
 
The generalized social process framework is structured around the concept that participants 
(people) with differing perspectives seek to maximize values (gratifying outcomes) by utilizing 
institutions to affect resources (Lasswell 1971: 18). The seven functional categories are:  
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Participants refer to individuals and groups (both official and unofficial) relevant to any 
decision making process (Lasswell 1971: 19). 
 
Perspectives are the identities, expectations and demands of participants. This category 
includes political myth, which is “the stable patterns of personal as well as group 
perspectives” (Lasswell and McDougal 1992: 353). 
 
Situations are arenas of interaction between two or more participants. Situations (arenas) 
“can be understood as centralized or decentralized, continuous or short-lived, focusing on 
specialized topics or general interests, organized or unorganized, and open or closed to 
broad participation” (Cherney et al 2009: 696). 
 
Strategies refer to “the management of base values to affect valued outcomes” (Lasswell 
1971: 26). Strategies are persuasive or coercive (engaged in value indulgence or 
deprivation). 
 
Values are factors “sought as an end or employed as a means” (Lasswell and McDougal 
1992: 340). Scope values are those sought; base values are those available to the 
participant. The policy sciences recommend utilizing eight values: power, enlightenment, 
wealth, well-being, skill, affection, respect and rectitude. 
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Outcomes refer to the immediate value indulges and deprivations obtained though the 
seven decision process functions (Lasswell 1971: 19). 
 
Effects are the long-term outcomes of a particular decision process. For example, an 
environmental nonprofit may win a lawsuit relisting wolves under the Endangered 
Species Act (outcome). However, the resulting effect may be the institutionalization of 
ill-will and distrust of the opposition. (Lasswell 1971: 19). 
 
While a slight oversimplification, chapter five explores generalized social process challenges and 
chapter six focuses on organizational decision making. 
To make the inferences in chapter five, I narrowed my inquiry by using the situations 
category of the social process to look at cases where multiple groups were interacting in pursuit 
of similar (or directly conflicting) goals. To make my inferences, I reviewed six different cases 
where multiple groups were interacting. These included including bison, elk, grizzly bear, 
pronghorn migration, snowmobile, and wolf management. In each case, I determined that 
conventional explanations were not strong enough to leverage greater performance. I distilled the 
alternative conditioning factors I identified in to three explanatory factors. The resulting three 
conditioning factors are not all inclusive. However, they appeared to be the most significant 
under-attended factors that the community face. To make the inferences in chapter six, I used 
two different methods. I reviewed specific challenges that the Buffalo Field Campaign, Greater 
Yellowstone Coalition, Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance, Natural Resources Defense 
Council, and The Nature Conservancy faced in 11 different campaigns. Second, I supplemented 
these analyses through interviews that represented 24 other environmental nonprofits. I then 
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selected what appeared to be the three most influential conditioning factors that are under-
attended to by conservation nonprofits.  
The purpose of identifying these six conditioning factors is not to highlight every 
possible explanatory factor for nonprofit failure. In contrast, I use these six factors as a means to 
show that the holy trinity (plus one) are insufficient to explain nonprofit failure. Using the 
perspectives category of the social process, I made determination that the fundamental 
conditioning factor for nonprofit failure relates to formulae. The perspectives category can be 
broken down into identity, expectations and demands (Clark 2002). Identity is the fundamental 
characteristics that define who a person’s perspective. Expectations are what an individual 
believes is likely to happen in the future. Demands relate to value indulgences and deprivations; 
it is what a person wants. The identity is fundamentally shaped by political myth, which gives 
meaning to a person’s life. Political myth includes the general philosophy an individual believes 
in, the formulae to achieve success, and the folklore they believe. The holy trinity (plus one) is 
suggestive that the formulae of those involved with environmental nonprofits are lacking to meet 
their personal and organizational goals.  
Again, the purpose of this dissertation is to expand the options that conservation 
nonprofits have in trying to meet their organizational objectives; the purpose is to expand the 
range of possible choices that nonprofit leaders have at their disposal. In terms of the policy 
sciences, this dissertation seeks to shed light on critical factors that are under-attended in thought 
and action by nonprofit scholars. 
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Chapter 3: Mission Failure: Is there room for improvement? 
 
During the winter of 1996-1997, the Montana Department of Livestock slaughtered 1,084 
bison that migrated outside of Yellowstone National Park in search of winter forage. The scale of 
this management removal was unprecedented the memory of contemporaneous environmental 
activists. Paul Pritchard, former president of the National Parks and Conservation Association, 
said at the time, “We fear…we could be witnessing the beginning of the end of the bison herd in 
portions of the park's interior" (Wilkinson 1997, p.3). The average number of bison slaughtered 
during the previous ten years was 186 per year.  The drastic reduction of the Yellowstone bison 
herd prompted activist Michael Mease to found the Buffalo Field Campaign—an environmental 
nonprofit with an explicit mission “to stop the slaughter of Yellowstone’s wild buffalo” (NRCC 
& CI 2007) After returning to the historic average for the subsequent seven years, 2,699 bison 
were slaughtered in the winters of 2005-2006 and 2007-2008 combined (BFC 2008).  
 The failure of the Buffalo Field Campaign to realize their self-defined purpose is not 
unique among environmental nonprofits in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. In 1987, the 
Defenders of Wildlife created the Wolf Compensation Trust to reduce political opposition to 
wolf recovery by compensating ranchers for livestock lost to wolf depredation. From August 
1987 to June 2008, the fund distributed $1,100,122 to 776 ranchers (DW 2008). In a study of 
political conflict in greater Yellowstone, Mark MacBeth and Elizabeth Shanahan (2004) found 
that the economic compensation program has not “reduced the intensity of the conflict over wolf 
reintroduction.” In 2005, the Greater Yellowstone Coalition began a campaign to eliminate 
Wyoming’s winter feeding of elk. After a three year effort led the Coalition, the US Forest 
Service reauthorized Wyoming’s winter feeding of elk for the next 20 years (Hatch 2008b). 
Since 1998, The Wilderness Society has attempted to force Yellowstone National Park to phase 
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out recreational snowmobiling. In 2008, after a more than 10-year campaign, Yellowstone 
National Park made a decision to allow approximately double the number of snowmobiles 
permitted in 2003 (Brown 2008). 
 The preceding examples are mere snapshots of bison, wolf, elk and snowmobile 
controversies in Greater Yellowstone. Each case is ongoing and much more complex than simply 
chalking up wins or loses to a particular interest group. There are many notable examples of 
conservation nonprofits success in Greater Yellowstone as well. For example, The Nature 
Conservancy  and partner organizations  increased the protection of private land in the 
Centennial Valley in western Montana from 1,800 acres in 1998 to 55,000 acres in 2010; a 30-
fold increase. In 1996, the Greater Yellowstone Coalition helped prevent the development of the 
New World Mine that threatened to pollute Yellowstone’s waterways (Gedicks 2001; Hofrichter 
2000). In 2009, a coalition of over 11 environmental nonprofits helped push forth the Wyoming 
Range Legacy Act, which protected 1.2 million acres from mineral development (Gearino 2009). 
 The conservationists I interviewed believe that such victories highlight the success of 
environmental organizations. These same conservationists argue that failures highlighted above 
are taken out of context and are far from the norm. Is this really the case? This chapter suggests 
otherwise. I argue that despite notable success stories, environmental nonprofits in Greater 
Yellowstone are still far from meeting their self-defined purposes, and the failure to meet their 
organizations’ purposes means one thing: there is room for improvement in the effectiveness of 
conservation nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone. This chapter sets out to accomplish three tasks.  
First, I explore the challenges in evaluating nonprofit performance. Second, I provide an 
overview of what Greater Yellowstone environmental nonprofits claim to seek. Third, I evaluate 
performance towards these goals as an indicator of whether Greater Yellowstone’s 
38 
 
environmental nonprofits face a collective problem. The central question is: in the aggregate are 
these organizations performing as well as they can?  
3.1 How to evaluate nonprofits 
 
Evaluating how nonprofits perform is a troubling endeavor. The academic literature on 
nonprofit appraisals is complex and contentious. There is little agreement on how to classify the 
different approaches to evaluation, let alone obtain consensus on even the simplest criteria 
(Cameron 1980; Herman and Renz 1994, 2004; Quinn and Rohrbaugh 1981, 1983; Scott 1977; 
Seashore 1979 Sowa et al 2004). Climbing down from the ivory tower, we might look for 
guidance from foundations and philanthropic advisors who wrestle with this question on a daily 
basis. The answer in the philanthropic sector is equally contested. No two foundations or 
advisors seem to judge nonprofits in the same way. Often, these professionals are highly critical 
of the methodologies used by their peers. Fortunately, the lack of consensus on evaluation does 
not cripple us from trying to improve the performance of nonprofits. This section reviews 
different ideas on nonprofit evaluation and justifies the methods used in this analysis.  
The first major development in the evaluations of nonprofits is referred to as the goals 
model (Herman and Renz 1998; 1999). This methodology asserts that to evaluate a nonprofit’s 
effectiveness we must judge the organization against how well it achieves its goals. The goals 
model is equally prevalent in the for-profit and governmental sectors. For example, we might 
assume that a for-profit organization seeks to maximize shareholder wealth. This is often the 
assumption made by individuals trained in business schools across the United States. Evaluation 
often takes the form of asking, is a corporation maximizing their return on investment? Using a 
single quantitative metric to measure effectiveness makes judging relatively simple. It also 
makes inter-organizational comparisons easy. If we compare two businesses, the company that 
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has a higher return on investment is generally considered to be more effective than the 
organization with lower returns. 
In practice, the goals model of organizational effectiveness is not so straightforward, even 
for corporations. In Built to Last, Jim Collins and Jerry Porras survey 18 visionary (highly 
effective) for-profit organizations to determine what factors distinguish them a control group of 
18 corporations that the authors consider merely effective. Collins and Porras argue that return 
on investment and other similar measures of profit maximization are useful metrics to measure 
organizational effectiveness. However, these metrics are insufficient to capture what makes the 
most effective for-profit organizations more effective than others. In fact, Collins and Porras 
(2004: 55) state: 
We did not find “maximizing shareholder wealth” or “profit maximization” as the 
dominant driving force or primary objective through the history of most of the visionary 
companies. They tended to pursue a cluster of objectives, of which making money is only 
one—and not necessarily the primary one. [emphasis in original] 
 
In short, there is rarely a simple, single goal for which we can evaluate progress. The trouble 
with the goals model is further compounded when we look at nonprofits. It is widely recognized 
that nonprofits also seek a wide range of goals. However, it is rarely clear what goals are the 
most appropriate to measure. The most obvious place to look is a nonprofit’s mission statement, 
but such statements are often a murky entanglement of goals, strategies, values, symbols, 
identifications and demands. Without a clear statement of goals, it is difficult to develop 
indicators that measure progress towards organizational effectiveness.   
The systems resource model of evaluation (Pfeffer 1973; Provan 1980; Yuchtman and 
Seashore 1967) is an attempt to sidestep the goals model by proposing that organizational 
effectiveness should be measured by an organization’s ability “to exploit its environment to 
acquire scarce resources” (Herman and Renz 2004: 695). For a nonprofit, this means that 
40 
 
effectiveness takes the form of acquiring more funding than peer organizations or recruiting 
more highly desirable candidates for staff. Indeed, environmental nonprofits use this model for 
justification of their effectiveness—even in the scientific literature. For example, a paper in the 
journal Science (authored by Conservation International scientists) argued for the effectiveness 
of their conservation prioritization tool “hot spots,” in part, by demonstrating that the concept of 
“hot spots alone have mobilized at least $750 million of funding for conservation” (Brooks et al 
2006: 60). 
 Conservation nonprofits need financial resources to run effectively. But, it is easy to see 
the limitations measuring effectiveness this way. Continuing the previous example, it is not hard 
to imagine that a donor of Conservation International is more interested in whether the concept 
of hot spots actually improves conservation biodiversity in practice versus being impressed with 
how effectively the concept fundraises. In other words, the acquisition of capital “may be the 
most important criterion of effectiveness for chief executives or board members (though they 
would never say so)…it seems unlikely to be important to other stakeholders” (Herman and Renz 
2004: 695).  
The internal process model of evaluation focuses on how well the decision processes 
within an organization operate (Herman and Renz 2006; 2008). The idea being that a nonprofit 
cannot effectively operate without efficient communication, human resource management, 
healthy power dynamics, information management, and other similar variables. Proponents of 
this style of evaluation tend to focus on getting the right management practices in place and the 
striving for compliance within the organization. For example, many small nonprofits lack the 
requisite skills, such as accounting, to efficiently run their corporation. Proponents of the internal 
process model would focus on outsourcing or developing such skills within the organization. 
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There is a significant allure to trying to find the right management practices for 
nonprofits. Indeed, there is a vast popular literature on experts claiming to know the best 
management practices for nonprofits (and organizations in general), but there is signification 
reason for caution in this approach. While good management practices are necessary for an 
organization to be effective, there is a growing body of literature suggesting that best 
management practices are not universal (Herman and Renz 2008). Rather, the most effective 
management practices are contextual depending on the organization’s needs. This finding should 
not be terribly surprising. The internal management processes for an enforcement-based 
environmental nonprofit (e.g. Natural Resources Defense Council) are likely to be different than 
a local land trust (e.g. Jackson Hole Land Trust). In other words, how an organization manages 
its staff and resources to most effectively prevail in a lawsuit (enforcement based) is different 
than how an organization manages for purchasing land and conservation easements (land trust).  
The participant satisfaction model recognizes that nonprofits serve a range of different 
constituencies, often with highly variable goals. For example, a soup kitchen serves both the 
needs of the homeless (e.g. providing food to the hungry) and the donors who choose to endow 
the soup kitchen with operating funds (e.g. a sense of self-virtue). This model of nonprofit 
effectiveness defines organizational effectiveness in terms of an organization’s ability to satisfy 
the needs (goals) of all relevant constituencies (Boschken 1994; D’Aunno 1992; Kaplan 2001; 
Kanter and Brinerhoff 1981; Zsammuto 1984). In other words, this methodology is an expanded 
version of the goals model of effectiveness. Rather than just focusing on the formal goals of an 
organization, this form of evaluation suggests that we identify all relevant stakeholders and 
identify how well the organization is serving their needs.  
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The participant satisfaction model is often favored by academic evaluators due to its 
comprehensive nature of including all relevant stakeholders—including the stakeholders’ 
formally stated and informally unstated goals. This model recognizes that quite often the formal 
goals of an organization are really symbolic in nature and that the driving force behind an 
organization is to meet unarticulated goals of certain key stakeholders. There are two primary 
challenges with this model. First, trying to identify all goals from every relevant actor can be 
overwhelming. While being comprehensive is one goal for evaluations, timeliness is another 
criterion that we must consider (Lasswell 1971). Second, being fully comprehensive introduces 
the concepts of goal legitimacy and goal hierarchy. In other words, all goals of stakeholders are 
not equally legitimate or important. Reverting back to the soup kitchen example, should an 
evaluator consider the formally stated goals of an organization (e.g. providing food to the 
hungry) equally legitimate to informal goals of a donors (e.g. creating a sense of self-virtue)? 
The answer is likely no. 
The most common means to evaluate nonprofits by foundations and government agencies 
slightly deviates from these models. Often evaluations are focused “program evaluation rather 
than more general organizational effectiveness” (Herman and Renz 2004:694). In other words, 
foundations tend to be less concerned with overall nonprofit performance and more interested in 
understand what the foundation’s donation produced. We can use land trusts as an example. 
Donors tend to be more interested in the number of acres their donation was able to secure 
through a conservation easement versus how effective the land trust is at meeting its 
organizational goals. 
With such diverse methods to evaluate nonprofits, how do we decide on which method to 
use (Table 3.1)? It should be evident that every method evaluation has its benefits and drawbacks 
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(Carlsson and Hedman 2007). Because of this reality, some scholars argue that there is no one 
size fits all model of organizational effectiveness (Sowa et al 2004). Rather, the challenge for 
appraising effectiveness and improving organizational practices is more about “finding the right 
fit” versus than “doing things the ‘right way’” (Herman and Renz 2004: 694). The best 
methodology for assessing effectiveness depends on the purposes of your evaluation. A 
development director—responsible for raising donations—might find the systems resource 
model to be the most relevant form of evaluation for their duties. In contrast, an executive 
director might use the internal process model to determine if resources are being allocated 
efficiently within the organization. A foundation might evaluate its grantees through the goals 
model, trying to learn if an organization met the responsibilities of a conditional grant.  
Nonprofit leaders inherently understand that there are multiple ways to evaluate their 
organization and tend view such appraisals as serving three primary three functions: as a drain on 
the organization’s resources, as an external promotional device, and as a strategic management 
tool (Carman and Fredericks 2008). It is worth revisiting the purposes of this analysis in light of 
our understanding on how to evaluate nonprofits. The purpose of this analysis is to aid in to 
encourage thoughtful reflection and strategic thinking on high-order factors hindering 
conservation nonprofits from meeting their goals. This analysis is not intended to develop a 
causal model of why certain nonprofits have failed to achieve their organizational mission, 
determine what makes one nonprofit ‘better’ than another, or develop a theory of the ‘perfect’ 
structure for a nonprofit or nonprofit community. Rather, this analysis is concerned with barriers 
to environmental nonprofits achieving their formally stated goals. This makes the goals model 
the most appropriate choice for this evaluation.   
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 Since this analysis uses the goals model, the next question we must ask is what goals? 
For the purposes of this study, I use each nonprofit’s self-defined mission statement as the 
primary basis for evaluation. In other words, a nonprofit’s mission is the organization’s bottom 
line. Effective organizations are ones that have met, or are on track to meet, the highest order 
formally articulated goals. The use of mission statements is justified due to nonprofit’s contract 
with the IRS. Pursuing the mission statement is the commitment an organization makes with the 
American people. In other words, “nonprofits should be accountable for how well they meet a 
need in society rather than how well they raise funds or control expenses” (Kaplan 2001: 369). 
Model Evaluation Criteria 
Goals Formal Organizational Goals 
System Resource Resources Acquired 
Internal Process  Management Function 
Participant Satisfaction Goals of All Stakeholders 
Program Evaluation Program Goals 
 
Table 3.1. Summary of Table of Nonprofit Evaluation Models 
 
Contrarians to my approach will correctly point out that nonprofits pursue a range of 
legitimate goals beyond their mission, just as Jim Collin’s argued that for-profit organizations. 
Unofficial goals are equally legitimate and necessary for a nonprofit to function properly. In fact, 
informal goals tell us the real story of what an individual or organization is actually interested in 
achieving through their actions.  We can think about fundraising as a simplistic example. Most 
nonprofits will set fundraising targets and actively pursue these goals for the good of the 
organization. However, the goal of fundraising will rarely be incorporated into the organization’s 
formal mission. I do not ignore these possibilities; rather, I view them as secondary goals in 
pursuit of the organization’s mission. My evaluation accounts for these secondary goals by 
looking at how they support or detract from an organization’s mission. The seemingly more 
damaging critique to my approach is that a nonprofit’s primary goal not be captured in their 
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organizational mission. However, we can quickly dispense with this critique as well. Nonprofit 
who seek hidden purposes in lieu of their formal goals are committing fraud on the American 
people.  
3.2 Yellowstone’s conservation nonprofit goals 
 
What are conservation nonprofits trying to accomplish in the Greater Yellowstone 
Ecosystem? Formal goal statements are usually presented through organizational mission 
statements and written promotional material. While mission statements change over time and are 
often symbolic in nature, they are the highest order goal that an organization publicizes. As 
argued in the previous section, formal goals are the social contract nonprofits have with their 
organization’s constituency and the broad public. We can start to understand what Greater 
Yellowstone’s conservation nonprofits community wants to accomplish by looking at both the 
breath (diversity) and intensity (concentration) of goals.  
 The formal goals articulated by Greater Yellowstone’s conservation nonprofit community 
are highly diverse (see Appendix 1). The Defenders of Wildlife’s mission, for example, is to be 
“a national, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to the protection of all native animals 
and plants in their natural communities.” While we might expect that all conservation nonprofits 
in Greater Yellowstone are concerned with species and ecosystem conservation, there are 
numerous nonprofits concerned with other aspects of conservation. The Yellowstone-Teton 
Clean Energy Coalition is a prime example. The Coalition’s mission is to “displace the use of 
petroleum in the Greater Yellowstone region's transportation sector.” While both organizations 
are interested in conservation, the goals they seek have little direct overlap. The Greater 
Yellowstone Conservation Directory (2007) provides a starting point to understand the breath of 
goal diversity. The directory asked all conservation nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone to self-
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report what types of issues their organization is focuses on. The results of this survey included 27 
different conservation sectors: agriculture, aquatics and fisheries, art and music, business and 
economics, fire, forestry, GIS and mapping, grazing, growth and development, history and 
heritage, hunting and fishing, land use planning, mining, oil and gas, outfitting, private lands, 
public lands, public policy, recreation, resource management, restoration, rivers and wetlands, 
spirituality, sustainability, transportation, wilderness, and wildlife. 
The mere diversity of formal goals does not tell the full story of what conservation 
nonprofits in Yellowstone want to accomplish. We also need to look at goal intensity. In other 
words, do the formal goals of nonprofits cluster around certain topics? This type of analysis can 
help us understand where the majority of conservation profits focus their attention and resources. 
The simplest way to do this is through a content analysis of mission statements using word 
frequency—simply counting the number of mission statements that mention a particular word. 
The results are striking. Of greater Yellowstone’s 183 conservation nonprofits, 97 nonprofits 
(53%) mention “wildlife” as a key term. The second most frequently referenced word is 
“conservation,” which is included in 53 mission statements (31%). The next most frequently 
cited terms are natural, mission, protect, and environmental (see Table 3.2; Figure 3.1).  
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Term 
 
Number of 
Mission 
Statements 
Percentage 
of Mission 
Statements 
Term 
 
Number of 
Mission 
Statements 
Percentage 
of Mission 
Statements 
Wildlife 94 51% Future 28 15% 
Conservation 57 31% Water  27 15% 
Natural 50 27% Promote 26 14% 
Mission 48 26% Communities 23 13% 
Protect  43 23% Generations 23 13% 
Environmental  35 19% Education 23 13% 
Habitat  32 17% Wyoming 22 12% 
Montana 30 16% Foundation 22 12% 
Wild 30 16% Management 21 11% 
People 29 16% Resources 21 11% 
Land  29 16% National  20 11% 
 
Table 3.2. The most frequent terms used in Greater Yellowstone environmental nonprofit 
mission statements. 
 
To understand the meaning of this content analysis, we need think carefully of how these 
words are used in context. “Wildlife” is a clear content-based term. This means that wildlife is 
primary subject of focus within these mission statements.  Consider the excerpts from the 
following mission statements: 
…working for wild bears and wildlife. 
…advocates the protection of Montana's wildlife and its habitats.  
…dedicated to protecting wildlife and wild places… 
…protecting the rich biodiversity and the public lands, streams, wildlife… 
… promote awareness and sensitivity to the conservation of wildlife… 
 
In contrast, the second most popular term “conservation” tends to modify the subject of a goal. It 
is important for us to note the term “conservation,” but does not let us know the subject of focus 
on the nonprofit. Consider the excerpts from the following mission statements: 
…ensure the conservation of mule deer, blacktail deer, and their habitats. 
…provide agricultural landowners with land conservation options… 
… provides leadership for the conservation of Wyoming's soil… 
…dedicated to the conservation of open space… 
… dedicated to the long-term conservation of the Yellowstone grizzly bear… 
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These five missions all focus on the conservation of different things (i.e. mule deer, land, soil, 
open space, and grizzly bears). If we look at content-based words in the goal statements, the 
second most referenced term is “habitat” with 32 mentions in unique mission’s statements. 
Wildlife is mentioned in three times as many missions as habitat. The results are even more 
dramatic when we consider that many missions focus on a single species versus all wildlife (e.g. 
…the long-term conservation of the Yellowstone grizzly bear…). If we add mission statements 
that focus on a single species to the “wildlife” count, we arrive at a total of 118 (65%) mission 
that mention wildlife in some form.  Following wildlife, habitat (17%), land (16%), and water 
(16%) are the next most cited content based terms. This is suggestive that the majority of 
organizations focus issues related to the first wave of environmental nonprofits—wildlife and 
land conservation. However, people (16%) and communities (13%) also appear to be significant 
concerns for the conservation community.  
 
Figure 3.1. Visual representation of most frequently cited words in organizational mission and 
vision statements.  
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It should be clear that while a diversity of goals are sought be the Greater Yellowstone 
conservation community, wildlife and land are the dominate issue focus. However, not all 
mission statements are pure goal statements. Often goals are conflated with strategies.  A 
Naturalist’s World provides a clear example. The organization’s mission statement reads, “A 
Naturalist’s World is dedicated to providing educational programs and materials about natural 
history and ecology.” Most individuals can infer what the goals of A Naturalist’s World might 
be; however, it is not directly clear from the mission statement. Why is A Naturalist’s World 
dedicated to providing educational programs and materials? Is it because the organization seeks 
an ecologically educated population? Is the organization interested in changing the way people 
view the natural world? Is the organization trying to promote a particular worldview, in place of 
one they deem insufficient? Is the organization trying to encourage students to become 
scientists? Conservationists? Environmentalists? There are a number of great reasons (goals) that 
providing natural history and ecological materials might help achieve. However, the strategies of 
providing educational materials and programs might not be the best—or the most effective—to 
achieve those desired goals. We can still evaluate such organizations by asking if they are 
implementing the strategies the claim to implement. The most common strategies mentioned in 
mission statements are education, advocacy, and litigation.   
3.3 Mission appraisal 
 
Do Greater Yellowstone’s nonprofits face a problem in achieving their self-defined 
purposes? If these organizations are on track to meet their objectives, further analysis of these 
organizations is not warranted. However, if these organizations are not meeting (or on track to 
meet) their organization’s formal goals then there is room to suggest improvement in how they 
operate. At this point, we are not trying to diagnose why a particular organization is failing to 
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meet its organizational objectives. Rather, we are trying to identify broad trends of success and 
failure in the conservation community.  
There are a number of ways to approach this analysis. The most intuitive is to select a 
subset of the 183 conservation nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone and directly appraise the 
effectiveness the selected organizations. Indeed, this is the approach I took initially for this 
analysis. To do this, I selected five organizations to evaluate based on a set of criteria to capture 
a wide range of nonprofit types and practices.  These organizations were the Buffalo Field 
Campaign, Greater Yellowstone Coalition, Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance, Natural 
Resources Defense Council, and The Nature Conservancy. As I began conducting organizational 
appraisals, a serious concern surfaced in my interviews. Conservation nonprofits in Yellowstone 
perceive themselves to be in extreme competition for resources. They viewed my research as a 
way to develop a scorecard to determine what organizations are good or bad at achieving their 
organizational goals. This type of interpretation is a distraction from the purpose of this 
manuscript’s analysis. This analysis is attempting to identify broad trends in the conservation 
community, not embarrass or praise specific nonprofits. In short, this analysis is organizational 
blind. 
In view of this concern, I choose to pursue an alternative method to evaluate progress 
towards official goals. I took the official goal statements from Yellowstone’s 183 conservation 
nonprofits and modified the mission and vision statements in two ways. First, I eliminated all 
references to specific organizations to make the statements anonymous. The purpose is to make 
this analysis organizational blind. Second, when official goal statements had multiple objectives 
articulated, I separated the statements into units more easily construed as a single goal statement. 
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This was done to aid evaluation. These statements can be found in Appendix 1. I then randomly 
selected four goals to evaluate. The four goal statements are: 
1. We envision a day when all people work together to protect the ecological integrity and 
beauty of the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. 
2. Long-term conservation of the Yellowstone grizzly bear and its habitat. 
3. Contribute new knowledge toward improving the management and preservation of our 
natural environment by pursuing innovative, long-term research on key ecosystem 
components. 
4. Help people and wildlife coexist. 
This methodology is justified on several grounds. First, we must remember that the central 
purpose of this chapter is to determine if there is sufficient empirical basis to warrant exploration 
of environmental nonprofit effectiveness in Greater Yellowstone. If these organizations appear to 
be on track to meet their goals, further analysis is not warranted. This chapter does not attempt to 
quantify the percentage of goals met by conservation or determine why failure occurred. Rather, 
I am arguing that there is sufficient evidence to justify exploration the problem of improving 
environmental nonprofit performance.  
We must note that most nonprofits do no clearly articulate their goals in a way that can 
easily be quantified. For example, we can examine the Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance’s 
mission: 
The Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance is dedicated to responsible land stewardship in 
Jackson Hole, Wyoming, to ensure that human activities are in harmony with the area’s 
irreplaceable wildlife, scenic and other natural resources. 
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On the surface, this type of mission statement appears to be strong. We can infer that this 
organization believes in protecting the environment. We might also correctly infer that this is a 
watchdog group, focused on how people interact with the environment in the Jackson Hole. 
However, if we want to evaluate this organization’s progress towards its mission, we are at a 
loss. What does it mean for human activities to be “in harmony” with the region’s wildlife? What 
is responsible land stewardship?  A quantitative analysis is challenging. Consider this against 
The Nature Conservancy’s mission: 
The mission of The Nature Conservancy is to preserve plants, animals and natural 
communities that represent the diversity of life on Earth by protecting the lands and 
waters they need to survive. We are dedicated to preserving biological diversity, and, as 
described below, our values compel us to find ways to ensure that human activities can be 
conducted harmoniously with the preservation of natural diversity. We aspire to the 
vision articulated so wisely more than 50 years ago by Aldo Leopold in his book, A Sand 
County Almanac: conservation is a state of harmony between man and nature. 
 
The Nature Conservancy also strives to have human activities in harmony with nature. However, 
the first sentence of their mission provides a basis for a much more rigorous quantitative 
analysis. For evaluation we can ask: has the Nature Conservancy actually preserved plants, 
animals and natural communities? Unfortunately, most of the goal statements of environmental 
nonprofit operating in Greater Yellowstone do not follow this pattern. However, this does not 
cripple our ability to evaluate them.  
The central challenge in any appraisal is judging success and failure. Since most formal 
goal statements in this analysis do not have a single quantitative metric we can use to determine 
success, conservation nonprofits cannot be judged in this way. We can, however, judge them in a 
qualitative manner.  So, how can we know that our assessments are correct? Policy scientist Ron 
Brunner equates this challenge to the task astronomers face when trying to verify the existence of 
a new planet. In astronomy, singular direct evidence is rarely available to determine the existence 
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of a planet. Rather, discoveries occur through the “convergence of multiple independent streams 
of information on the same context” (Brunner 2006: 145). The same is true in policy analysis. 
Using different sources of data we can triangulate on what is likely happening in any particular 
context to judge success and failure. 
However, we must acknowledge that failure is a big word. It conjures up certain emotions 
and expectations in our minds. As such, it is worth briefly discussing what I mean by failure and 
success in the context of this analysis. As previously defined, a problem is a discrepancy 
between a desired state of affairs (goals) and the current or projected state of affairs (trends). I 
use this definition of a problem to create criteria for success and failure of environmental 
nonprofits. Success is making progress towards formal goals or having achieved those goals. In 
other words, the relevant trends are moving in a direction consistent with the stated goal. Failure 
is making progress away from formal goal or having trends remain stagnant. A third possibly 
exists that I call mixed results. Mixed results occur when conflicting trends make it difficult to 
definitively determine success or failure. It is important to note that these definitions of success 
and failure are biased towards nonprofit success. Nonprofits do not need to achieve their goals to 
be successful. Rather, trends related to high-order formal goals that an organization commits to 
must show minimal progress. It is important to acknowledge that trends related to these high-
order goals are often subject to exogenous factors or other shocks that may seem beyond the 
control of the nonprofit. For example, a nonprofit may commit to the formal goal of having a 
long-term viable population of elk in the Greater Yellowstone. Despite the hard work of this 
nonprofit, an unforeseen disease may hypothetically reduce the elk population or cause localized 
extinction. While a nonprofit does not have control of such exogenous factors, we must judge 
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success and failure by the formal goal commitments an organization makes regardless if the 
trends are altered by the nonprofit.  
The words success and failure also invoke questions of whether or not the Greater 
Yellowstone Ecosystem is a better place because of environmental nonprofits. In other words, 
have these nonprofits actually contributed to the conservation of this region compared to a status 
quo baseline of conservation outcomes without the presence of environmental nonprofits? Such 
an analysis would provide interesting results, but they are a distraction from the purposes of this 
chapter. This chapter seeks to determine if Greater Yellowstone’s environmental nonprofits face 
a problem in achieving their stated objectives. The purpose is not to determine if environmental 
nonprofits have contributed to successful outcomes in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. The 
way I have defined success and failure, causality is irrelevant in the context of this chapter. It is 
possible for the trends related to conservation nonprofit goals to be positive (successful) without 
active intervention by a nonprofit. Similar, failure is possible with heavy nonprofit activity. This 
chapter is concerned about the likelihood of formal goals to be achieved. Nonprofits that fail to 
achieve or make progress towards their formal goals face a problem.   
There are two important implications for the following four goal evaluations. First, rather 
than view each evaluation as a comprehensive determination, we are simply trying to determine 
the likelihood of the goal being met. All four goals are complex enough to merit an analysis that 
fills an entire volume. We are trying to determine what the data suggests. Second, the purpose of 
evaluating four random goals is to triangulate if a trend exists for in achieving organizational 
goals. We can view the four evaluations as independent streams of knowledge on the central 
question: does a problem exists for environmental nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone? 
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Goal # 1: We envision a day when all people work together to protect the ecological 
integrity and beauty of the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. 
 
Not all goal statements made by conservation nonprofits can be fully realized in practice. 
Formal goals such as “envisioning a day when all people work together” are statements of ideal. 
While we might wish for such a future, informed experience in our democracy suggests that we 
can rarely expect uniform action on any issue. Our inability to completely realize such principles 
does not invalidate the importance of striving for these types of important outcomes. For 
example, most Americans would argue that all citizens should have equal rights. Regardless of 
our best intentions and policy, discriminatory practices are likely impossible to completely 
eradicate in any society. The challenge in practice is to minimize discriminatory behavior in 
pursuit of equal protection for all.  
 An organization that strives to have all people working together to protect Greater 
Yellowstone’s ecological integrity and beauty faces an identical challenge. While such a goal is 
not fully realizable in practice, we can track indicators that suggest if we are making progress 
towards or away from this goal. There are two simple measures was can use as criteria. First, is 
political conflict escalating or decreasing the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem? If political 
conflict is escalating, we can infer that people are not working together. Second, has 
Yellowstone’s conservation nonprofit community been working together to protect the region’s 
ecological integrity and beauty? In other words, if Yellowstone’s nonprofit community is not 
working together, certainly we cannot expect the broader community to do so.  
Just looking at a few indicators of conflict suggests Greater Yellowstone has balkanized 
over the last 30 years. Between 1970 and 2006, there was a 350% increase in the number of 
lawsuits per year that mention the phrase ‘Yellowstone National Park” (see figure 3.2) In fact, 
the specific conservation nonprofit that is has “all people working together” as a goal is a 
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complainant in a number of these lawsuits. A similar count of articles from major United States’ 
newspapers from 1980 to 2007 shows a 1050% increase in the number of articles that mention 
both the terms ‘Yellowstone’ and ‘conflict.’ We see the same trend when we look the major 
conservation cases in Greater Yellowstone. In the last 15 years of wolf management, major 
authoritative decisions reversed ten times (e.g. wolves on or removed from the endangered 
species list). Additionally, 11 major lawsuits were filed. Prior to 1995, there was not a single 
lawsuit or reversal of authoritative decision.  The same pattern holds true in bison, grizzly bear, 
and snowmobile management. 
 
Figure 3.2. Metrics of increase conflict in Greater Yellowstone. Data drawn from Lexis-Nexus 
searches. 
 
Academics and writers who focus Greater Yellowstone have documented similar trends. 
Professors Mark McBeth and Elizabeth Shanahan (2004: 334) from Idaho and Montana State 
Universities portray Greater Yellowstone as “a political battlefield characterized by minimal 
trust, trading, or compromise between the competing perspectives,” and projects that the 
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situation is likely to intensify in the future. Yale University’s Susan Clark (2008: 2) states, “One 
thing is clear [in Greater Yellowstone]: people in the region are finding it difficult to identify, 
secure, and sustain their common interests. Interactions are often politicized and conflict-ridden 
and rigid ideologies crash against one another.” Law professor Bob Keiter (1991: 3) argues that 
“the entire Yellowstone region has been a principal battleground" over ideological perspectives 
on how to manage the West. Jack Turner (2008: 4) believes that “most visitors to the 
Yellowstone country do not realize how serious the conflict has become.” He paints a sobering 
picture that Greater Yellowstone’s future “will make the conflict over drilling in the Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuge seem like child's play” (Turner 2008: 7). Perhaps Steve Primm (2000: 
6) summarizes the situation best when he argues that grizzly bear conservation in Greater 
Yellowstone “looks more like a bar room brawl than a professional, scientific undertaking.”  
Conflict is not just limited to political and policy rhetoric. There has been significant non-
sanctioned violence directed towards wolves, primarily through illegal poaching and poisoning. 
Additionally, there is concern—and surprise by some—that no one has shot at the federal wolf 
managers. The threat of violence cannot just be attributed to those who oppose wolves. In 1998, 
when the 10th Circuit was hearing arguments over the reintroduction of wolves, eco-terrorists 
threatened to blow-up the Farm Bureau’s national office (Richardson 1998). While just outside 
of the Yellowstone system, in 1974, Glacier National Park ranger Art Sedlack shot a snowmobile 
with his pistol out of frustration over illegal snowmobiling (Yochim 2003). In the brucellosis 
case, members of the Buffalo Field Campaign often attempt to provoke bison hunters by 
following hunters into the field. Clearly, all people are not working together. Conflict appears to 
be escalating. 
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 If we narrow the scope of the original goal statement from “all people” to “all people in 
the Greater Yellowstone conservation nonprofit community,” do we see a positive trend the 
ability of Greater Yellowstone’s nonprofit community to work together? Abundant examples 
exist of the Greater Yellowstone environmental community working together. Recent successful 
campaigns for Wyoming Range Legacy Act, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, and the Path of the 
Pronghorn are prime examples. In every one of my interview for this analysis, at least one of 
these cases were mentioned at the best example of collaboration in the region. Collaboration and 
comradery clearly exist among some organizations. This does not mean that all is well. A subset 
of my interviews included long-term members of Greater Yellowstone’s nonprofit community 
(individuals who are active for more than 25 years). These conservationists all asserted that 
conflict, territorialism, and balkanization have substantially increased within the nonprofit 
community during their tenure in the region. A research scientist, with 42 years of experience 
with Greater Yellowstone’s nonprofits remarked, “Early on [referring to the 1970s], there used to 
be a lot more openness and sharing of ideas and data among nonprofits. Now sharing is 
counterproductive. Our organization has been ‘scooped’ by others; stealing our ideas and selling 
them to funders.” His small nonprofit (staff of two) only works with a group of long-time, 
trustworthy friends. He rarely considers collaborating with new organizations. The executive 
director of one of the region’s largest conservation nonprofits shared a similar sentiment. In this 
director’s 35 years in Greater Yellowstone he acknowledges that effective collaboration occur 
among conservation nonprofits, but believes the general trend is negative. He states: 
There is no question. Our community is increasing dysfunctional….One of the greatest 
lessons over the last 20 years is that our community needs to be less concerned about who 
gets the credit for a particular victory. We need to be focused on what is good for the 
ecosystem, not our organizations. When we do this, we win. However, things are often 
muddied due to turf, ego, and identity. As our community has grown, so has this issue—
battles over turf seem to be getting worse. 
59 
 
 
An employee at Natural Resources Defense Council has a cynical take. He stated, “Conflict is 
inevitable between conservation nonprofits. We compete for funds and attention. This will never 
change.” A member of the Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance agrees that “too much division 
and alienation has been created” in the Greater Yellowstone nonprofit community and that “we 
need to find ways to more effectively engage each other.” A survey of conservation nonprofits in 
Greater Yellowstone found that 51% of organizations claim the community collaborates 
‘somewhat well,’ concluding that “there is clearly room for improvement in how organizations 
work together” (GYCOI 2009: 8). There is room for improvement in meeting this first goal, as 
the majority of indices suggest failure.   
Goal # 2: Long-term conservation of the Yellowstone grizzly bear and its habitat. 
 
In 1975, grizzly bears received protection under the Endangered Species Act as a 
‘threatened’ species. The major precipitating event was a drastic increase in grizzly bear 
mortality and diminished reproductive rates due to the closure of Yellowstone’s open-pit trash 
dumps (Craighead et al 1995; Stringham 1986). Prior to 1968, Yellowstone’s dumps were the 
primary food source for grizzly bears (Craighead et al 1995). Following the publication of A. 
Starker Leopold’s seminal paper "Wildlife Management in the National Parks,” the United States 
Park Service transition to a new management philosophy called natural regulation (Chase 1987). 
Natural regulation attempts to mimic natural processes by minimizing human influence on 
wildlife and landscapes. Yellowstone phased out the use of dumps within the park’s boundaries 
between 1968 and 1971. The park’s intention was to slowly wean bears off of trash and onto 
more traditional food sources. While well intentioned, the result of this policy was the death of 
189 grizzly bears between 1968 and 1973—half of Yellowstone’s grizzly population (Chase 
1987). 
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At the most basic level, we can use population estimates of grizzly bears that inhabit 
Greater Yellowstone as a metric to evaluate the long-term success of grizzly bear conservation. 
Between 1975 and 2007, the protection of grizzly bears under the Endangered Species Act 
significantly reduced grizzly bear deaths in the Yellowstone region (Mattson and Merrill 2002). 
In 1975, the Greater Yellowstone grizzly bear population was approximately 200 individuals 
(Haroldson et al. 2008). By 2010 the population increased three-fold, with roughly 600 grizzly 
bears in the region (Brown 2010). This remarkable recovery prompted the delisting of grizzlies 
from the Endangered Species Act in 2007. Grizzly bear recovery coordinator Dr. Chris Servheen 
called the population increase “the biggest success story under the Endangered Species Act” 
(Robbins 2005). Yellowstone National Park Superintendent Suzanne Lewis (2008: 1) agreed, 
stating “we owe ourselves a modest pat on our collective back” for this “success story.” From a 
population perspective the long-term conservation of grizzly bears appears successful.  
If we dig deeper into the story of grizzly bear conservation, another chapter emerges. 
Many conservation nonprofits in Yellowstone who focus on large carnivores believe that 
population numbers alone do not paint the full picture of grizzly bears’ future. Natural Resources 
Defense Council grizzly bear advocate Louisa Willcox argues that grizzly bear mortality has 
increased in the last 10 years, likely due to the decline in grizzly food sources. Willcox (2009) 
maintains, “No one can deny that the population will go into a tailspin if current trends 
continue.” The Greater Yellowstone Coalition’s Jeff Welsch (2010: 10-11) concurs with 
Willcox’s opinion stating, “the bear’s future is still far too tenuous….of particular concern is the 
dramatic loss of the whitebark pine.” The general argument conservationists make is: If grizzly 
bears’ three major food sources in Yellowstone (white bark pine, army cutworm moth, and 
Yellowstone cutthroat trout) continue to decline, we may experience a scenario similar to the 
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dump closures of 1968 to 1971. As grizzly bears search to find new food sources, they are more 
likely to come into deadly contact with humans. The Greater Yellowstone Coalition (2010) 
makes this argument explicitly: 
even with the species protected, it’s still threatened: By the end of October 2010, 48 bears 
in Greater Yellowstone had died or were moved to zoos—equaling the previous record 
set just in 2008. Most of the mortalities are the result of conflicts with humans—bears 
killing livestock or frequenting homes and campsites for food, or being killed in 
encounters with deer and elk hunters in the fall. 
 
This argument is not new. Pease and Mattson argued in 1999 that “threats posed by diminishing 
whitebark pine and increasing numbers of people are inconsistent with an optimistic long-term 
prognosis for the Yellowstone grizzly bear population.” These authors demonstrate that grizzly 
bear mortality was nearly three times higher in years with poor whitebark pine seed crops than 
during bumper years. The USFWS has downplayed this projection argument, claiming that 
grizzly bears will adapt to other food sources.  
 In response to the delisting, nine environmental groups filed a lawsuit to relist grizzly 
bears under the endangered species list in 2007.8 On September 21, 2009 U.S. District Judge 
Donald Molloy sided with environmental nonprofits ordering that grizzly bears be relisted under 
the Endangered Species Act. Among his rationale for relisting, Molloy (2009: 31) focused on a 
lack of consideration for the decline of grizzlies’ food sources: 
Deference to an agency’s scientific expertise is mandated when the agency articulates a 
rational connection between the facts and its conclusion. The science relied on by the [US 
Fish and Wildlife] Service does not support its conclusion that declines in the availability 
of whitebark pine will not negatively affect grizzly bears. In fact, much of the cited 
science directly contradicts the Service’s conclusions. While the agency’s discretion is 
broad in its area of expertise, the discretion is not unlimited. The record supports the 
Service’s own statements that the extent of declines in whitebark pine and the grizzlies’ 
                                                 
8 Earthjustice, Advocates for the West, Western Watersheds Project, Sierra Club, Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Alliance for the Wild Rockies, Center for Biological Diversity, 
Great Bear Foundation, and the Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance.  
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response is “uncertain.” Where the agency’s conclusions contradict the science, the 
conclusions are not reasonable and the Court need not defer to the agency’s decision. 
Such is the case here.  
 
When appraising progress towards the goal of securing the long-term conservation of the 
Yellowstone grizzly bear we must determine if a trend (population numbers) or projection (food 
source) argument is more appropriate, or both. Increasing bear numbers is certainly encouraging 
in measuring progress towards the long-term viability of grizzlies. However, we must give the 
projections argument more weight in the context of this appraisal for a simple reason: 
Yellowstone conservation nonprofits are the primary interest group pushing forth the food source 
argument. If the assessment of conservation nonprofits is that their goal has not yet been met, we 
can assume there is room for improvement in meeting this goal. 
Goal # 3: Contribute new knowledge toward improving the management and 
preservation of our natural environment by pursuing innovative, long-term research on 
key ecosystem components. 
 
The Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem is one of the most studied ecological regions in the 
world. Several organizations maintain bibliographic databases of scientific and popular articles 
pertaining to the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. The Washington State University’s 
Yellowstone Park Science Bibliographic Database contains 14,060 entries (WSU 2010). The 
University of Wyoming’s Greater Yellowstone Bibliography boasts 28,900 citations (UW 2001). 
Clearly, Greater Yellowstone is the geographic focus of a large amount of scientific research. 
Rather than focus on the quality of scientific information, let’s assume that Greater Yellowstone 
is home to many distinguished scientists conducting excellent scientific research—including 
innovative, long-term research on key ecosystem components. However, the goal we are 
evaluating requires that this increasing base of knowledge to improve both the management and 
preservation of the natural environment.  
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Evaluating the effect of science on management is challenging for at least three reasons. 
First, for scientific knowledge to contribute to improving management it be must be relevant to 
decision making (McNie 2007). While this statement may seem like a non sequitur, this fact is 
often neglected in practice. Ask any scientist ‘is your research is relevant to decision making?’ 
and the answer you will likely receive is ‘yes.’ Scientific research is nearly always presumed to 
be relevant topically by scientists, but often fails to meet the needs of decision makers (Sarewitz 
and Pielke 2007). A more appropriate question to ask a scientist—or of a particular scientific 
study—is ‘how will this scientific information change a particular decision?’ For example, how 
will, and what type of, scientific research on Yellowstone National Park’s wolf population will 
actually alter the management of wolves in within the boundaries of Yellowstone? Since 
Yellowstone is a protected refuge for wolves, the reality is that scientific research on wolves has 
little decision relevance for the superintendent of Yellowstone. The second challenge we must 
contend with is the actual use of scientific information. Even if research is relevant to a decision, 
it is not a guarantee that it will be used to improve management (Bozeman and Sarewitz, 2005; 
Sarewitz et al., 2004; Clark 2009). Extra-scientific factors such as political manipulation, poor 
comprehension, and competing priories may hinder the use of research by decision makers 
(Ascher and Steelman 2010; Pielke 1995; Lemos 2002; Lemos and Morehouse 2005). Third, the 
relationship between science and decision making is highly complex. Science can be 
appropriately utilized in the decision making process in multiple ways (Pielke 2007). Often, it is 
not apparent exactly how scientific information is (or should be) used by decision makers.  
When speaking with nonprofits that focus on research, there appears to be little thought 
on how scientific information will improve decision making. For example, at a public 
presentation a lynx researcher at a Teton County nonprofit was asked how their organization’s 
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research might affect lynx management, the individual did not have an answer. A scientist for the 
Wildlife Conservation Society made a comment typical of scientists in the region, “We focus on 
doing good science, not influencing policy.” A researcher for a nonprofit in Bozeman, MT had a 
much more cynical take. He said, “Our research is influenced by what our funders want, not 
what are the most scientifically appropriate questions.” He continued that he believes that this 
trend is systemic amongst organizations reliant on soft money (donor support).  
The use of science in decision making is a hotly contested issue in Greater Yellowstone 
and in environmental policy more broadly. Numerous individuals have lambasted governmental 
decision makers for abusing science in the decision making process in Greater Yellowstone (e.g. 
Chase 1987, Clark 1997, Clark et al 1999, Wagner 2006). Long-term regional reporter Todd 
Wilkinson documented the intimidation of governmental scientists by the USFWS when those 
scientists’ professional judgments did not justify predetermined policy alternatives supported by 
the agency. The most egregious example was the treatment of grizzly bear biologist Dave 
Mattson in 1993. Mattson’s data demonstrated that logging roads present a significant challenge 
to grizzly recovery, which was in contrast to the USFWS official position. In the middle of the 
night, Mattson’s superior’s raided his office. The USFWS (Wilkinson 1998: 85): 
deleted data files and confiscated floppy discs from Mattson’s computer, tore out pages 
of research from his notebook binders, and removed field data from office filing 
cabinets….Ten years’ worth of accumulated data—the results of thousands of hours 
afield gaining an intimate view of bears—was taken away from the scientists most 
capable of interpreting it 
 
The USFWS is not the only agency accused of ignoring or manipulating science that does not 
conform to agency positions. In 1970, grizzly bear biologist Frank and John Craighead were 
banned from research in Yellowstone due to their studies conflicting with NPS’s official bear 
policy (Chase 1987). At the time, the Craighead brothers were the most knowledgeable grizzly 
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bear biologists in the park and the world. Utah State University professor Fredric Wagner 
intensively studied the northern Yellowstone elk herd. Wagner (2006: 308) found “the weight of 
the evidence since 1970 failing to support much (if not most), of the park-supported scientific 
inference on the northern range [elk] issue.” As a result of their misinterpretation of the science, 
management was not informed by the empirical biologic realities. Susan Clark (1997) 
documented a similar problem with the Wyoming Game and Fish Department in her study of 
endangered black-footed ferrets in southeastern Greater Yellowstone. Susan found the agency 
ignored critical scientific information in order to maintain the agency’s power position in ferret 
recovery.  
There appears to be a systemic trend in Greater Yellowstone of scientific information 
being ignored when it does not conform to pre-held political positions (Clark 2000). 
Conservation nonprofit leaders recognize this dilemma and many suggest it is getting worse. The 
executive director of one of the GYE’s large environmental nonprofits stated: 
Compared to 30 years ago, we have a lot more good science. This has greatly benefited 
the conservation community. However, the scientific information is more fragmented. 
Due to the large body of literature, it is more bewildering to figure out what is going on. 
This makes it tricky to use the best available science in our conservation strategies.  
He continued that the opposition often cherry picks scientific data, not taking the full scientific 
context into account. Science policy Dan Sarewitz (2004) has documented this phenomenon 
across a number of scientific contexts and calls it the excess of objectivity. Sarewitz argues that 
we are inundated with scientific information today. The sheer volume of information virtually 
guarantees that information will be cherry picked—intentionally or not—to support our 
predisposed political perspectives. Using the case of wolves as an example, an ongoing debate in 
Greater Yellowstone is the effect wolves have on elk. Anti-wolf advocates often claim that 
wolves decimate elk populations and pro-wolf advocates counter-claiming that wolves have 
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minimal impact. Since these claims directly contradict each other, it is easy for us to assume side 
must be supported by scientific fact and the other by mere conjecture. However, the science 
provides a much more nuanced answer. From 1984 to 2009, overall elk population increased 5% 
in Idaho, 35% in Wyoming, and 66% in Montana (RMEF 2009).9 During the same time period, 
several elk herds in Greater Yellowstone declined.  From 1995 and 2008, the Northern 
Yellowstone elk herd decreased by 68%, the Gallatin Canyon elk herd by 67%, and the Madison 
Firehole elk herd by 78% (Allen 2010). A number of factors are responsible for these declining 
populations. However, wolves are certainly a major factor. Both sides are able to develop 
scientifically supportable positions by ignoring the full context.  
 While nonprofits contribute to scientific information related to conservation, there are 
clearly major roadblock to the use of science in conservation decision making. In short, there is 
substantial room for improvement in the realization of this goal. The improving the use of 
science in management is a failure.  
Goal # 4: Help people and wildlife coexist. 
 
The concept of wildlife coexistence has expanded in popularity over the last 15 years. 
Many conservationists believe that humans are a primary cause of species’ mortality. To these 
individuals, ensuring the long-term conservation of Greater Yellowstone’s wildlife requires 
reducing human-wildlife conflicts on private and public lands. For example, when wolves kill 
livestock the offending wolves are usually killed by government officials. Wolf-livestock 
coexistence strategies have the potential to reduce livestock depredations by wolves and thereby 
minimize wolf mortality. More broadly, some coexistence advocates are interested in producing 
broad social change. In the context of carnivore coexistence, Susan Clark and Murray Rutherford 
                                                 
9 Wolves were reintroduced in 1995.  
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(2005: 6-7) argue coexistence requires finding ways to “minimize local, on-the-ground conflicts 
between people and predators” and “finding ways to change what carnivores mean and 
symbolize.” In fact, minimizing actual conflicts is an explicit strategy to build social tolerance 
for highly charged politically species (Clark and Mattson 2005). Using this definition, successful 
coexistence strategies requires (1) pragmatic programs that change outcomes related to wildlife 
and people, and (2) help ameliorate negative social perceptions of wildlife.  
 Most of the leading conservation nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone currently have 
coexistence programs. For example, Defenders of Wildlife’s (2010: n.p.) Coexisting with 
Carnivores Program seeks "to develop both a better understanding of how to prevent conflicts 
with wild carnivores, as well as tools for living harmoniously with them.” The Greater 
Yellowstone Coalition claims to work with “state agencies, ranchers, hunters and fellow 
conservationists….to help wolves and people coexist” (Clark 2010a: n.p.). Similarly, The 
Wildlife Conservation Society (2010: n.p.) claims it is “devising creative ways to help people 
and wildlife coexist.” The sheer number of such programs is a positive indication that this goal is 
a worthwhile objective. However, do such programs help reduce wildlife conflicts and change 
social perceptions? We can use carnivore coexistence as a surrogate for understanding the goal 
of wildlife coexistence in Greater Yellowstone. 
 At small scales, coexistence programs have shown to be effective at reducing human-
wildlife conflicts. For example, the Blackfoot Challenge Initiative has reduced grizzly bear 
conflicts in the Blackfoot region of Montana by 93% between 2003 and 2009 by reducing the 
vulnerability of food sources to bears (Porter and Wilson 2010). The Northern Rockies 
Conservation Cooperative is involved in similar efforts in the Gravelly Mountains of western 
Montana (Primm 2010). These types of programs are a positive step; however, broad scale trends 
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related to wildlife coexistence have not been significantly impacted by such efforts. For example, 
wolf conflict has escalated since wolves were reintroduced in 1995 and grizzly bear conflicts 
have remained steady (Figure 3.3). Additionally, human caused wolf and grizzly bear mortality 
has steadily increased over time (Figure 3.4). These trends do not bode well for the current 
influence of coexist strategies across the entire ecosystem. Susan Clark and Murray Rutherford 
(2005: 19) argue “if the current situation continues, things may get much worse as wolves and 
grizzlies expand their densities and range.” In light of this trend, some coexistence advocates are 
frustrated by what they perceive to be the symbolic uptake of coexistence strategies with little 
change on the ground. To them, coexistence is a “practical problem that needs local, lawful and 
low-cost responses” that actually solves the problem (Chaney 2009: n.p.). They argue that 
coexistence is the new buzz concept in Greater Yellowstone, and that very few organizations 
have the capacity to actually achieve coexistence goals. This dynamic is discussed in more detail 
in chapter five under the heading parasitic organizations.  
 
 
Figure 3.3. Wolf and grizzly bear conflicts. Wolf conflicts include numbers of cattle and sheep 
killed per year (USFWS 2001-2010). Grizzly bear conflicts include damage to property, 
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anthropogenic foods, human injury, gardens/orchards, beehives, and livestock depredation 
(Schwartz and Haroldson 2002-2004; Schwartz et al 2005-2010).  
 
 Similar to the challenge of actually reducing metrics physical human-wildlife conflicts, 
social opinion over many mega-fauna species has not changed significantly in recent years. In 
1987, the Defenders of Wildlife created the Wolf Compensation Trust to reduce political 
opposition to wolf recovery by compensating ranchers for livestock lost to wolf depredation. 
This is a coexistence strategy to build social tolerance. From August 1987 to June 2008, the fund 
distributed $1,100,122 to 776 ranchers (DW 2008). In a study of political conflict in greater 
Yellowstone, Mark MacBeth and Elizabeth Shanahan (2004) found that the economic 
compensation program has not “reduced the intensity of the conflict over wolf reintroduction.” 
Tolerance towards large carnivores in Greater Yellowstone does not seem to be improving 
(Clark et al 2005; Nie 2003). Mike Clark (2010c: n.p.), executive director of the Greater 
Yellowstone Coalition, bluntly states, “Anti-wolf rhetoric is at an all time high in Greater 
Yellowstone.” 
  Coexistence strategies often require one-on-one diplomacy in order to change the 
practices of private actors (Wilmot and Clark 2005). In this sense, they are a slow means to elicit 
change and we should not expect significant gains at the landscape scale at a rapid pace. 
However, if the ultimate goal of coexistence is to reduce human-wildlife conflict and change the 
symbolic politics of these species, there is still room for significant process. In other words, the 
nonprofit community is failing to meet this goal at the system wide level. 
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Figure 3.4. Human caused wolf and grizzly bear mortality in the Greater Yellowstone 
Ecosystem. (Schwartz and Haroldson 2002-2004; Schwartz et al 2005-2010; USFWS 2001-
2010). 
 
Summary of goals 
 
The aim of this chapter is to make the case that there is substantial room for improvement 
in the realization of Greater Yellowstone’s environmental nonprofits’ goals. For the purposes of 
developing a case for improvement it is not necessary to develop a generalized model of what 
how many goals are lagging. Rather, all four goals in this chapter’s analysis suggest that 
nonprofits can do better. We are not on track to meet any of the four goals. The first goal is an 
outright failure. Political conflict is escalating in Greater Yellowstone. It appears increasingly 
unlikely that all people (or even a majority) will likely work together to protect the region’s 
ecological integrity and beauty—despite the fact a majority of the region is in support of such 
protection. This dynamic is discussed in more detail in chapter four. The second goal is equally 
unmet. While grizzly bear numbers increased substantially over the last 40 years, conservation 
nonprofits share concern over the future viability of the species. As the bears’ major food sources 
decline, it is likely that the species will have increased deadly encounters with humans. Overall 
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in the ecosystem, there is little grounded work being done to address this future problem. The 
third goal is the most positive. There is no question Greater Yellowstone is home to extensive, 
cutting-edge, long-term scientific research. However, there appears to be significant disconnect 
between research and decision making. Often research is used to justify an a priori political 
position. The use of science to justify worldviews is further discussed in chapter six. The fourth 
goal is also associated with mixed trends. There are a number of innovative wildlife coexistence 
strategies being implemented by the Greater Yellowstone environmental nonprofit community. 
However, these strategies are often symbolic in nature with little grounding in the realities that 
wildlife and people face.  In short: Substantial room for improvement exists within the Greater 
Yellowstone environmental nonprofit community. The community is failing to make progress 
towards all four goals surveyed (Table 3.3).  
 Goal Criteria Trend Verdict 
#1 
All People 
Work 
Together 
↓ environmental litigation ↑environmental litigation 
Failure ↓ conflict publications ↑conflict publications 
↓ perception of conflict ↑perception of conflict 
↑ perception of cooperation ↓perception of cooperation 
#2 Grizzly Bear Conservation 
↑ or stable bear population ↑ bear population Mixed 
Results* ↓ threats food source decline 
#3 
Science in 
Decision 
Making 
↑ relevance of science  
to decision making  
Unclear; no likely change 
 Failure 
↓ manipulation of science Unclear; no likely change 
#4 (Carnivore) Coexistence 
↓ carnivore-livestock 
conflicts 
↑ carnivore-livestock 
conflicts 
Failure 
↓ carnivore-human conflicts 
↑ carnivore-human 
conflicts 
↑  social tolerance  ↓ social tolerance  
 
Table 3.3. Summary of goal achievement. *Grizzly bear conservation must be considered a 
failure as the threats (projection) criteria the primary measure of success articulated by the 
environmental nonprofit community.  
 
 It is worth briefly discussing the interplay between individual and community goals. At 
the individual organizational level, the analysis in this chapter suggests that failure to achieve 
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formal organizational goals is occurring. This is problematic from the standpoint of any 
particular organization. However, in aggregating goals, we are able to infer a larger problem. The 
goal of his dissertation is for nonprofits to achieve their organizational mission. The failure of the 
four goals appraised in this chapter suggests a large collective action problem in the 
environmental nonprofit community. The failure of these four goals suggests a systemic problem 
in the environmental nonprofit community in the ability of all environmental nonprofits in 
Greater Yellowstone to achieve their formal organizational goal commitments. In other words, 
the broad community faces a crisis in goal obtainment. One way to understand this is the 
likelihood all four goals failing from randomly four goals from the list of 194 in Appendix A 
(assuming a 50% failure rate in the overall population). A binomial probability demonstrates that 
the chance or randomly selecting four goals as failures (with a 50% failure rate) is 6.25%. This is 
suggestive that the actual failure rate for environmental nonprofits is actually much higher.   
3.4 Do nonprofits agree? 
 
Early on in my interview process, a Defenders of Wildlife employee discounted my 
research. He asserted that, “I cannot possibly imagine how we could be more effective.” This 
person explained that his self-assessment pertained to both Defenders of Wildlife and the Greater 
Yellowstone conservation community. Similarly, I was told by an employee of the Nature 
Conservancy that evaluating the effectiveness of a nonprofit community was like “comparing 
apples to oranges.” How could one possibly evaluate the effectiveness of a land trust (e.g. The 
Nature Conservancy) and an advocacy organization (e.g. Sierra Club) in the same analysis? He 
told me it was told it is an “impossible task” that was “not worth taking on.” The purpose of this 
chapter is to argue against such critics, making the case that there is room for improvement in the 
ability of Greater Yellowstone’s environmental nonprofit community to achieve the conservation 
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outcomes they desire. The goals evaluated suggest that there is room for these organizations to 
do better. However, beyond the analysis offered in the chapter, many Yellowstone 
conservationists agree.  
In virtually every case I examined, a member of the nonprofit community asserted that 
there was room for improvement within their organization or within the community. For 
example, the executive director of one of the largest nonprofits operating in Greater Yellowstone 
asserted, “Every time we file a lawsuit it is an admission of political failure on our part.” He 
continued that the increased reliance on litigation by the environmental community suggests that 
they have lost touch with political strategies that work. Similarly, a 33-year staff member of a 
Bozeman based nonprofit asserted that “we underestimated the psychological impacts of the 
introduction of wolves.” He argued that environmental nonprofits often fail to take into account 
the symbolic politics of their opposition, stating “we should be more political savvy.” One of the 
preeminent regional conservation leaders asserted, “We have learned it takes eight to ten years to 
even come close to solving an issue. The New World Mine; The Wyoming Legacy Act—both 
took ten-year campaigns. However, some issues will be with us forever. Wolves are the prime 
example. What we need to do on those issues is find better ways to find common ground.” 
The Northern Rockies Conservation Cooperative and the Charture Institute conducted 
two survey’s that support this conclusion. In May 2008, these two organizations surveyed 23 
Greater Yellowstone environmental nonprofits and asked respondents to rate the effectiveness of 
their environmental nonprofit and how effective the environmental nonprofit community is as a 
whole. Only one respondent gave their organization a perfect score. On a scale with zero being 
neutral and five being the most effective, respondents’ average rating for their own organizations 
was 2.96 and the overall community at 1.96. While respondents obviously favored their own 
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organizations, there appears to be broad agreement that the community can improve. The 
Northern Rockies Conservation Cooperative and Charture Institute conducted a followed up 
survey in 2009. The results of the second survey are even more striking. Respondents were asked 
open-ended questions on what were the greatest Greater Yellowstone conservation success and 
failure in 2008. After condensing the response into categories of similar responses an interesting 
trend emerged.  There appeared to be conflicting assessments between organizations in four 
major categories (Figure 3.5). In virtually every issue that was considered a major success, other 
nonprofit community members saw the issue as a failure. This is suggestive that there is a “wide 
divergence of opinion in the conservation community regarding what constitutes a conservation 
success or failure, even on the same issue” (GYCOI 2009: 1). In other words, while a number of 
respondents saw improvement in a particular issue, there are community members who believe 
that more is possible.  
 
  
Figure 3.5. Responses to the questions: “During 2008, what were the most significant 
conservation successes in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem?” And, “During 2008, what were 
the most significant conservation failures in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem?” (NRCC and 
CI 2009).  
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While we may be tempted to assign responsibility for the achievement and failure of 
nonprofit goals to specific organizations or programs, it is irrelevant for this chapter’s analysis. 
The central issue is that nonprofits in Yellowstone can do better. We can and should expect more 
from these organizations. As argued in the first chapter, such a critique is not a slight on these 
organizations or evidence that organizations are incompetent or mismanaged. Rather, these 
Greater Yellowstone’s environmental nonprofits have a special responsibility to improve the 
conditions of conservation in the region. Just as the world’s best athletes can continue to strive to 
do better, so can Yellowstone’s environmental nonprofits. Nonprofits are subject to a number of 
institutional pressures that obstruct these organizations from achieving their formal goals; the 
formal goals being their organization’s contract with the American people. The next three 
chapters discuss why Greater Yellowstone’s nonprofits are failing to meet their potential.   
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Chapter 4: Why Nonprofits Claim to Fail: The holy trinity (plus one) 
The previous chapter argues that conservation nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone could 
be more effective at achieving their formal organizational goals. In order for us to understand 
how nonprofits can do better, we must first answer a simple question: Why do nonprofits fail to 
achieve (or make progress towards) their formal goals? The next three chapters are dedicated to 
answering this question.  
Reasons for nonprofit failure are highly diverse. However, explanatory factors tend to 
cluster around certain topics. For example, failure to achieve organizational goals is often 
attributed to financial short falls or mismanagement within an organization. Extra-organizational 
factors ascribed to failure include an uneducated public (or decision maker) or a powerful 
opposition. This chapter explores conventional explanations for nonprofit failure, which I 
simplify into four factors. I call the first three explanations the holy trinity of conservation 
nonprofit failure. These three factors for organizational short comings are so often repeated 
within Greater Yellowstone’s conservation nonprofit community—and within the larger 
environmental movement—that the explanations approach dogma. The first explanation is that 
conservation nonprofits fail due to a lack of resources. It is assumed that if a nonprofit only had 
more money the organization would be better able to achieve its organizational goals. Second is 
that political will is lacking for conservation by the public or politicians. Educating ‘uninformed’ 
citizens is generally the solution prescribed. Third is the presence of a well-funded and 
politically powerful enemy. In other words, the environment would be in better shape if 
corporate special interests did not actively oppose environmental interests. A fourth explanation, 
which I label poor management, is also addressed. Many foundations and academics believe that 
nonprofits often falter due to the lack of business skills by well-meaning nonprofit staff. 
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This chapter critically examines these four factors and asks: are these sufficient 
explanations to explain why nonprofits fail to achieve their goals? The answer this analysis 
arrives at is no. While each of these four factors may be useful for describing failure in certain 
circumstances, there is sufficient empirical evidence to suggest that we should be cautious in 
employing these explanations. Chapters five and six compare these four factors against 
alternative explanations in specific contexts. The general premise being that if we want to 
improve the performance of conservation nonprofits, we must look beyond conventional 
explanations for failure so we can innovate and develop alternative solutions for success.  
4.1 The holy trinity of conservation nonprofit failure 
 
In our search for answers to why Greater Yellowstone’s conservation nonprofits have 
trouble meeting their goals, speaking directly with staff and board members is the most 
appropriate place to start. A nonprofit’s workforce is the greatest reservoir of knowledge 
regarding the minute details of the conservation cases they work on, as they are the individuals 
who actually implement a nonprofit’s programs. More importantly, the conservation outcomes a 
nonprofit achieves are dictated directly by the performance of its employees. Board members 
help set strategic directions for nonprofits and are well attuned to the big picture questions a 
nonprofits face. Rather than rely on theoretical basis for poor performance, practitioners provide 
an empirical basis for understanding failure. It is their perspectives that matter in securing 
conservation outcomes.  
My interviews revealed three major explanations by conservationists for environmental 
nonprofit failures. In every interview I conducted for this manuscript, at least one of these factors 
was highlighted by the interviewee. I call these explanations the holy trinity of nonprofit failure: 
lack of resources, lack of political will, and a robust opposition.  These three factors are also 
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described, in part, in the academic literature. While these explanations are primarily derived from 
my interviews, the full account of each factor is supplemented by the nonprofit literature. 
4.1.1 Lack of resources 
 
In 2008, the Northern Rockies Conservation Cooperative and the Charture Institute 
hosted a conference called Conservation 2.0: Greater Yellowstone past, present and future. All 
183 conservation nonprofits operating in Greater Yellowstone were invited to participate.  Every 
organization that attended was invited to partake in a five minute ‘brag session.’ During the 
allotted time, each organization was asked to describe their mission, accomplishments and 
greatest challenges. There was a clear theme among the challenges nonprofits claimed to face: a 
lack of resources. For example, Steve Hoffman (2008) of the Montana Audubon Society stated, 
“organizationally, of course, our greatest challenge is probably sustainable funding.” Bob Inman 
(2008) of the Wildlife Conservation Society agreed, “One of our challenges is multi-year funding 
and the willingness for funders to stick with it.” Louise Lasley (2008) of the Jackson Hole 
Conservation Alliance echoed that “One of our challenges…is sustainable funding.”  Penelope 
Pierce (2008) of the Yellowstone to Yukon Initiative agreed that a central challenge of her 
organization is to “sustain and diversity our funding base.” Lil Erickson (2008) of Corporation 
for the Northern Rockies was of the same opinion, “We are challenged by funding.”  
My interviews with nonprofit leaders revealed a similar attitude. In every single interview 
with a nonprofit executive director, failure to achieve organizational goals was attributed in part 
to a lack of funds. For example, the director of a Jackson Hole wildlife based nonprofit stated, 
“our organization does not have the funding necessary to appropriately staff our programs…[as a 
result,] we spread ourselves too thin.” She argued that with an appropriate amount of funding, 
her organization could effectively tackle all problems they face. The executive director of an 
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environmental advocacy nonprofit based in Laramie, WY asserted, “Many of our projects require 
a multi-year [financial] commitment. Our grant makers are unwilling to commit to multi-year 
funding.” He maintained that his staff was insecure in their job, due to a lack of organizational 
stability. With the right amount of funding, his staff would be able to relax and “concentrate on 
their performance.” The regional program director (based in Bozeman, MT) for a national 
environmental nonprofit attributed his organization’s lack of effectiveness on combatting natural 
gas development in Greater Yellowstone to the fact “we can’t get traction with funders on this 
issue.” He asserted that few funders were willing to even touch the issue for political reasons. 
Without funding, there is no way his organization could “take on big oil.”  
Money is the lifeblood of a nonprofit. Without sufficient resources, it is impossible for a 
director to hire staff and pursue the organization’s objectives. As such, revenue is always a 
principle concern for nonprofit managers. The statements mentioned above are hardly 
unexpected. However, we must ask the question: is the lack of resources as reasonable 
explanation for why nonprofits fail to meet their organizational objectives in Greater 
Yellowstone? It is easy to argue that if any particular nonprofit had more resources the 
organization could expand the services they offer. Certainly, this is the case to some extent. The 
more resources an organization has, the more likely the organization can devote additional 
resources to their mission. It is near heretical to argue otherwise.   
However, this does not necessarily mean a lack of resources is a reasonable explanation 
for nonprofit failure. All organizations and people face resource constraints. For example, the 
United States’ Census Bureau publishes guidelines every year for defining the poverty thresholds 
for American citizens. People who earn below a certain income (e.g. below $10,991 for a one-
person household in 2008) are presumed to lack the appropriate resources to meet their basic 
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human needs.10 These basic needs (personal goals) include food, shelter and water. People also 
have countless other goals that extend beyond these basic needs. For example, an individual may 
have a personal goal to visit family across the country. It is often difficult for those in poverty to 
meet their extended goals compared with more wealthy individuals. Chapter three defined failure 
as the inability to meet or make significant progress towards an organization’s formal goals. 
With so many complaints of funding, we might assume that Greater Yellowstone environmental 
nonprofits are resource starved to the point where they are in organizational poverty. In other 
words, we might believe these organizations are in such dire straits that their lack of resources 
prevents them from making progress toward their formal goals. They must struggle to stay in 
business.  The question we must ask to determine if a lack of resources is reasonable explanation 
is: are these organizations truly resource starved? Do they have enough resources pursue their 
formal goals, or are they truly hindered by a lack of resources? 
We can answer these questions by looking at both the nonprofit community and 
individual organizations. Nonprofits are required to file tax returns with the IRS, commonly 
referred to as 990s. We can use these tax documents to estimate the total revenue of the Greater 
Yellowstone nonprofit community. The IRS does not require a nonprofit describe the revenue 
received or spent in a specific geographic location. So, for example, it is not possible to use these 
forms to determine the revenue streamsVof large national nonprofits operating in Greater 
Yellowstone (E.g. Sierra Club, National Parks Conservation Association, Natural Resources 
Defense Council, The Nature Conservancy, or Wildlife Conservation Society). These 
organizations do not geographically separate their revenue for the IRS. Fortunately, 34 of 
Greater Yellowstone’s 183 conservation nonprofits exclusively focus their efforts on the Greater 
                                                 
10 http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/threshld/thresh08.html 
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Yellowstone Ecosystem. We can look at this subset of the community to get a sense of Greater 
Yellowstone’s nonprofit funding.  
Using tax documents from 1998-2006, the Greater Yellowstone conservation nonprofit 
community appears to be extremely well funded.11 The combined average annual revenue of the 
34 Greater Yellowstone centric nonprofits is approximately $50 million per year. Since these 34 
organizations only represent 18.5% of the total number of organizations operating in the region 
and does not include any of major national nonprofits, tripling this number ($150 million per 
year) gives us a relatively conservative estimate of the regional environmental nonprofit revenue. 
In my interviews and informal discussions, nonprofit staff members tend to be shocked by this 
figure. They simply do not believe that this figure is anywhere close to accurate. In contrast, 
program officers at one of the largest foundations who work in the region agree that this figure is 
reasonable. In fact, a former grant maker at another Yellowstone centered foundation said, “I 
wouldn’t be surprised if the total revenue exceeds $300 million.” To put this figure in context, 
the estimated yearly nonprofit community’s revenue of $150 million equates to just over 
$800,000 per organization. This means that over the last 10 years at least $1.2 billion was spent 
in the conservation nonprofit sector in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. Major federal land 
management agencies serve as a reasonable basis for comparison to determine the scope of this 
figure. The National Park Service spends approximately $40 million per year in the region. All 
major federal agencies in the region (the GYCC) spend on average $130 million per year 
including fire suppression (Clark 2008). The nonprofit community’s revenue is nearly equivalent 
to the major federal landowners in the region. Clearly, the environmental nonprofit community 
as a whole is well funded.  
                                                 
11 The nonprofit GuideStar catalogs nonprofit 990s. The largest time period for which a complete set of Greater 
Yellowstone 990s were available was the nine year period of 1998-2006.  
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There are few areas in the world where conservation nonprofits can boast such an 
impressive figure. As such, it is difficult to argue that the system as a whole lacks resources for 
conservation—even if specific organizations have trouble. Further solidifying this argument is 
the fact the Greater Yellowstone environmental nonprofit community is running on a surplus. 
During the 1998-2006 time period the average combined annual expenditures for the 34 
conservation nonprofits that exclusively focus on Greater Yellowstone was approximately $40 
million per year, leaving a $10 million yearly surplus. This surplus is consistent with 50 largest 
national nonprofits whose combined operating surplus was approximately one-fifth of their 
combined revenue in the same time period.12 If the community were in dire straits we would 
expect them to be running a deficit, or at least breaking even.   
There are, however, environmental nonprofits with financial challenges. These 
organizations below the ‘poverty line’ clearly can reasonably claim that resources are a principle 
reason for their failure to achieve their formal goals. Since the beginning of the 2008 recession, 
at least two nonprofits have closed their doors due to lack of funding in Greater Yellowstone.  
These two organizations represent only one-percent of the regional nonprofit community. The 
vast majority of organizations, in contrast, are well funded enough that we can expect them to 
make progress towards their goals—even if more money would help. The plight of a few 
conservation nonprofits is not evidence that community as a whole is in trouble. Just as some 
business fail, we must expect that some nonprofits will end up closing their doors. With only 
one-percent of the region’s environmental nonprofits dissolving during a major financial crisis, it 
is unlikely that the majority of organizations are in trouble.  
                                                 
12 These figure were determined by examining the claimed revenue and expenditures on the 990s for the 34 
nonprofits operating in Greater Yellowstone and the top 50 conservation nonprofits (defined by income) registered 
with the IRS.  
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Following the money as an explanation for failure is challenged in a number of contexts 
beyond nonprofit performance. For example, the issue of campaign finance reform is a hot topic 
in American politics. There is a general assumption that the more money a political candidate is 
able to fundraise, the more successful the candidate’s election prospects; money equals 
effectiveness. Columnist David Brooks challenges this conventional wisdom arguing that 
tracking spending of political campaigns is a poor way to explain electoral success. Brooks 
(2010: A25) explains that in the 2010 election cycle “Democrats in the most competitive races 
have raised an average of 47 percent more than Republicans. They have spent 66 percent more, 
and have about 53 percent more in their war chest.” In the face of this considerable advantage, 
Brooks points out that the polls showed Democrats plummeting compared to their Republican 
counter parts. In the context of these electoral races, money does not equal effectiveness. He 
concludes (2010: A25):  
In the end, however, money is a talisman. It makes people feel good because they think it 
has magical properties…In this day and age, money is almost never the difference 
between victory and defeat. It’s just the primitive mythology of the political class.  
 
The same can be said for the environmental nonprofit community in Greater Yellowstone. 
Financial resources are an invaluable factor in contributing to nonprofit success. Without money, 
nonprofits are unable to even attempt to achieve their organizational mission. Of course, 
increased funding and efficiency of resource use are important factors for a nonprofit to consider. 
However, financial resources cannot full explain the failure of Yellowstone nonprofits to achieve 
their organizational mission. There are simply too many resources available for the community 
to use a lack of resources as a scapegoat. As David Brook’s articulates, money is a talisman. 
With well-funded nonprofits, money is rarely the difference between an organization achieving 
its goals and organizational failure.   
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4.1.2 Lack of political will  
 
In his 2007 film, An Inconvenient Truth, former vice-president Al Gore argued that in 
solving the global issue of climate change, "we have everything we need, save perhaps political 
will” (Guggenheim 2006). Political will is a common popular explanatory factor for why 
political campaigns fail, particularly from within the environmental community. There is a 
general assumption that environmental policies will fail to be implemented if some undefined 
threshold of public opinion is not crossed, due to policy makers lacking the incentive to take the 
requisite actions. When a lack of political will is identified, the standard prescription within the 
environmental community is to engage in education campaigns to increase the awareness or 
educate the public in the scientific facts of the issue. 
 In my interviews with environmental nonprofit staff, political will was a prevalent theme 
to describe political failure. For example, a staff member of the Sierra Club argued that there is 
“political apathy for conservation” in the region. She said that “people just don’t care.” Another 
respondent who works for The Wilderness Society argued that “mobilizing the public is 
difficult.” He believes that when people have competing priorities with conservation, 
“conservation always loses.” Ember Hall (2008) of the Teton Science Schools argues the 
problem is getting worse:  
Looking forward into the future, I think the biggest challenges for us as an organization 
and for the GYE [Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem] are connecting with a public that is 
becoming more and more disconnected from the landscape. That is a big challenge and it 
is difficult to foster a conservation ethic in people that maybe don’t experience the 
landscape that often and don’t understand the connections between ecosystem function 
and water and food and all of those things we naturally need. 
 
To solve the issue of political will, most organizations focus on education campaigns. Anna 
Trentadue of Valley Advocates for Responsible Development (2008) argues that to improve 
conservation outcomes “we need to get the messaging out there.” An employee of the Jackson 
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Hole Land Trust believes that “educating people is central to our role as conservationists.” The 
executive director of a Bozeman based nonprofit argues that “as a community, we need to get 
better at public outreach and education.” He continued that “we are not good at broadening our 
political base. Without increased public support from nontraditional partners, conservation [in 
Greater Yellowstone] will ultimately be unsuccessful.” 
There are two questions we must ask in regard to political will in Greater Yellowstone: Is 
the public unsupportive of (or have little concern about) conservation outcomes in the region? 
And, is political will actually a good explanation of conservation failure in general? The answer 
to both of these questions is no. Conservation in Greater Yellowstone is highly supported by both 
people in the region and throughout the United States. Irrespective of the answer to this question, 
we must also acknowledge that political will is a poor explanatory factor to why conservation 
policies fail. 
Political will is a difficult concept to define and thus measure. However, we can 
understand political will as support for a particular policy outcome. In doing so, we must also 
acknowledge that support for a particular outcome can be differentiated from support for 
particular policy alternatives. In other words, we can differentiate goals from actions. For 
example, the longest land mammal migration in North and South America (excluding migrating 
caribou in the Yukon) is a pronghorn antelope migration in the southern portion of Greater 
Yellowstone. Securing this migration in perpetuity is of high concern from all political 
perspectives involved in the issue (Cherney and Clark 2009). In short, there is very high political 
support for the goal of maintaining the migration in perpetuity. However, this case has been 
highly controversial. Political opponents battled over the best way to secure the future of the 
migration. In general, environmentalist wished for the development of a new protected area and 
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individuals interested in local rights wanted a bottom-up landowner driven solution. Political will 
existed from multiple political perspectives on the overriding goal. Yet, conflicting stakeholders 
were deadlocked over the most appropriate solutions. In other words, there was political will for 
a conservation outcome, but not for any solution in particular. Since perspectives on good policy 
alternatives (solutions that are technically proficient, morally justifiable and politically viable) 
will always differ both between and within different political groups, the appropriate question we 
must ask is: Is there a lack of support for conservation goals in Greater Yellowstone?  
The first way to answer this question is to take a broad scale look at support for 
conservation within the United States. Prior to 1960, environmental issues were virtually ignored 
by both pollsters and academic surveys on American public opinion. However, the early 
environmental polls in the mid-1960s to 1970 show a drastic increase in the number of 
Americans who care about environmental issues (Taylor 2009). This is consistent with the rise of 
environmental nonprofits during the same time period. For example, from 1973 to 2006, the 
General Social Survey asked respondents if the US Government is spending “too much, too little, 
or about the right amount” on protecting the environment. Over the three decades, public opinion 
remained relatively constant that government is under spending on environmental protection 
(Figure 4.1). In fact, public opinion has never dropped below 50% (Davis and Smith 2009). 
Similarly, Gallup has surveyed American citizens asking if they support environmental 
protection over economic growth. Between 1984 and 2006, opinion only dropped below 50% 
once (49% in 2004; Figure 4.1).  
Public opinion on greater Yellowstone shows similar trends. In 2001, the Los Angeles 
Times conducted a telephone survey asking adults in nine western states13 if they favored 
“protecting the areas where wolves and grizzly bears are still living now, even if it means 
                                                 
13 Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming. 
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limiting commercial activities such as logging, building roads, mining and oil or gas drilling in 
those areas?” The public’s response was 69% in favor with only 21% opposed. The same survey 
asked the public’s opinion on the restoration of wolves and grizzly bears, with 53% responding it 
was a good idea and only 36% a bad idea (Los Angeles Times Poll 2001). Similar trends are seen 
in Greater Yellowstone. Prior to the reintroduction of wolves 56% of Idaho residents, 48.5% of 
Wyoming residents, and 43.7% of Montana residents favored wolf reintroduction (Bath and 
Philips 1990; Bath 1990). Wyoming Game and Fish Department’s pre-reintroduction survey 
found 44% of the Wyoming public supportive of wolf conservation with only 34.5% opposed 
(Thompson 1991). The opposition to environmental nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone often 
shares a strong affinity to pro-environmental outcomes. For example, in regard to the issue of 
wolves, Jackson Hole hunting outfitter B.J. Hill states, “I have three boys…I would have liked to 
see if they could have learned to like that animal” (Hatch 2010, n.p.). Most members of the 
environmental nonprofit community would not expect an anti-wolf advocate to make such a 
statement.  “We’re not against predators,” Hill explains, “We’re against the politics of the 
predators” (Hatch 2010, n.p.).  
There seems to be a broad agreement by the public that conservation in the Greater 
Yellowstone region is important. Even if political will were weak, we still must be careful in 
relying too heavily on this explanatory factor for nonprofit failure. The simple reasoning being: 
political will is an amorphous concept with little empirical grounding. Many political scholars 
are at a loss at how to understand the concept of political will. For example Linn Hammergren 
(1998: 12) argues that political will is: 
...the slipperiest concept in the policy lexicon. It is the sina qua non of policy success 
which is never defined except by its absence. It thus becomes the explanation for every 
policy failure despite the fact that so many programs are undertaken where it certainly 
does not seem present.  
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Lori Post, Amber Raile, and Eric Raile (2010: 654) share a similar view point, arguing that the 
ambiguity of political will makes “it ideal for achieving political aims and for labeling political 
failures when the diagnosis is unclear.” They (Ibid) continue: 
interest groups are fond of invoking the term to account for a lack of policy 
change….The way the term “political will” is bandied about is a reflection of its 
presumed centrality in achieving policy change, but such casual usage is troublesome for 
those concerned with crafting, promoting, implementing, and analyzing public policies. 
  
Post, Raile and Raile develop a comprehensive a framework for assessing political will. Central 
to their argument is that political will is a concept measuring agreement among decision makers 
to support a particular course of action. This definition strays from how political will is used by 
the vast majority of individuals I interviewed. The nongovernmental community in Greater 
Yellowstone addresses political will as a concept of willingness of the public to take action. 
Hence, this is why I evaluated the concept through public opinion.  
 
 
Figure 4.1. Public opinion on environmental protection (Davis and Smith 2009; Gallup 2007).14  
                                                 
14 The General Social Survey’s question is: "With which one of these statements about the environment and the 
economy do you most agree? Protection of the environment should be given priority, even at the risk of curbing 
economic growth. OR, Economic growth should be given priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent." 
Gallup Poll asked, “are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on improving and protecting the 
environment?” 
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A number of scholars have evaluated the relationship between public opinion and 
political action. For example, environmental advocates often argue that political will is lacking 
for action on climate change. This is reflected in previous quote by Al Gore. In contrast, Roger 
Pielke Jr. (2010: 41) argues that “public opinion on climate is not a fundamental limiting factor 
holding back action. Political will is not lacking.” Pielke suggests that we lack good policy 
alternatives, not support for action.  In another study, Paul Burstein (2006) studied examined 34 
bills before Congress and compared them with public opinion data. He found that in only 50% of 
the cases, the legislative decision was congruent with polling data. The other 50% of cases, the 
legislative decision moved against public opinion. This should not be interpreted that public 
opinion does not matter in policy decisions. However, after a critical threshold public opinion 
likely only provides marginal returns to the likelihood of political success—just as David 
Brook’s argues with the magical talisman of more money.  
While a slippery concept, political will is a necessary component for long-term 
conservation success. The public must value environmental outcomes. While it is convenient to 
blame the public as complicit in environmentally damaging outcomes, the data presented in this 
chapter suggests that the American public (and the Greater Yellowstone community) highly 
values the environment. Enough political will exists for environmental action in Greater 
Yellowstone. The public does not need to be convinced of the importance of the region. 
However, the fact political will exists does not guarantee pro-environmental outcomes. Political 
decision makers must balance competing interests with the environment. The key for 
environmental nonprofits is to find solutions that both met the environmental agenda and the 
interests of competitors.15  Blaming the black box of political will for political nonprofit failures 
                                                 
15 Coexistence strategies, for example, are centered on this type of outcome (discussed in chapter three, under goal 
number four). Wolf coexistence focuses on reducing the vulnerability of livestock to wolves (minimizing 
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has little real empirical grounding. It is a poor explanatory factor for nonprofit success and 
failure. 
4.1.3 A robust opposition  
 
Environmental nonprofits often explain failure as the result of a strong and well-funded 
enemy. This generalized mythology is widespread in environmentalism and easily recognizable 
as a modified version of the biblical story of David versus Goliath. The story tends to unfold that 
greedy corporate interests are to blame for environmental destruction. It is the responsibility of 
underfunded environmental nonprofits to stand up and—as Dr. Seuss’ Lorax says—speak for the 
trees. For example, in fighting natural gas development in southwestern Wyoming the 
environmental community developed a narrative of the ‘big bad oil companies’ versus migration 
pronghorn and mule deer (Cherney 2011). The same narrative occurs in Alaska over oil 
exploration in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge where migrating caribou are pitted against 
fossil fuel extraction.  
 Greater Yellowstone is no exception to this narrative with most conservationists I 
interviewed attributing organizational failure to a strong opposition. For example, a program 
manager at the Wilderness Society lamented, “With increasing pressures for oil and gas 
exploration and use of our natural resources, we are going to be fighting bigger battles with big 
oil.” He believes that successful outcomes will be rarer in the future, as more industry comes to 
the region. Lisa McGee (2008) of the Wyoming Outdoor Council states, “We’re up against the 
oil and gas industry. They have a lot of money and a lot of power.” However, the wealthy 
cooperation’s are not the only opposition blamed for failure by conservation nonprofits. 
                                                                                                                                                             
depredation). By solving the problems ranchers face, the hope is fewer wolves will be killed. Wolves, in general, are 
killed through management actions when they are documented attacking cattle and sheep. If less livestock are killed, 
less wolves will be removed—a pro-environmental outcome.  
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Ranching also receives similar complaints. An employee of a Lander, WY based nonprofit 
argues, “They [ranchers] have the political power in Wyoming.” She argues most politicians 
consider the agricultural industry’s interests before conservationists. A board member for the 
Greater Yellowstone Coalition agrees. She states, “We need politicians who understand us; not 
ranchers.” 
 We must ask, once again, is a robust opposition a reasonable explanation for 
environmental nonprofit failure? Certainly, most interest groups would prefer not to face a well-
funded and political strong opposition. Environmental groups are no different in this respect. As 
we explored in the first two factors of the holy trinity of nonprofit failure, there are times where a 
robust opposition may be a reasonable explanatory factor. It is easy to attribute failures to the 
strength of the other team. However, a strong opposition is not necessarily a contributing factor 
to nonprofit failure on at least two accounts. First, it assumes that the strategies a nonprofit 
utilizes are fixed and uncreative; that conservation is a game of black and white victories and 
failures. Second, a robust opposition often further motivates nonprofit constituencies to engage 
in action.  
 The strategies a nonprofit utilizes are critical to the organization’s success. Most 
nonprofit managers inherently understand this fact and strive to pursue strategies they believe to 
be the most effective. In spite of this, most nonprofits utilize relatively fixed strategies with 
creativity around the margins. This is evident in the way nonprofits market themselves to their 
donors. For example, rather than be problem oriented and describe organizational goals, most 
nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone appear to be strategy or solution oriented in their marketing. 
Conservation nonprofits describe their organizational activities through terms such as being 
education-based, centered on land acquisition, focused on legislative advocacy, or litigation. 
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Nonprofits tend specialize on a single one of these strategy and innovate within their area of 
expertise. When a nonprofits strategy fails, the generalized alternative is to fundraise harder and 
put more force behind the nonprofit’s primary strategy.  Little effort is place on determining if 
the organization’s primary strategy is the right tool for the job. As management Guru Peter 
Drucker argues if a strategy fails—try once more. After the second failure, it is time to move on 
to a new strategy. In regard to nonprofits effectiveness, Drucker (2005: 71) states: 
There is only so much time and so many resources, and there is so much work to be done. 
There are also true believers who are dedicated to a cause where success, failure, and 
results are irrelevant, and we need such people. They are our conscience. But very few of 
them achieve. Maybe their rewards are in Heaven. But that’s not sure, either.  
 
As Drucker recommends, some environmental nonprofit in Greater Yellowstone utilize 
alternative strategies to secure their desired outcomes when the first methods fail. This is 
particularly important when battling an opposition with significantly more resources, financial or 
political. For example, rather than taking on the entire livestock industry, some nonprofits that 
focus on carnivore-livestock coexistence try to develop strategies in the interest of both 
environmental and ranching communities. Similarly, rather than try to prevent fossil fuel 
extraction in Greater Yellowstone, some organizations focus on encouraging what they view as 
responsible development. For example, some organizations advocate for directional natural 
drilling to minimize surface habitat disruption versus arguing against all development. Or, trying 
to minimize drilling during time periods and places where wildlife is most vulnerable (e.g. 
during the winter of critical winter range habitat). Many national environmental nonprofits 
utilize these basic strategies in other contexts. For example, working with Wal-Mart or Shell Oil 
to minimize environmental impacts versus advocating against all of the actions these corporation 
undertake.  
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A second major problem with this explanatory factor is that a robust opposition often 
serves to galvanize environmental constituencies rather than hinder them. One of the most 
influential individuals in the growth of environmental nonprofits was President Ronald Reagan’s 
Secretary of the Interior James Watt. Secretary Watt was infamous for his anti-environmentalist 
rhetoric and policies, often attributed to such quips as “We don't have to protect the environment, 
the Second Coming is at hand" (Dawkins 2006: 288). Watt served as a lightning rod for fund 
raising and membership growth for environmental nonprofits. During Watt’s tenure as Secretary 
of the Interior, membership of the Sierra Club approximately doubled (1980-3), the Wilderness 
Society tripled (1980-4, and Greenpeace quadrupled (1980-5) (Rosenberg 2008: 288). Many 
other large environmental nonprofits followed this same trend. (Youth 1989). Ronald Shaiko 
(1999: 28) states that "to this day, veteran staffers in the environmental community still refer to a 
significant cohort of members who joined their organizations in the early 1908s at ‘Watt 
babies.’" 
The anti-Bush rhetoric in the environmental community from 2000-2008 served a very 
similar function. In Greater Yellowstone, a development director for a Bozeman based nonprofit 
referred to the Bush Administration as “the good years.” This individual lamented the relative 
ease of using President Bush as a symbolic fundraising tool. The executive director of a small 
scientific nonprofit agreed. He stated that “Lots of people still blame Bush for the challenges we 
face [in Greater Yellowstone]. This makes relating to donors easy.” We can see this trend in 
Gallup poll data on the percentage of American’s who claim to be members of a national or local 
environmental group. Since the Watt era, public opinion polls show that there are on average 10 
million more members of environmental nonprofits during Republican presidential 
94 
 
administrations than during Democratic administrations (Figure 4.2). Clearly, a robust opposition 
is good for environmental nonprofit business.  
There is little question that at times a robust opposition hinders conservation success. 
However, the frequency at which this explanatory factor is cited by conservation professionals in 
Greater Yellowstone is at odd with the robustness of the actual explanatory power of this 
variable. In many cases, environmental nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone face a strong enemy. 
The natural gas industry, for example, has more resources at their disposal than environmental 
nonprofits. However, blaming failure on the opposition highlights a lack of creativity and 
innovation on the part of some environmental nonprofits. Success can be achieved without 
destroying the perceived enemy. Additionally, blaming a robust opposition serves an important 
symbolic function for environmental nonprofits. It allows environmental nonprofits to fundraise 
and increase organization membership by using the symbolic value of the opposition as means to 
galvanize support.   
 
 
95 
 
 
Figure 4.2. American environmental nonprofit membership (Gallup 2006).16 
 
4.2 Plus one: Poor management 
 
In my interviews with nonprofit staff, poor management was rarely discussed as a 
rationale for failure. This is hardly surprising, as most nonprofit managers likely believe they are 
effective managers. However, this explanatory factor was mentioned in every interview I 
conducted with grant makers (both foundations and individual donors). Additionally, poor 
management is the dominant explanatory factor in the academic literature on nonprofit 
effectiveness. This is likely due to the increased focus on nonprofit management and 
performance by business schools in the United States.  
The field of nonprofit management is highly diverse and nuanced. However, for our 
purposes, poor management falls into two major categories. The first is philanthropic 
amateurism. That is, the idea that nonprofits are often made up of well-meaning individuals who 
are extremely passionate about their cause, but have limited experience running and managing an 
                                                 
16 Data for the percentage of the population claiming to belong to an environmental group was aggregated through 
several Gallup Polls. Total membership was determined by multiplying the estimated percentage of the population 
with U.S. Census estimates for polling years.  
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organization. In other words, failure is due to a lack of skill in managing finances, marketing the 
organization, or human-resource management. The majority of academic and grant making 
thought on nonprofit failure falls into this category. The basic alternative to this conditioning 
factor is to increase the level of professionalism within nonprofits. The second category is 
professional mismanagement. That is, nonprofit managers who have the requisite skills to 
effectively manage but still make mistakes such as over expanding the nonprofit, poor strategic 
planning, or inattention to detail. The generalized alternative suggested is to increase nonprofit 
accountability.  
Within both philanthropic amateurism and professional mismanagement, research is 
heavily oriented toward organizational governance and financial management. In general, the 
field of organizational governance focuses on unearthing basic principles for managerial success 
and the development of ideal organizational structures. For example, scholars are interested in 
finding the best structures for board governance, strategic planning, and human resource 
management. There is general agreement nonprofits who use ‘best management practices’ are 
more likely to be successful than those who do not. However, broad agreement ends there. The 
most recent reviews of the literature find that consensus on best practices is limited.  In a review 
study of strategic management in nonprofit organizations, Stone, Bigelow, and Crittenden (1999: 
379) found that “few connections have been made among research studies, contributing to 
fragmentation of the field rather than consolidation.” They argue that the findings within the 
field are so disparate that few generalizable concepts can be reliably applied in practice. Herman 
and Renz (2004) came to a similar conclusion in their study of nonprofit effectiveness. These 
authors (701) assert that “many sources that claim to offer best practices about nonprofit board or 
management provide little or no basis for assertions about best practices.” In other words, there 
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is little empirical evidence for what best practices a nonprofit should employ. Crutchfield and 
Grant (2008: 208) further that: 
Even the most efficiently managed nonprofits, the groups that are ‘run like a business,’ 
will fail to reach their full potential if they only shore up their internal capacity to deliver 
programs. You can’t neglect your organization, but neither should you let it eclipse your 
large purpose: to have impact…to achieve greater social change you must also focus on 
the things that are external to your organization. 
 
Generalizable concepts on best practices for nonprofit management are likely highly context 
specific to individual organizations. While poor management is likely an important conditioning 
factor on why nonprofits fail to achieve organizational goals, pin-pointing reliable empirical 
evidence on poor performance is impossible save for the most egregious cases of 
mismanagement. We refer to such cases as fraud.  As such, the conditioning factor of poor 
management is a weak explanatory factor for nonprofit failure. If we cannot identify poor 
management (except for the most glaring cases) and there is little evidence for how organizations 
can improve, it does not give us a reliable means to improve nonprofit performance. In contrast, 
the excess of contradictory studies presents the opportunity for current managers and board 
members to symbolically justify the status quo management of their organization.   
The field of nonprofit financial management also argues that American nonprofits face a 
fundraising crisis (Eisenberg 1997). There is the perception that nonprofits often lack the skills 
necessary to fundraise effectively. This argument is often supplemented by a perceived 
accountability crisis; the belief that Americans are losing faith in nonprofits due to poor 
accountability and scandals within the nonprofit sector. The argument suggests that if a dishonest 
nonprofit commits fraud, it may disgust donors to the point where they will not donate their 
money or time to any organization including organizations beyond the perpetrator (Synder 
2006). The academic literature focuses heavily on how to overcome philanthropic insufficiency 
98 
 
through improved fundraising techniques and improving accountability to minimize nonprofit 
fraud.  
While novel means of fundraising are advantageous to capture funds from potential 
donors, those of us interested in the nonprofit sector as a whole should be aware that trends in 
overall giving are relatively stable. In constant dollars, the amount of charitable giving has 
increased substantially over the last 30 years (Figure 4.3). Additionally, as a percentage of 
personal income, giving has remained constant. In other words, there is little evidence to suggest 
that a fundraising crisis exists for nonprofits. The amount of money available to nonprofits is 
increasing. If a true crisis were occurring, we would expect giving a percentage of income to 
decrease. This trend is consistent with environmental nonprofit revenue in Greater Yellowstone. 
Using the 990 data from the 34 environmental nonprofits exclusive focused on Greater 
Yellowstone, total revenue in constant dollars is increasing at a rate of approximately 8.4%.  
Scholars focusing on improved fundraising miss-define the problem as a lack of 
resources and ignore the more important question of how those resources are used. Increased 
proficiency in nonprofit fundraising likely gives any particular nonprofit a competitive advantage 
over another, but does not necessarily improve the situation for securing the outcomes nonprofits 
claim to seek. Since American’s have not devoted greater portions of their income to 
philanthropic charities over time, increased nonprofit fundraising has likely little benefit for 
nonprofit communities as a whole. As a result, improved fundraising is about the reallocation of 
resources among a nonprofit community and not a reasonable explanation for failure.  
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Figure 4.3. American nonprofit giving (Wing, Pollak, and Blackwood 2008). 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
Political scientist Graham Allison’s (1971) classic study, The Essence of Decision, uses 
multiple explanatory models to understand decision making surrounding the 1962 Cuban Missile 
Crisis. At the time his manuscript was published, the conventional wisdom for modeling decision 
making was the rational actor model. This theory of decision making assumes that individuals 
(and governments) make decisions to maximize expected payoffs in respect to a particular set of 
goals. In the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis, rational actor models suggested that the 
possibility of nuclear war between the United States and USSR was unrealistic due to the 
rational actor concept of mutually assured destruction. In other words, no government would 
make a nuclear strike first because the consequences would result in nuclear annihilation for both 
countries. Allison disproved the idea of mutual assured destruction by showing the rational actor 
model ignored critical information needed by the Kennedy administration to make the most 
informed decision about the USSR and Cuba’s actions. He did this by offering two other 
empirical models that arrived at different conclusions. Allison argued that reliance on the rational 
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actor model could have had catastrophic consequences. For example, prior to 1941, Japan was 
aware that their military power could not stand up to a full war with the United States. The 
rational actor model would predict—similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis—that the Japanese’s 
government would not strike the United States first, since the resulting outcome would likely be 
the devastation of Japan. A military commander using conventional wisdom would never have 
considered the possibility of the attack on Pearl Harbor; the results were disastrous for our 
Pacific Fleet. Allison’s other two models consider a range of alternative explanations for the 
actions of Russia and Cuba during the crisis. He does not claim that these two models fully 
explain what occurred during the military standoff, nor does Allison argue that we can develop a 
perfect model of decision making. Rather, his major point is that decision makers would have 
benefited from considering alternative explanations beyond conventional wisdom.  
The question on the table in Greater Yellowstone is does the holy trinity (plus one) of 
conservation nonprofit failure fully explain why nonprofits are lagging in progress towards their 
formal goals? In other words, if a nonprofit is well-funded, enjoys broad public support, does not 
face a strong enemy, and utilizes effective management principles does that mean the 
organization is likely to achieve its organizational goals? The answer to this question—as 
Allison argues in The Essence of Decision—is maybe. In certain circumstances these 
explanations may in fact be correct. Nonprofits should consider these four factors. However, this 
chapter argued that there is significant evidence to suggest these generalized factors are not full 
accounts of nonprofit failure. While no single explanation will ever likely be enough to fully 
account for failure, the disproportionate reliance on these factors by nonprofit staff, boards, and 
donors skews attention away from potentially more robust explanations. If nonprofits want to 
improve their performance, reaching beyond pet explanations for failure is necessary. The 
101 
 
ultimate test for understanding and modifying performance is action (Brunner 2006). Reliance on 
conventional explanations has failed to solve the problems nonprofits face. 
 The next logical question is how can we reach past conventional explanations and find 
alternative conditioning factors for nonprofit failure? The next two chapters utilize the policy 
sciences framework as a means to expand our perspective. The generalized argument throughout 
the rest of the manuscript is that conventional explanations—the holy trinity (plus one) of 
environmental nonprofit failure—are disproportionally focused on manipulating two major 
variables: power and wealth. The bias in these explanatory factors is also evident in the various 
models of organizational effectiveness discussed in chapter three. The system resource model 
(judging success by the ability to fundraise) presupposes that the most influential factor for 
organizational success is financial resources (wealth). This model reduces the scope of choice for 
management interventions to questions about increasing total fundraising and efficiently using 
organizational funds. The internal process model (judging success by indicators of organizational 
governance) similarly assumes that poor management is the driving factor behind nonprofit 
failure. This model again restricts organizational interventions to choices over corporate 
governance (power). The participant satisfaction model (judging success by how well the 
interests of all relevant stakeholders are met) allows for a wider view of alternatives than the 
system resource and internal process models. However, it is still based in power dynamics. 
While not discussed in chapter three, these biases are one of the major reasons for 
selecting the goals model of organizational appraisal for this analysis. This model allows for a 
broader set of explanatory factors for nonprofit failure—beyond wealth and power dynamics. To 
be clear, I am not dismissing wealth and power as factors leading to nonprofit failure. In contrast, 
I am suggesting that these are important factors for any nonprofit to consider when judging the 
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success of their own organization. However, the holy trinity (plus one) of conservation nonprofit 
failure are incomplete explanations of why conservation nonprofits fall short of meeting their 
organizational objectives. Nonprofit staff and officers that want to improve their organization’s 
performance should consider these as serious possibilities, but also recognize that they are not 
necessarily full accounts of why their organization may be failing to meet organizational 
objectives. The next two chapters explore alternative explanations beyond conventional wisdom.     
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Chapter 5: Alternative Explanations: Challenges of the community 
 
Imagine that you are appraising the effectiveness of a soup kitchen. What should be the 
primary measure of success? The first thing that may come to mind is quantifying number of 
meals served. A soup kitchen that serves more meals than another, or the most meals at the least 
cost, is likely to be considered the more effective organization. However, what does this metric 
say about addressing the larger issue of homelessness? Does serving more meals mean that we 
are effectively combating the issue of homelessness? The correct answer is no. We cannot 
understand the effectiveness of a soup kitchen’s role in addressing the problem of homelessness 
without understanding dynamics between complementary organizations with similar goals. 
Homeless shelters, job training programs, and substance abuse centers programs matter too. 
Similarly, we must look at the dynamics of the larger conservation community to understand 
why environmental nonprofits often have trouble achieving their goals.  
When looking at the broad dynamics of a nonprofit community, the first response of most 
analysts is look for gaps and redundancies in practice. For example we might ask: Is the Greater 
Yellowstone conservation community over or under attending to strategies such as advocacy, 
conservation easements, direct action, or lawsuits? Or, are there too many nonprofits focused on 
wildlife conservation and a dearth of organizations focused on clean energy? Large foundations 
are particularly prone to such thinking. A program officer for a foundation that funds over 20 
Greater Yellowstone nonprofits explicitly states that her organization’s job it to “make sure there 
are no redundancies” in the system.   
This formula for effectiveness assumes two critical features. First is that an optimal set of 
strategies exist for any particular nonprofit community in the realization of their formal goals. 
Second, is that we can identify these optimal strategies for any particular nonprofit community.   
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Perhaps, in a carefully controlled experimental setting such conditions could be met. However, 
Greater Yellowstone’s nonprofits operate in a real-world setting where the context is 
uncontrolled, complex and constantly evolving. Holland (1992: 20) argues that in such cases: 
the aggregate behavior of the system is usually far from optimal, if indeed optimality can 
even be defined for the system as a whole. For this reason, standard theories in physics, 
economics, and elsewhere, are of little help because they concentrate on optimal end-
points, whereas complex adaptive systems "never get there." They continue to evolve, 
and they steadily exhibit new forms of emergent behavior….It is the process of 
becoming, rather than the never-reached end points, that we must study if we are to gain 
insight.   
 
It is easy for us to succumb to the “the considerable temptations of the optimal or best solutions 
the conventional disciplines seem able to provide” (Brewer and DeLeon 1983: 4). However, 
these optimal approaches often fail in practice due to oversimplifying or misconstruing the 
context. We must acknowledge that problems in open systems have “no objective, scientifically 
verifiable, optimal solution…yet the problems are real and demand solution” (Clark 2002: 4). 
While many people have tried to elicit general principles for optimal nonprofit performance, this 
analysis approaches the problem of improving nonprofit performance from an alternative 
perspective. Through empirical observation and analysis, the next two chapters seek to expand 
the scope of thought and choice that nonprofits have in appraising their own performance rather 
than develop a generalized model of nonprofit success. Optimal performance is not sought. 
Rather, the chapters are conserved with how to continually strive to do better.  
In this chapter, I offer three alternative explanations for the failure of Greater 
Yellowstone’s environmental nonprofits to achieve their organizational goals. This chapter looks 
at the dynamics of the broad community. For each of the three alternative conditioning factors, I 
explain the general concept and demonstrate how each factor has stronger explanatory power 
over conventional explanations in specific contexts.  Chapter six is a parallel analysis looking at 
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inner-organizational challenges. The purpose of these analyses is to demonstrate that 
conventional perspectives on nonprofit effectiveness are inadequate if our goal is to improve the 
performance of these organizations.   
5.1 Parasitic organizations 
 
In the previous chapter, I highlighted that the most frequently articulated reason for 
nonprofit failure is a lack of financial resources. The conventional response to this challenge is 
upgrading the fundraising skills of development personnel within a nonprofit. Certainly, 
educating and training staff in expertise such as grant writing, funder diversification and 
marketing will likely help an organization stay afloat. However, Greater Yellowstone’s 
conservation nonprofits face a significant resource challenge beyond the proficiency of any 
single organization’s ability to fundraise. A chronic challenge for the Yellowstone nonprofit 
community is parasitic organizations.  
Parasitic nonprofits drain scarce resources away from other organizations with similar 
goals. The most straightforward form is an organization that fundraises on a particular issue, but 
devotes no resources addressing that issue in practice. For example, of the 183 conservation 
nonprofits that claim to operate in Greater Yellowstone, eleven nonprofits do not maintain a 
physical presence in Idaho, Montana, or Wyoming. For nine of the organizations, I could not 
verify that the nonprofit currently or previously had any substantial program focused on 
conservation in Greater Yellowstone. We can infer that these nine organizations use the widely 
recognized symbol of Greater Yellowstone as a means to secure funding from their donor base. 
As a result, these organizations draw resources away from efforts intended to secure 
conservation outcomes in Greater Yellowstone. Richard Steinberg (2006: 126) describes these 
types organizations as “for-profits-in-disguise,” arguing such organizations reduce nonprofit 
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effectiveness by causing other “nonprofits that wish to provide the promised [services]…[to] 
have increasing trouble breaking even.” This often forces the nonprofit intending to provide the 
promised service to “compromise on quality or leave the market” (Ibid).   
When I describe the phenomena of parasitic organizations to Yellowstone’s nonprofit 
leaders, their first response is typically to ask me for the names of those nine organizations. They 
want to smoke out the perpetrators and recapture the funding streams. My response is 
straightforward: I use these nine organizations as an example to illustrate the concept of a 
parasitic nonprofit. Thankfully, these nine parasitic organizations are all relatively small with 
minimal funding streams. Understanding the basic concept of a parasitic nonprofit allows us to 
better grasp the more insidious and damaging form. Often organizations claim to be engaged in 
work on a particular issue in Greater Yellowstone, but can provide no evidence demonstrating 
grounded programs on a particular issue beyond the promotional material for their organization. 
There are many instances where this behavior has perverse outcomes for the conservation 
community. Carnivore conservation in Greater Yellowstone provides a good example of how 
traditional explanations fail to account for parasitic organizations.17 
On January 14, 1995, 14 wolves were reintroduced to Yellowstone and 15 in central 
Idaho. Bruce Babbitt, former Secretary of the Interior under President Clinton, declared at the 
reintroduction in Yellowstone, “At last the wolves are coming home, and Yellowstone will be a 
complete ecosystem ... It’s an extraordinary achievement and it’s an important statement about 
who we are as Americans” (Milstein 1995). Sixty years had passed since the last wolf sighting in 
the Northern Rockies. The effective management policy at the time was eradication. The 
reintroduction under the Endangered Species Act shifted the policy to protection. In 2005, ten 
                                                 
17 Goal #2 in Chapter three is: Long-term conservation of the Yellowstone grizzly bear and its habitat. For the 
purpose of the analysis in this chapter we can substitute large carnivores for simply grizzly bears.  
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years later, more than 1,000 wolves inhabited the Northern Rockies; 325 in the public lands of 
greater Yellowstone. By 2009, the total Northern Rockies population exceeded 1,500 wolves 
(USFWS et al 2010). The reintroduction is considered a major achievement by the environmental 
community. For example, the media has depicted recovery as “Something's [that is] right with 
the world” (Corrigan 2005), “a marquee success story for wilderness ecology, park tourism and 
the federal Endangered Species Act” (O'Driscoll 2001), and “the preeminent symbol of all that is 
wild, free, and majestic” (Lloyd 1997). 
 On the surface, the reintroduction of wolves appears to be a success story of the 
Endangered Species Act. Wolves in the Yellowstone system are effectively recovered. However, 
a closer look at the reintroduction and delisting decision making processes reveals another story 
(Clark and Gillesberg 2001). Most communities surrounding Yellowstone see the reintroduction 
of wolves as a threat to their way of life. Charles Price, a rancher in Daniel, WY, states, “Wolves 
have no business in this country. It was almost a crime to reintroduce wolves in Yellowstone. 
There is no place here for them” (Robbins 2006). Such vehement opposition is usually justified 
on economic grounds. Steve Gordon, a rancher in Dubois, WY argues, "We are paying the price 
for society's desire to have wolves right here…[a]nd it's costing us a ton of money" (Stein 2003). 
Most environmentalists do not agree with this story. Louisa Willcox, of the Natural Resources 
Defense Council, counters, “These are just more fairy tales about wolves…What we've actually 
seen over the last nine years since the Yellowstone reintroduction is that wolves are barely 
making a dent on livestock and elk, and tourism revenues are up year after year, in large part 
because wolves are attracting so many visitors from all over the country" (ENS 2004). 
 Since 1994, 13 separate lawsuits over the reintroduction and delisting of wolves were 
filed. Seven of the lawsuits exclusively address the reintroduction. Most notably, in 1996, the 
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Farm Bureau Federation sued the UWFWS asking the court to order the removal of all 
reintroduced wolves. The district court found in favor of the Farm Bureau, and ordered the 
USFWS to remove the experimental population. This ruling was overturned by 10th Circuit 
Court in 1998. Dismayed with the Circuit Court’s ruling, one Idaho (Custer), five Montana 
(Fergus, Wheatland, Blaine, Phillips, and Valley), and three Wyoming (Carbon, Park, and 
Freemont) counties passed resolutions calling wolves an ‘unacceptable species’ and ‘outlawing’ 
wolves within the county boundaries. For example, Phillips County, MT explicitly banned the 
“the presence, introduction or reintroduction of wolves” (AP 2003). While these resolutions are 
not enforceable, the counties’ declarations—and the lawsuits—demonstrate an expectation of the 
unlawfulness of the reintroduction by many participants.  Today, there is a battle over the listing 
of wolves under the Endangered Species Act, with five pieces of legislation in front of congress 
to potentially exclude wolves from consideration under the Act. 
 Nearly everyone involved in wolf conservation argues that political conflict over wolf 
management is escalating and highly problematic. Wolves are a highly polarizing symbolic 
species (Casey and Clark 1996). While the population count of wolves in the region suggests 
conservation success, the rise in social conflict creates fear that the current outcome is tenuous at 
best. For example, as a direct result of the political conflict, Montana Governor Brian Schweitzer 
(D) has actively encouraged ranchers to shoot wolves that harass livestock and directed Montana 
game wardens to suspend all investigations of wolf shootings north of Interstate 90 (Brown 
2011). This occurred while wolves were listed under the Endangered Species Act. Similarly, 
former Idaho gubernatorial candidate Rex Rammell (R) urged Idaho County commissioners to 
pass an emergency ordinance to allowing county Sheriff Doug Giddings to kill wolves as a 
means to eradicate them from the county (Barker 2010).  
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 As a means to reduce both human-wolf conflicts and social intolerance, a number of 
nonprofits have engaged in developing coexistence strategies for human wolf conflict. As 
discussed in chapter three, coexistence is an explicit conservation innovation to both improve 
environmental and social outcomes. Beyond wolves, some conservationists see a need to engage 
in wolf coexistence as a means to improve outcomes in other conservation issues. The director of 
a large carnivore focused nonprofit states that it “much more intense and politically vindictive 
out here [on other issues] because of wolves.” A long-time staff member for the Greater 
Yellowstone Coalition agrees that “The wolf issue invades every other issue in the region.”  
 My appraisal of the fourth goal in chapter three—helping people and wildlife coexist—
concluded that there is still room for significant process in meeting this goal. As demonstrated in 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3, livestock-wolf conflicts and human caused wolf mortality has increased 
substantially over the last 15 years. To reverse this trend, there are a few individuals and 
nonprofits actively prototyping wolf coexistence strategies on the ground. Examples include 
Steve Primm’s in the Madison Valley, MT and Timm Kaminski’s similar efforts in the Upper 
Green in western Wyoming. Their general efforts included using innovative depredation-
avoidance techniques that correspond to the home ranges of actual wolves versus trying to 
develop strategies applicable to the whole region. Such innovations include electrified fencing, 
fladery,18 guard dogs, patrolling pastures, and finding alternative grazing areas. Additionally, 
these coexistence programs aim to build forums where ranchers are able to share their 
experiences of what actually worked in their personal experiences to minimize depredation 
events. While limited in scope, the perceived positive impacts of such coexistence programs 
have gained notoriety in the broader Greater Yellowstone conservation community. As a result, 
                                                 
18 Fladery is a technique that uses fencing (often electrified) with small flags tightly spaced along the fence line as a 
means to deter wolves from crossing.  
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more nonprofits are attempting to engage in coexistence work. On the surface this may appear to 
be a positive trend. However, as we dig deeper another story emerges.  
In my interviews with individuals who are engaged in coexistence strategies, their 
primary explanatory factor for failure is a lack of funding. One practitioner explained that 
coexistence strategies are “more than a technical fix.” He argues that the most successful 
examples share a common feature, trust among the ranching community and the conservation 
practitioner. He claims that it took some of his colleagues over 15 years of working with these 
communities to build enough trust even engage in the simplest projects. He argues that “working 
with people takes time. It seems like the foundations aren’t willing to support the type of work 
we do.” Another individual laments that he is constantly living hand-to-mouth. He states, “I 
wouldn’t be here if I didn’t truly care about both people and bears…we are making an impact, 
but can barely get by due to the limited funding we can raise.” 
While more funding would certainly help, one of the primary challenges these individuals 
face is moving beyond the debilitating stereotypes ranchers have of environmentalists. It is 
necessary for coexistence practitioners to build trust and respect with ranchers and agency staff. 
This is the true currency of their work. Often this requires the coexistence practitioner remain in 
the background and allow other to take credit for grounded projects. However, one long-time 
coexistence practitioner is frustrated by what he calls the “disproportionate attribution of 
success” by environmental nonprofits. This individual was able to describe multiple instances 
where environmental nonprofits took full credit for success of coexistence projects, despite the 
fact the nonprofits only participated in a minor fashion. One clear case occurred where a national 
nonprofit approached his organization and asked, “Can we pay for a few electric fences [to keep 
out wolves]?” After allowing the national nonprofit to help pay for a small part of his work, the 
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national organizations began claiming success throughout the national nonprofits promotional 
material on carnivore coexistence. The national nonprofit never showed up to install the fence, 
nor did it put in the ten years of work to build trust in the local community. The result is what 
another conservationist calls “green blowback.” A number of ranchers got wind of the national 
nonprofit’s claims and responded furiously to the coexistence practitioner. In this instance, he 
claims it took nearly eight months to deal with the fall out. The practitioner argues that “the 
social capital we have amassed has taken years to develop. We have been there in good times 
and bad.” He argues that when other organizations take credit of the community’s hard work, it 
often causes challenges for him in future iterations. Another wolf coexistence expert observer, 
“the national groups often exacerbate the wolf conflict by fundraising on wolves. They do this 
because it works [for raising money], but is often very politically damaging to local grassroots 
efforts. Often the local people we work with get confused.” Another coexistence specialist 
argues that “often the ranching community doesn’t distinguish between me and an 
environmentalist in New York City. When groups fundraise on issues and don’t show up to do 
the work…It makes my job worse.”  
Parasitic nonprofits do not just siphon off potential wealth. These organizations engage in 
behaviors that actually make resolving the problem more difficult by reducing other resources 
such as social capital. There are two primary explanations for this behavior. The least charitable 
possibility is that nonprofits actively seek out success stories with complete disregard for the 
work of others. Nonprofits that have been ‘scooped’ in Greater Yellowstone default to this 
explanation. The more charitable explanation is that the staff members of parasitic organizations 
truly believe they are doing the same work. A coexistence conservationist believes that 
conservationists “often give themselves a black eye….a lot of it has to do with naiveté and 
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innocence.” He explained that a lot of “green blowback” has to due to misunderstandings 
between the ranching and environmental cultures, often over norms of respect. At times, solving 
this problem could be as simple as “taking your sunglasses off and looking someone directly in 
the eye.” 
When I interviewed individuals who were accused of this form of parasitic behavior, I 
was surprised to learn these individuals were self-aware of their impacts. An employee of a 
major carnivore nonprofit bluntly states,  Capitalizing on the high symbolism of charismatic 
mega-fauna is not inherently problematic.  What conservation groups must consider is the 
different ways the symbol of wolves plays at the national versus local level. The fundraising and 
promotional literature at the national level can often have detrimental effects at the local by 
enflaming the opposition. A program manager at Defenders of Wildlife asserts, “We understand 
this.” He explained in great detail how past promotional material escalated local conflict over 
wolves, acknowledging “we could change our strategies. However, it plays well to say you can 
save Yellowstone’s wolves….We raise a lot of money from our wolf campaign.” An employee at 
a competing nonprofit described this dynamic in terms of his regional office tension with the 
national office in Washington DC: 
The national office creates an alert to send to our membership. We always vet it for 
accuracy. They [the national office] are always pushing the limit of what we are 
comfortable saying. There is a conflict between what works for fund raising and what 
works on the ground. We are always factual in our vetting, but sometimes the details on 
the ground are glossed over. 
 
A well respected long-term Yellowstone environmentalist described the same phenomenon in 
another context. She described how the symbolic baggage that is attached to some well-meaning 
nonprofits actually causes her trouble: 
I have been involved with Y2Y [Yellowstone to Yukon Initiative] and the Wildlands 
Project since their inception. These organizations have undoubtedly made it more 
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difficult to work in the region. The big maps and large vision of these organizations 
created concrete evidence for our opposition to pigeonhole all environmentalists. 
 
She continued to describe that Y2Y is an inspiring vision for her as an environmentalist, but that 
the idea does not “play well” on the ground with the ranching community. Another 
conservationist agrees. He states, “Y2Y is a boogey man in the [United] States. The organization 
does not deserve that title, but it [the image] is true…being affiliated with Y2Y credibility with 
ranchers.” In this example, Y2Y is syphoning off social capital unintentionally.  
 Parasitic organizations is an explanatory factor that falls outside of the range of the holy 
trinity (plus one) of nonprofit failure, but is an important factor hindering the success of 
organizations engaged in coexistence strategies and wolf conservation in general. Improving the 
effectiveness of some organizations will require developing strategies to contain the damage 
created by other well-meaning conservation nonprofits. Simply fundraising more, increasing 
political will, weakening an enemy, or improving organizational management cannot solve the 
challenge of a parasitic organization. The syphoning off of social capital and the increase in 
green blowback by the conservation community itself is a challenge that limits conservation 
success.  
5.2 Cultures of meaning 
 
Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger (2004: 8), in their landmark essay The Death of 
Environmentalism, declared that “today environmentalism is just another special interest.” These 
authors argued that environmental leaders have arbitrarily determined what types of issues get 
counted as ‘environmental,’ often neglecting key issues of environmental importance. More 
troubling is Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s accusation that the “movement’s leading thinkers, 
funders and advocates do not question their most basic assumptions about who we are, what we 
stand for, and what it is that we should be doing” (ibid). While it is not unexpected that the 
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environmental elite are interested in maintaining the status quo, it is these basic assumptions that 
fundamentally define the identity of environmentalists and conservationists. 
Nonprofit organizations, particularly advocacy organizations, are comprised of 
likeminded individuals banding together towards a common valued outcome. These individuals 
share a common identity. Often we assert—as is the basis for evaluation in this manuscript—that 
the primary purpose of nonprofits is to achieve the commonly valued outcomes of its members, 
which should take the form of a mission statement. This is the goal statement of the common 
identity. However, nonprofits serve other purposes beyond the organization’s mission. Some of 
the non-mission related objectives are not tangible, as is the cases when organizations seek 
symbolic outcomes. One fundamental (and non-tangible) purpose of Greater Yellowstone 
nonprofits is to create a community of meaning to augment the identities of the individuals 
involved with the nonprofit. In other words, these organizations serve as a means to generate 
meaning in the lives of those involved with nonprofits and a sense of community by reinforcing a 
particular worldview among members. Such is the case for all organizations and communities. 
While this idea may not sit well with some readers, it is not controversial that people tend to self-
select and join organizations with which they share an identity. For example, the Buffalo Field 
Campaign (an animal rights organization) draws a different membership base than the Mule Deer 
Foundation (a sportsmen’s organization). Both nonprofits provide a means for their member’s 
worldviews to be supported by likeminded individuals. 
The fact people gravitate towards organizations which with they identify is no surprise. 
This gravitation is not inherently problematic for the regional environmental community. 
However, cultures of meaning can isolate themselves from other interest groups. This has the 
effect of further entrenching the group’s perspective away from the broader community. Doing 
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so creates the conditions where a special interest group—even environmental—will have little 
room for finding workable political solutions.  
This phenomenon widely recognized outside of conservation in Greater Yellowstone. 
Cass Sunstien (2001) describes a similar phenomenon in American Politics he calls the “echo 
chamber.” Sunstien argues that the political left and right in America are polarizing in a way 
where it is possible to gather information solely from sources with which you agree. For 
example, a left-leaning democrat can gather all their news from blogs such as the Daily Kos or 
The Huffington Post. In contrast, the right-leading republicans can gather information from 
sources such as Fox News and the Rush Limbaugh Show. As a result, dialog and exchange 
between political groups is replaced by self-reinforcing knowledge that further polarizes the 
political landscape.  In such cases, psychologist Aaron Beck (1999: 8) observes that “[p]eople in 
conflict perceive and react to the threat emanating from the image rather than to a realistic 
appraisal of the adversary…In ethnic, national, or international conflict, myths about the Enemy 
are propagated, giving the image further dimension.” In other words, empirical knowledge of 
people outside the identity group is replaced by unrealistic caricatures. Andrew Rich agrees with 
the general phenomenon (2004: 216), arguing that often political groups will not even consider 
scientific information produced by scientists they perceive to be affiliated with an opposing 
political party: 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, research is frequently evaluated more in 
terms of its ideological content and accessibility to audiences than by the quality of its 
contents. In interviews with longtime congressional staff, many of the best known think 
tanks were assessed only in terms of their ideological and marketing proclivities. 
 
The central challenge for communities of meaning is preventing themselves from becoming 
entrenched as an exclusive special interest. This is especially important given that the first goal 
appraised in this manuscript is for “all people to work together to protect the integrity and beauty 
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of the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem.” The Greater Yellowstone environmental nonprofit 
community cannot afford to establish themselves as a narrow special interest.  
Unfortunately, the dynamic of community of meaning isolating the environmental 
community as an exclusive special interest holds true in Greater Yellowstone. Employees of 
environmental nonprofits often stereotype their adversaries in ways that are mere caricatures of 
reality. An employee of a ecology research based nonprofit stated, “I have a hard time 
envisioning ranchers as anything but backwards rednecks.” Of course, the same holds true for the 
adversaries stereotyping environmentalists. Jackson Hole outfitter B.J. Hill agrees, "You do not 
negotiate with an environmental greenie. If you want to play, you play hardball" (Hatch 2010). 
Political scientists McBeth and Shanahan (2004, 334-335) explain: 
concurrent with the decline in social capital and the rise of policy marketing, consumer-
oriented citizens in the GYA [Greater Yellowstone Area] live in competing social 
realities with mutually exclusive sources of knowledge and competing interpretations of 
reality. Thus, when citizens examine policy conflicts, they—like the policy marketers that 
provide the information—approach the conflict from diametrically opposed frames that 
fail to consider the values of the opposition and the larger context of Greater Yellowstone 
policy conflict. 
 
The result creates a deeper divide than actually exists when a realistic appraisal of perspectives 
are mapped. Rather than attacking the problem, both sides are able to symbolically displace their 
anxiety on their opposition. This is likely the reason that a robust opposition is a common 
explanatory factor for environmental nonprofit failure. For conservation to be successful in the 
long-term, alternatives implemented in practice need to supported by a broad constituency.  
The trend of cultures of meaning occurs at different scales. At the broadest scale, the 
trend is apparent in the concentration of nonprofits within the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. 
The geographic distribution of the Greater Yellowstone conservation nonprofit community is 
highly skewed (Figure 5.1). Of the 183 conservation nonprofits who claim to work in Greater 
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Yellowstone, only 118 (64.5%) have a physical office in the 25 counties that encompass the 
ecosystem. Of the 118 conservation nonprofits offices in the region, 64% of nonprofits reside in 
two counties (Gallatin, MT and Teton, WY). If we expand to include the top five counties, these 
account for approximately 85% of total offices. 19  Eleven counties in Greater Yellowstone do 
not have a single conservation nonprofit office.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. The number of environmental nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone by county, overlaid 
with National Park Service and National Forest Service landownership.   
                                                 
19 The counties with the highest concentration of conservation nonprofit office are: 
Gallatin County, MT (40); Teton County, WY (35); Park County, MT (10); Fremont County, 
WY (9); Teton County, ID (6).  
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There are multiple ways to interpret the skewed geographic location on environmental 
nonprofits. First is that a disproportionate amount of wealth is centered in Teton and Gallatin 
Counties. Teton County is the most liberal county in Wyoming20 and has the highest per capita 
income the United States.21 Similarly, Gallatin County has the fourth highest per capita income 
in Montana (and the highest per capita income of Montana’s counties in Greater Yellowstone). 
Nonprofits may concentrate to areas with high personal income, as an approach to increase 
donations. The second explanation is Teton and Gallatin Counties have had the greatest 
population growth over the last 40 years. Between 1960 and 2000, Gallatin County’s population 
grew by 160% compared with a 47% average growth for Greater Yellowstone counties in 
Montana.22 Teton County grew by an amazing 496% during the same time period. This is 
compared with 133% average growth for Greater Yellowstone counties in Wyoming (37% if you 
exclude Teton County). In other words, nonprofits are also concentrated in areas with the highest 
population growth. These are areas where more new people have moved to the region. 
Regardless, both explanations highlight that nonprofits are clustered around a relatively narrow 
group of people: the wealthy and relative newcomers. 
At the smallest scale, communities of meaning are also evident within a single 
organization. The Nature Conservancy’s Greater Yellowstone Program provides a great example. 
While the public face of The Nature Conservancy is of a single national organization, state 
chapters are given significant autonomy to pursue their own conservation targets and fundraising 
                                                 
20 Teton County, WY is the most liberal as determined by voting in the 2008 presidential election. Teton County was 
one of only two Wyoming counties won by Democratic candidate Barak Obama. He won Teton County by the 
highest margin (61% Obama; 37% McCain. Washington Post, Presidential Election Winner by County available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/interactives/campaign08/election/uscounties.html 
21 As measured by per capita income ($132,726 in 2007). Bureau of Economic Analysis, Local Area Personal 
Income, 68 available at http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2009/05%20May/0509_lapitables.pdf  
22 Data was taken from the U.S. Census Bureau (2000) by county for the 25 counties that comprise Greater 
Yellowstone. In Idaho: Bear Lake, Bingham, Bonneville, Caribou, Clark, Franklin, Fremont, Jefferson, Madison, 
and Teton Counties; In Montana: Carbon, Gallatin, Madison, Park, Sweet Grass, Stillwater, and Yellowstone 
Counties; In Wyoming: Fremont, Hot Springs, Lincoln, Park, Sublette, and Teton Counties. 
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streams. A scientist for The Nature Conservancy’s national office argues that this decentralized 
design is a distinct advantage as it allows state chapters to conform to grounded experience 
within the state versus the culture of the national office. While this may be an advantage for the 
organization as a whole, it creates a window of opportunity to see how cultures of meaning can 
impact organizational results. To develop more coordination between chapters in the tri-state 
region of Greater Yellowstone, The Nature Conservancy formed a Greater Yellowstone Program 
office. While a well-meaning effort, a past director of this program called it “a train wreck from 
the start.” He argued that there the “organizational cultures” between state chapters in Idaho, 
Montana, and Wyoming were “so vast there was little room for cooperation.” Another Nature 
Conservancy employee involved with this program agreed with the former director’s assessment 
stating, “this program will never work the way it was intended.” He argued this issue was not 
systemic within The Nature Conservancy, pointing out that the Great Lakes Program works 
exceptionally well across state chapters. He concluded that chapters in Idaho, Montana, and 
Wyoming “just want different things.” The chapters have distinct cultures.  
While the dynamic of communities of meaning is apparent across a wide range of cases, 
snowmobile politics is a prime example of how communities of meanings paralyze the 
environmental community from resolving an issue. On November 21, 2006, the Park Service 
unveiled a plan that would allow 720 snowmobiles to operate daily within Yellowstone National 
Park. The environmental community labeled the preliminary decision as “nonsensical” (LAT 
2006) and “an unfortunate U-turn” in snowmobile policy (Soraghan 2006). In contrast, Jack 
Welch, president of the snowmobile Blue Ribbon Coalition, stated “I don’t think there is a 
problem with the numbers” (Jalonick 2006).  This recent controversy is the most recent iteration 
of a 40-year battle over the appropriateness of snow machines in Yellowstone National Park.   
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 The winter of 1963 marked a turning point for recreation in Yellowstone. This was the 
first year snowmobiles operated within the park boundaries (Glick and Freese 2004). By the mid-
1970s, commercial tourism by snowmobile was a staple of winter operations. Superintendent 
Jack Anderson justified the use of snowmobiles under the park’s mandate to protect the natural 
and cultural resources for human enjoyment. He stated snowmobiles "finally let people see what 
a great experience it is to get out in the wintertime and really see the park….We sometimes hear 
individuals say snowmobile operation in the park infringes upon the intrinsic majesty of the area, 
or threatens the wilderness characteristics of the park. I'd have to say they are wrong" (Grandall 
1997). 
 Under Anderson’s management, snowmobile use was relatively minor compared with 
today. By the mid-1990s, up to 70,000 snowmobiles entered the park each winter season 
(Yochim 2009). This increase in use triggered environmental concerns of air pollution, noise 
control, and wildlife harassment. A winter use plan was developed in 1990, followed by a second 
plan in 2000. The 2000 winter plan caused a drastic shift in the effective snowmobile policy. 
Donald Barry, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, declared “[t]he time has come for the National 
Park Service to pull in its welcome mat for recreational snowmobiling…[they are] noisy, 
antiquated machines that are no longer welcome in our national parks” (Hebert 2000).  
 Outraged by this decision, every single county commissioner—minus one—from the five 
counties that border Yellowstone signed a formal protest against the decision.  Clark Collins, 
former president of Blue Ribbon Coalition, stated “[t]he National Park Service’s plan to end 30 
years of snowmobile use in our parks flows from a public process that was badly flawed, and 
preordained as a means to placate a few extremists” (AP 2000). Ed Klim, President of the 
International Snowmobiling Manufacturers Association, agreed “There is no basis in fact or law 
121 
 
to totally eliminate snowmobile use” (ibid). In December 2000, the International Snowmobile 
Association and Wyoming State Snowmobile Association sued the Park Service asking for the 
court to throw out the plan. This was the second of five legal battles over snowmobiles between 
1997 and 2004. In July 2001, the case was settled with the contingency that a new plan be 
developed by 2002. A revised plan was released in November 2002, allowing a limited number 
of four-stroke snowmobiles (cleaner burning and less noisy) to operate in the park under the 
supervision of trained guides. The rule was adopted by the park service in 2003, and 
environmental groups subsequently sued the Park Service to reinstate the snowmobile ban of 
2000. Michael Scott, former executive director of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition, lamented 
on the adoption of the management plan, “We had hoped the Park Service would’ve moved in 
the direction of a healthier future for Yellowstone. Instead, they moved in a political direction” 
(AP 2004a).  
Other environmentalists criticized the Park’s policy using the conventional explanation of 
a robust enemy for nonprofit failure. One individual stated, “This is absurd. There are hundreds 
of miles just outside of Yellowstone and Grand Teton where snowmobilers can roam. Congress 
should stop kowtowing to the snowmobile lobby and ban these machines from these national 
parks” (SDUT 2004). Another asserted that “there is no place for snowmobiles in 
Yellowstone....This does not discriminate against snowmobile enthusiasts. They have millions of 
acres of national forest in which to scoot about” (ATS 2004). Another stated, “National Parks 
teeming with wildlife are no place to unleash snowmobiles, no matter what the Bush 
administration and Republican-controlled Congress have maintained” (SFC 2004). In 2008, after 
a more than 10-year campaign by environmental groups to end winter snowmobiling, 
Yellowstone National Park Service made a decision to allow approximately double the number 
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of snowmobiles permitted in 2003 (Brown 2008). An employee of The Nature Conservancy and 
30-year Yellowstone conservationist stated that “winter use is another other outright failure by 
the environmental community.” He asserts that “we can’t get traction of the issue…I’m not 
terribly optimistic that things will change.” 
We see this same dynamic with the pro-snowmobiling groups. Lynn Birleffi, director of 
the Wyoming Lodging and Restaurant Association, believes, “citizens should have access to 
Yellowstone during its most spectacular time, and if we don’t make sure that the snowmobiles 
don’t have some role, then people aren’t going to be able to get into some parts” (AP 2004b). 
The alterative proposed by environmentalists to eliminate snowmobiles is to allow slow moving 
snowcoaches transport visitors. Curt Kennedy, president of the Utah Snowmobile Association, 
calls snowcoaches “a cattle-car arrangement. It might be a neat experience for someone from 
Manhattan who has never been out of the city before” (Woolf 2000). Jerry Johnson, West 
Yellowstone Mayor and operator of Backcountry Adventures, agrees. He sees snowmobiling as 
“an individual experience. You’re outside with the wind in your face. It’s the American way: 
You’ve got control of your own destiny” (Fullwood 2004). 
While these types of statement typify the traditional explanation of a robust enemy, the 
statements also demonstrate that the snowmobile case is fundamentally about the 
environmentalists’ identification with nature. Conservationists have developed a strong culture 
of meaning of what types of activities are appropriate during the winter months in Yellowstone. 
To most conservations, snowmobiles should not be allowed—period. For example, when I asked 
on advocate if there was any information that would change his mind he responded, “No.” For 
the last 10 years, environmentalists have advocated for the use of snowcoaches as a replacement 
to snowmobiles in the park. Snowcoaches are large multi-person vehicles that have the ability to 
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move over snow and ice. The Greater Yellowstone Coalition (2010) argues, “Snowmobiles have 
been a noisy, air-fouling, wildlife-stressing influence in Yellowstone for four decades.” This 
organizations declares that that their “mission” in winter use is to “phase out snowmobiles in 
Yellowstone in favor of cleaner, quieter, more efficient snowcoaches that still provide ample 
access for visitors to explore and enjoy Yellowstone's remarkable wildlife and geysers in 
winter.” 
Yellowstone’s outdoor recreation planner Michael Yochim (2009: 200) argues that “some 
people have been involved [in this issue] so long that they have difficulty accepting compromises 
or solutions different from the ones they have always advocated.” For example, consistent with 
the Greater Yellowstone Coalition’s goal, Yellowstone National Park’s winter use EIS argued 
that plowing the roads and allowing buses in Yellowstone would be more environmentally begin 
than snowcoach, as buses and plows are quitter and would consume significantly less fuel than 
snowcoaches. However, this solution is considered unacceptable by most environmentalists as it 
is not part of their identity and discourse. Yochim states (2009: 200-209): 
…..Conservationist had been fighting the winter battle so long that they had acquired 
tunnel vision. A different solution that would accomplish their own ends in more 
desirable ways would threaten the credibility that they, and their interest groups, had 
achieved in advocating a consistent position for the better part of a 
decade….Conservationists will continue to advocate for the snowcaoach-only alternative, 
failing to celebrate improvements that have occurring in the park, as well as failing to 
admit that snowcoaches consume much more fuel and are twice the cost of buses.  To do 
otherwise—to celebrate success and move on or to change their position to support 
plowing—would be to risk losing control of the issue and the perceive ability to emplace 
their values in Yellowstone. By claiming that snowmobiles continue to devastate park 
resource, conservationists portray the issue dichotomously, painting themselves at 
Yellowstone’s savior in white with the correct solution (and associated values). 209 
 
In other words, rather than solve their stated problem, environmental groups appear to be 
interested in using the winter use issue as a means to reinforce their cultural identity. The process 
of reinforcing their identity further entrenches the environmental nonprofits as an exclusive 
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special interest without room for compromise. Cultures of meaning is an additional explanatory 
factor that falls outside of the range of the holy trinity (plus one) of nonprofit failure, but is an 
important factor hindering the success of organizations engaged in coexistence strategies. 
Improving the effectiveness for some organizations will require strategies that allow 
organizations to advocate for common versus exclusive special interest solutions. 
5.3 Homogenization of strategy 
 
A central challenge in policy studies is the development of strategies to solve societal 
problems. At the most basic level, there are two schools of thought on implementing policy 
alternatives. The first school of thought is based in the traditional scientific method, often 
referred to as positivism (Brunner 2006; e.g. Friedman 1953). In practice, people who are 
predisposed to this approach believe that through careful examination of empirical evidence we 
can determine the optimal solution for any given policy problem. To them, the homogenization 
of organizational strategy is not inherently problematic. Rather, as analysts and practitioners, our 
goal should be to determine what is the optimal strategies (or portfolio) of strategies to secure 
conservation outcomes. The second school of thought hinges on the idea we can identify likely 
levers of policy change, however, there are always factors beyond the scope of our control. This 
perspective argues that optimal solutions do not exist in open systems (Brewer and deLeon 1983; 
Brunner 2006; Clark 2002). Rather, we are in a continual struggle to try to find ways to do better. 
This perspective assumes that having a diverse community that innovates is likely a better recipe 
for success than relying on a single solution to achieve our goals in open systems.  
Capitalist theories assume that for an organization to be successful it must differentiate 
itself from its competitors. This is assumed to be especially true for nonprofits whose primary 
source of funds relies on the good nature of donors. Borrowing from ecology, nonprofits must 
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find their own niche to be successful. Many individuals I interviewed for this manuscript believe 
that the Greater Yellowstone conservation nonprofit community follows this pattern, arguing that 
organizations have hyper-differentiated. For example, a program direction at the Jackson Hole 
Conservation Alliance states bluntly that “there is no redundancy” in the Greater Yellowstone 
nonprofit community. She believes that any suggestion otherwise is misguided. Similarly, a 
Greater Yellowstone Coalition employee says “there is not a lot of overlap. Over time groups 
learned to complement each other.” He believes that overlap only occurs by new groups that 
have not yet have time to acclimate to the nonprofit community.  
 On one hand, these individuals are right. As the director of a Jackson Hole based 
nonprofit stated, “there are so many issues for us to address and so little time.” Conservation 
organizations often operate in ‘crisis mode’ trying to tackle every potential environmental issue 
in the region. There is always another issue that deserves attention. One could make a substantial 
argument that a community of 183 nonprofits and $150 million is still not large enough to focus 
on every relevant environmental issue. Environmental groups in Greater Yellowstone appear to 
have minor redundancy in focus—very few groups mirror each other perfectly. While content 
focus of nonprofits is highly diverse, the broad strategies used by nonprofit organizations in 
Greater Yellowstone are increasingly narrow. In other words, a homogenization of perspective is 
occurring, which severely limits the ability of the broad community to be successful.  
Many individuals I interviewed recognize this problem. An employee of The Nature 
Conservancy argued, “Yellowstone is where it all started…we’ve really been surpassed in how 
we think of conservation…we have not evolved as a community, we keep doing the same 
things.” He explained that often organizations try new strategies, but fall back on “what they 
know versus what works best.” The most lamented example described my interviews was the 
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history of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition. A 35-year member of the Yellowstone 
environmental community reminisced about the founding of the coalition in 1983. He states that 
the “Coalition was a breath of fresh air in Yellowstone. It was originally constructed as a 
coalition building organization. We needed that.”  He described coordinating action amongst the 
growing environmental community was innovative and needed in the early 1980s. An employee 
of The Wilderness Society explained that the Yellowstone nonprofit community was beginning 
to fragment in that time period, and “GYC [the Greater Yellowstone Coalition] was poised to be 
the glue to hold us together.” He continued that “Today, the Coalition is just another 
organization that competes for resource. They do the same thing as everyone else.” He contends 
that the Greater Yellowstone Coalition’s homogenization “was a loss for us all.” There was a 
general sentiment in my interviews that you can take the name off of any organization, slap it on 
another, and no one would know the difference.  
Homogenization has occurred for a number of reasons. A former employee of the Sierra 
Club stated that “We do not have a diversity of views in the conservation community. There are 
many possible explanations.  The age structure of environmental leadership is skewed. The sex 
structure of environmental leadership is skewed too.” While these statements are true, this 
individual’s explanations never went beyond the demographic of the conservation community. 
For example, parasitic organizations describe the phenomenon of restricting innovation through 
partial incorporation; this factor describes how nonprofits often restrict new ideas by 
symbolically but not substantively incorporating new ideas into their existing programs. 
Similarly, foundation drag in the next chapter explains how funding sources can create 
institutional pressures for nonprofit to conform to a reduced set of strategies.  
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The protection of an antelope migration in the southern portion of Greater Yellowstone 
provides an example of how homogenization of strategy is a more appropriate explanatory factor 
than the holy trinity (plus one). Greater Yellowstone is home to the longest land mammal 
migration in North and South America, excluding caribou in Alaska and the Yukon. Every fall, 
approximately 200 pronghorn antelope migrate approximately 90 miles from Grand Teton 
National Park to the Upper Green in southeastern Wyoming (Berger 2004). In addition to the 
extreme distance of this migration, environmentalists value this pronghorn movement for two 
major reasons. First, this migration prevents the localized extinction of pronghorn in Grand 
Teton National Park(Berger 2003). Without the migration, Grand Teton will lose their pronghorn 
population as deep snow conditions within the park are not conducive to winter survival (Harper 
1985). Second, archeological evidence suggests that at least portions of this migration have 
occurred for over 6,000 (Miller and Saunders 2000). While this migration was disrupted for 
approximately 50 years due to over hunting, it has major historical significance (Cherney In 
Press). Particularly, since this migration is just one of two long-distance pronghorn migrations in 
Greater Yellowstone (White et al 2007).  
The uniqueness of this migration was first recognized by the conservation community 
during the planning process for the Jackson Hole National Elk Refuge Environmental Impact 
Statement in 1999. While discussing the future of migrating elk near the National Elk Refuge, 
environmentalists realized that this area was also home to the longest land mammal migrations in 
North America. Over the subsequent eight years, environmental nonprofits began a major 
campaign to protect this migration in its entirety (Cherney In Press).  
This initial effort to conserve this migration was wrought with controversy. This 
controversy was surprising for one reason, as all political perspectives agreed on the goal of 
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maintaining this migration in perpetuity (Cherney 2004). Conflict existed over the most 
appropriate means to achieve this goal. Environmental nonprofits suggested that the migration be 
conserved through the created of a new protected area (e.g. Berger 2005). In its most liberal 
form, this protected area would be the development of a new national park. However, other 
alternatives were suggested including memorandum of understanding between major federal 
landowners. These solutions stood in stark contrast the solutions preferred by the majority of 
long-time Wyoming residents. Most individuals were in favor of doing nothing (they saw no 
major direct threats to the migration) or simply persuading—but not requiring— local 
landowners to change land management practices to facilitate the migration (Cherney and Clark 
2009).  
A political battle ensued between 1999 and 2008. In the summer of 2008, it appeared as if 
the environmental nonprofit had no chance at achieving their desired outcome (Cherney In 
Press). At this time, the majority of conservationists blamed their failure to achieve their desired 
outcomes on a robust opposition; the political power of the fossil fuel and ranching industries. 
For example, an employee of the Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance stated, “The BLM just 
kowtows to the gas industry. They [BLM] doesn’t care about pronghorn.” Similarly, an 
employee of a large regional conservation nonprofit said, “Wyoming Game and Fish 
[Department] ignores us. They just listen to their ranching buddies.” This individual argued the 
failure to achieve protection was due to the political power of local politics.  
The conventional explanations of nonprofit failure do a poor job at explaining why 
protection of this migration did not occur prior to 2008. We can see this through the relatively 
successful conservation of this migration subsequent to 2008, which did not require defeating a 
robust enemy. The 11 environmental nonprofits focused working on this case focused on a single 
129 
 
strategy: Creating the first ever national migration corridor as a comprehensive means to secure 
the long-term viability of this pronghorn migration. These organizations focused on a 
coordinated advocacy campaign at the local and national levels to convince the public and 
legislators that this was the best means to ensure protection. The strategy to protect this 
migration in its entirety failed. 
In May 2008, a surprising result emerged. Grand Teton National Park and the Bridger 
Teton National Forest signed an agreement to protect the northern portions of this migration, and 
the Bridger Teton National Forest designated the northern portion of the migration as a corridor 
requiring environmental review for any significant action (Hamilton 2008; Hatch 2008a). When 
Grand Teton National Park and the Bridger Teton National Forest signed their agreement, 
environmentalists were elated that their strategy appeared to work. While this appeared to be a 
success, few actual threats to the migration occurred on this land area. In other words, this new 
‘protected area’ amounted to little more than a symbolic gesture that this migration is important. 
The vast majority of threats occurred in the form of housing development on private lands and 
natural gas development on BLM land in the southern half of the migration. Simultaneous to 
policy change a number of local landowners began modifying fences that stood in the way of 
migrating pronghorn without through voluntary means. The two major participant groups in this 
case—environmentalists and localists—pursued parallel strategies to each protect a portion of 
the migration (Cherney In Press).  
Homogenization of strategy is better explanatory factor than the holy trinity (plus one) of 
nonprofit failure in this case. While some conservationists believe that “there is no redundancy” 
among environmental nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone, these individuals need to realize that 
while perfect redundancy does not exists, functional redundancy (homogenization) is occurring. 
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The 11 environmental nonprofits involved in the conservation of the pronghorn migration did not 
engage in redundant behavior. For example, one organization focused on local politics, another 
on national politics, and yet another on developing scientific information. However, the overall 
strategy of creating a protected area was homogeneous. If that strategy failed, the protection of 
the migration was likely to fail. The resulting success of this story was due to an alternative 
strategy developed by a participant group outside of the environmental community. 
Environmentalists can learn from this case that a portfolio of strategies may be necessary to 
achieve the conservation outcomes they seek.  
5.4 Conclusion 
 
The conventional explanations of nonprofit failure focus on two factors for why 
individual organizations have trouble achieving their goals. First are failures internal to the 
organization. For example, a lack of resources and poor management explain why an 
organization may not be able to provide the services it claims to provide. These explanations 
focus on improving the skills within a nonprofit’s staff.  The second object focuses on factors 
completely external to the organization. For example, lack of political will and a robust enemy 
place failure on individuals and organizations beyond the scope of any single organization. The 
implied solution is to fight harder. This chapter demonstrates that a third object exists. Rather 
than place blame internally or with the opposition, the broader nonprofit community can 
substantially impact the likelihood of specific nonprofit’s ability to achieve its goals (Table 5.1). 
Parasitic nonprofits capitalize on successful organization by siphon resources away from the 
successful organizations activities. When conservation nonprofits operate as cultures of meaning 
they often further entrenches the environmental agenda as an exclusive special interest. As long 
as the environmental agenda is seen as a special interest, it is unlikely that long-term success will 
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be achieved. Homogenization of nonprofit strategy reduces the likelihood that the available 
choices will secure the desired outcomes. 
Explanatory Factor Source of Failure Variable to Change 
Parasitic Organizations Interorganizational  Affection, Rectitude, Respect 
Communities of Meaning Interorganizational  Affection, Rectitude, Respect 
Homogenization Interorganizational  Enlightenment, Skill 
 
Table 5.1. Summary Table of Interorganizational Factors for Environmental Nonprofit Failure. 
 
Nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone and beyond operate in a complex and interdependent 
network of organizations. This chapter makes the case that conventional explanations of 
nonprofit failure do not capture the full range of reasons why nonprofits fail to achieve their 
desired outcomes, as the dynamic within a community typically ignored by nonprofit managers. 
For nonprofits to leverage greater effectiveness, managers need to consider how the choices of 
their organization and peer organizations effect the outcomes they seek. While many nonprofit 
managers recognize this dynamic, most are unwilling to directly address these set of challenges 
in their organizational strategy. The next chapter sheds light on why this is the case by 
investigating alternative explanations for failure at the organizational level.  
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Chapter 6: Alternative Explanations: Challenges of the organization 
Greater Yellowstone’s conservation nonprofits face many challenges. These 
organizations operate in a complex political and bureaucratic environment where they must 
compete for resources in order to achieve successful conservation outcomes. The previous 
chapter focused on explanations for environmental nonprofit failure where the dynamics of the 
nonprofit community impede progress of organizational goals. While the collective problems 
that conservation nonprofits face are significant, nonprofits do not primarily operate as a 
collective entity. They are first and foremost singular organizations pursuing their own agenda. 
A nonprofit’s primary responsibility is to their organization, not the broad community of which 
they are apart. This chapter highlights alternative explanatory factors for nonprofit failure at the 
organizational level. The three factors outlined in this chapter suggest that conventional 
explanations are also insufficient to explain organizational challenges.    
Considerable literature exists on how to improve nonprofit performance. As described in 
chapter four, the vast majority of the literature focuses on organizational fiscal and human 
resources management. Fiscal management includes both fundraising and efficiently using 
acquired resources. Human management applies to staff and board governance, in addition to 
organizational strategic planning. These topics may seem broad. However, these explanations 
primarily center on the shaping and sharing of wealth, power, and skill within the organization. 
While these are important variables to consider, there are other important values are at play in 
any institutional setting. This chapter supplements our understanding of the inter-organizational 
factors that impede nonprofit performance by unearthing explanatory factors beyond wealth, 
power, and skill.  
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6.1 Identity augmentation  
 
Why do individual citizens become involved with nonprofits? The charitable explanation 
is that people want to improve the communities in which they live. In other words, someone 
perceives problem in their community (e.g. environmental pollution, an expanding homeless 
population, increasing domestic violence) and takes action to help remedy the perceived issue. 
The premise of this dissertation is we should be evaluating nonprofits based on their performance 
in remedying the problems in which they formally make commitments to resolve. This is why 
the appropriate standard for evaluating a nonprofit is the organization’s mission statement. 
However, nonprofits provide a range of indirect services to their membership, donor base, and 
staff.  Often hidden from view and pursued unconsciously, these services are often major factors 
in why individuals become involved with nonprofits. One of these services is identity 
augmentation.  
 Identify augmentation is the indulgence of respect and rectitude that nonprofits provide 
their constituency. In other words, nonprofits help reinforce a sense of identity and meaning for 
the individuals involved.  For example, a staff member at the Natural Resources Defense Council 
said he “left a high paying corporate job” for one that gave him more “personal satisfaction.” 
Similarly, an employee at the Jackson Hole Land Trust said he switched from his real-estate 
career so he could “sleep at night.” Such tradeoffs are prevalent among donors and members of 
environmental nonprofits too. A major individual donor to environmental nonprofits in Greater 
Yellowstone said he made a small fortune and it was now time “to give back.” He talked about 
how donating to environmental nonprofits gave him a personal sense of “doing good for the 
planet.” Similarly, a program officer at the Moore Foundation remarked, “We give money to 
organizations that we like.” She spoke how the personalities involved in a nonprofit are just 
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important as the substance in her decision making process. This applies to small donors as well. 
At a public meeting in Jackson Hole, WY an individual member of the Sierra Club and Greater 
Yellowstone Coalition told me she joins such groups to “help save wildlife.” She spoke on how 
it “feels good to make a difference.” 
Communities of meaning discussed in the previous chapter speaks to this issue at the 
system wide level; that group identifications can further entrench environmental groups as 
special interests. Identity augmentation is similar. However, identity augmentation refers to the 
displacement of organizational goals by the informal goals of respect and rectitude indulgences.  
In other words, substituting conservation nonprofit’s goal with the goals of an individual wanting 
to be well liked and respected by the environmental community or creating a personal sense of 
worth.  
This dynamic may be controversial to some individuals involved in nonprofits. However, 
similar ideas are well documented in the literature beyond environmental nonprofits in Greater 
Yellowstone. Robert Kaplan (2001:358-359) of Harvard Business School describes the 
challenges of identity augmentation another way: 
Many people who become employees of these organizations [nonprofits] accept below-
market compensation because they believe in the mission of the agency. Their personal 
values motivate them to do good and to contribute to society through the agency’s 
programs. This is wonderful and a great sources of strength for the nonprofit sector. But 
it is also a danger. Such motivated individuals come to the agency already equipped with 
a clear, albeit personal, idea about how to accomplish the organization’s goals. And they 
often encounter a nurturing environment in which all opinions are valued and listened to. 
This is an engine for diffusing organizational energy.  
 
Kaplan tells the story of a specific nonprofit’s strategic planning process. After two full days of 
meetings that involved the organization’s leadership, a manager responded that the plan was 
great but it missed an issue of strong personal importance to her and for which the organization 
currently had a major initiative. The issue area had little relevance to the larger organizational 
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mission. However, she was ready to dismiss the strategic plan in favor of her area of passion. 
Kaplan (2001: 359) remarks that the organization “had wandered into a new initiative without 
any sense about whether the initiative fell within its mission and strategy, how the initiative fit 
with its core capabilities and competencies, or whether the agency [the nonprofit] was 
particularly well qualified, relative to alternative providers, to make a substantial, cost-effective 
contribution” simply because staff was passionate about this issue. Some nonprofit scholars 
recognize identify augmentation in donors and argue that nonprofits should capitalize on it. For 
example, Jen Shang and Adrian Sargeant (2011) found in the context of public radio "the more 
donors identified themselves with the station...the more likely they were to give." They argue 
that smart charities "want donors to begin to see their support of the organization as a critical part 
of who they are and deliberately attempt to foster this over time." To capitalize on identity 
augmentation, the authors suggest that nonprofits should be reminded of group identifications 
immediately before they decide to give. Identify augmentation can provide both benefits and 
drawbacks.   
 Many of the individuals I interviewed saw identity augmentation as a challenge, despite 
not having an explicit vocabulary to discuss the issue. For example, an individual at the Jackson 
Hole Conservation Alliance stated, “Personality and drive overtake reasoned discussion” within 
the conservation community. She lamented that in the environmental nonprofit community ideas 
were often valued on the basis of who spoke rather than the likelihood of the strategy to work in 
practice. She asserted that it was difficult to speak up against the most highly respected 
conservationists in the region as she was afraid on alienating herself from her peers. She called 
this issue “inappropriate hero worship.” Similarly, an individual at The Wilderness Society 
explained that “the moral imperative” is what “inherently attracts people to conservation.” While 
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he believes that passion is an asset in conservation related work, he continued that “showing 
people you are passionate” is often more important for your career than achieving conservation 
outcomes. In other words, identifying yourself as part of the team is more important than the 
conservation outcome. He stated, “this is depressing because the issues are hard and we need 
more good professional trained people.” An employee of an organization based in Lander, WY 
agreed, “lots of people are passionate about the region. They are really helpful, but don’t always 
get it.” She also believes that the drive to secure conservation outcomes gets usurped by the drive 
to maintain the perception of passion by fellow community members. An employee with the 
Greater Yellowstone Coalition bluntly stated that many environmentalists are “more into 
activism and a good fight than real solutions.” 
Wolf conservation—or any of the major charismatic megafauna in Greater 
Yellowstone—presents an ideal context to explain the challenge of identity augmentation. As 
described in the previous chapter, the failure of environmental nonprofit to achieve their goals 
related to wolf conservation (e.g. coexistence) is often blamed on a robust opposition. 
Environmental nonprofits often decry that anti-wolf advocates are too strong of an enemy to 
fight or that region lacks political will. For example, Mike Clark (2010b) of the Greater 
Yellowstone Coalition argues that “it’s time we muster the political will to move past the 
polarization and develop a new plan for managing wolves.” While the preceding chapter offered 
parasitic organizations as an alternative explanation, identity augmentation provides another 
explanation that needs to be considered.  
 One of the principle challenges of wolf conservation identified is that some conservation 
nonprofits utilize the wolf issue to fundraise despite the fact their advocacy efforts actually 
exacerbate wolf conflict. We can unpack this dynamic to understand identity augmentation. 
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There are at least two factors at play. The first is the recognition that many environmental donors 
identify with wolves as a symbol of wilderness. Environmental nonprofits recognize this 
identification in their donors and utilize wolves as a means to fundraise. The previous chapter 
explained this dynamic in detail. Suffice to say that that utilizing identity as a means to fundraise 
has the potential to inflame political conflict. The second dynamic is how identity augmentation 
within nonprofit staff can impede progress on formal conservation goals.  
   Identity augmentation by nonprofit staff in the wolf case impacts the realization of both 
goals related to wolf conservation and other equally important formal organizational goals. 
Related to wolf conservation, individuals appear more interested in symbolic (identification) 
outcomes over substantive. As one individual put it “I am frustrated that we [as a community] 
don’t strategize in an overtly political way versus just doing what feels good or allows us to be 
on our high horse.” This statement certainly rang true in my interviews. In virtually every 
interview I conducted, wolves were mentioned as one of the major conservation issues in the 
region. When I asked what were the goals of wolf conservation for each interviewee’s 
organization, I never received a substantive answer beyond “maintain a viable population of 
wolves in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem.” This is a good symbolic answer. However, no 
one could articulate to me what is “a viable population of wolves,” nor could many organizations 
explicitly explain how their work contributed to the realization of a viable population. Rather, the 
sentiment was ‘I care about wolves and I need to do something about it.’ By raising the symbolic 
identification with wolves above the substantive commitment to grounded outcomes these 
individuals demonstrate that the maintenance of identity is more important than the conservation 
goal. 
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The more troubling issue is how identity augmentation in the wolf case can impede non-
wolf conservation related goals. In other words, how securing one’s identify distracts from 
formal goals. For example, the executive director of a large Yellowstone nonprofit with a broad 
conservation mission statement said that, “if we wanted a true bang for our buck, we wouldn’t 
focus on wolves. Wolves are too politically polarizing to get anything done.” He continued that 
“if we wanted change, we would focus on issues that are more broadly popular.” The director 
listed a number of issues he thought his organization was well positioned to make progress on. 
While acknowledging this fact, he admitted that his and his staff’s strong attachment to wolves 
focused them on the wolf issue. He claimed his organization’s efforts would not achieve much, 
but said, “I cannot help myself.” A staff member at another carnivore conservation nonprofit 
agreed. He argued that his organization could make much more progress on issues related to 
cougars, wolverines, and even bears. However, he stated that “I’ve been working on wolves for 
15 years. How can I give that up?” To this individual, his life’s work is so central to who he is 
that he cannot imagine working on another conservation project.  
Identity augmentation can affect conservation related outcomes in a variety of ways. 
Utilizing the phenomenon for fundraising may increase the available funds a nonprofit has to 
operate. However, the effect may be negative if the goals of ‘feeling good’ replace the formal 
goals of an organization. This explanatory factor falls outside of the holy trinity (plus one). 
However, some people may try to explain away the negative impacts of identity augmentation as 
poor management. While management is certainly implicated, the issue runs much deeper. 
Maintaining a sense of identity is central to all people. The passion individuals bring to nonprofit 
organizations is of fundamental importance to the work of these organizations. Suggesting that 
proper management can eliminate the challenges associated with identity augmentation is naïve. 
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The indulgences that nonprofits provide staff, donors and boards are a fundamental and 
legitimate purpose of a nonprofit. However, when the goals of identity supersede the formal 
goals of an organization it may prevent the realization of the formal goals.  
6.2 Problem blind strategies 
 
Imagine you are on an expedition attempting to reach the North Pole. Which direction 
would you start traveling? This question may seem trivial, but it parallels the question that 
conservation nonprofits must answer. What strategies should we employ to reach our goals? If 
you want to reach the North Pole, you better have a pretty good reason to start traveling south. 
Unfortunately, many conservation nonprofits in the Yellowstone region are not just traveling 
south, they are wandering with no compass or sense of direction in achieving their formally 
articulated goals.  
 Another way to say this is many nonprofit organizations are solution-oriented versus 
being problem-oriented. Solution-oriented organizations have predetermined (or pet) strategies 
that they believe are the best ways to address an issue with minimal analysis to back up their plan 
of action (Clark 2002). In such cases, solutions are applied irrespective of context. If you have a 
hammer, everything looks like a nail. It is akin to deciding to travel to the North Pole via running 
or dogsled rather than focus on determining which is the in the right direction to head. For 
example, some enforcement based environmental nonprofits bring litigation regardless of their 
organization’s goals. This is potentially problematic. For example, if your organization’s goal is 
to have “all people in the region working together,” litigation may not be the best means to 
achieve that end. Similarly, strict advocacy organizations tend to focus on educating the public 
and decision makers to the ‘correct’ facts. Using the same goal of having all people working 
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together, what happens if your advocacy strategies alienate your opposition? Perhaps traditional 
advocacy is not always the best strategy to utilize.  
A number of individuals I interviewed spoke to this dynamic. They recognized that their 
organization may not be employing the most effective strategy, yet they found it difficult to 
change their organization’s course. For example, the executive director of a Bozeman, MT based 
nonprofit explained, “I find it hard to stay on the cutting edge of what is happening on the 
ground. We are so busy managing our programs set up in the ‘90s that we often can’t find time to 
attend to what might work best.” He recognizes that many issues his organization faces require 
utilizing alternative strategies. However, he finds it is difficult to “exchange what we know [how 
to do] for something different.” His organization has become problem-blind unintentionally. 
Steve Hoffman (2009), Executive Director of Montana Audubon, agrees. “Overcoming certain 
limiting factors within the organization in terms of traditions, values and organizational habits 
with respect to how we do our business,” he states is challenging in the realization of their goals. 
He continues, “We have been in business now for over 30 years. In some cases we come up 
against a situation where this is the way we’ve always done it.” The director of a Jackson Hole, 
WY based nonprofit agreed that “it is hard to be strategic when the pace is so fast.” He argued 
that modifying organizational strategy is difficult when your organization is always in “crisis 
mode.” A central challenge is overcoming our natural bias to prioritize short-term outcomes over 
long-term goals (Ascher 2009). 
We can see this dynamic in a number of issues. In the pronghorn migration case 
highlighted in the previous chapter, environmental nonprofits sought a permanent solution in the 
form of a new national migration corridor. While this is an inspiring large scale solution, 
political viability was lacking on the ground in Wyoming. Comprehensive solutions appeared to 
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be preferred in my interviews with environmentalists. A long-time regional conservationist said, 
“The more you work here, the more you want lasting solutions.” He continued that he does not 
think lasting solutions exist. Rather than find a “perfect solution” he conceded that “we need to 
find better ways to manage” the problems faced. Similarly, in wolf conservation, an interviewee 
said, “we are suffering from wolf fatigue” in the region. He continued that “it [wolf 
conservation] is the permanent conservation issue in the northern Rockies, and it might not be 
the most important biological issue we face.” He argued that if our goal was to “conserve 
biodiversity and the ecosystem…wolves are the last issue we work on.” 
In contrast to being solution-oriented (problem-blind), the alternative is to be problem 
oriented (Lasswell 1971). Being problem oriented requires that the strategies you employ can 
actually alter the trends in a direction that will help you meet your goals (Brewer and deLeon 
1983). Peter Drucker (1990: 82-83) reminds us that “performance in the non-profit institution 
must be planned. And this starts out with the mission…For the mission defines what results are 
in this particular non-profit institution.” After a nonprofit identifies its goals, a problem-oriented 
organization will identify what factors are preventing the realization of those goals. This step is 
challenging for many nonprofits.  A nonprofit evaluator based in San Francisco states that “most 
nonprofits have no model for causality.” In his experience working with over 200 nonprofits, he 
found that most organizations did not systematically think how the strategies they employ will 
help them reach their organizational goals. In contrast, he found that most organizations are 
focused on “pet strategies” versus “solving problems.” 
The issue of bison and brucellosis in Greater Yellowstone presents an ideal opportunity 
to understand problem-blind strategies. On September 12, 2006, Wyoming’s brucellosis-free 
status was restored by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Wyoming had lost 
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their status in the Spring of 2004 when the second of two cattle herds tested positive for the 
disease; states lose their brucellosis-free status when two or more cattle herds test positive in a 
two-year period. Nine months before Wyoming’s status was restored, Idaho lost their status for 
the first time since 1991 (Federal Register 2006). While Montana has maintained a brucellosis-
free status since 1985, there have been a number of scares in recent years when cattle have tested 
positive but have not triggered the two-year criteria. Losing a brucellosis-free status has 
economic consequences for livestock producers within that state. The price of cattle often drops, 
as access to certain markets is restricted. Brucellosis is a bacterium that causes abortions in 
variety of ungulates including bison, elk, and cattle. Once an animal is infected, it is considered a 
lifelong carrier. In greater Yellowstone, there is concern among livestock producers that both 
bison and elk have the potential to transmit the disease to cattle. 
 Most brucellosis politics focuses on bison. In 1916, the United States Livestock Sanitary 
Association formed a committee to attempt to eradicate brucellosis in the United States. By the 
1960s, brucellosis was largely under control in cattle – however, not completely eradicated. The 
United States Animal Health Association viewed wild game as a threat to their efforts, and the 
Park Service began to test bison for the disease and cull infected animals (Cromley 2002a). In 
the winter of 1996-1997, significant controversy erupted when 1,084 Yellowstone bison were 
sent to slaughter in the name of brucellosis management. This controversy resurfaced in the 
winter of 2005-2006 and again in 2007-2008, when 1016 and 1631 bison were killed 
respectively (Figure 6.1). The Montana Farm Bureau supports these actions claiming, “The 
National Park Service must take responsibility for animals under their jurisdiction” and that there 
should be “zero tolerance for bison outside the park” (AP 2006). Dick Dolan, program director 
of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition, stated, “[t]his is the same line they have drawn in the sand 
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forever,” suggesting that a more tolerant policy should be adopted (ibid). Since 1995, at least five 
lawsuits have explicitly address bison and brucellosis management. However, to date, there is 
not a single documented case of transference of brucellosis from bison to cattle. In contrast, 
almost all wildlife-cattle brucellosis infections are attributed to elk (Thorne et al 1991). 
The conflict over bison continues to date. The primary goal of environmental nonprofits 
appears to be allowing bison to naturally migrate outside of Yellowstone in search of winter 
forage. For example, Mike Clark (2011) of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition says his 
organizations goal is to “ensure bison have a bright future each and every time they leave 
Yellowstone National Park.” Similarly, the Buffalo Field Campaign mission is “to stop the 
slaughter of Yellowstone's wild free roaming buffalo.” These organizations have tried to halt the 
harassment of bison outside of Yellowstone for 15 years, but have largely failed. The 2,699 bison 
slaughtered in the winters of 2005-2006 and 2007-2008 are evidence to that fact, in addition to 
the yearly trapping of bison that leave the park. For example, in the winter of 2010-2011 nearly 
300 bison were trapped by Montana Fish Wildlife and Parks (Repanshek 2011). Despite these 
failures, environmentalists celebrated what they perceived to be a major victory in the winter of 
2010-2011 when 25 bison were allowed to leave the park unmolested (Clark 2011). Even this 
victory did not last long. Within two weeks of allowing the bison to migrate out of the park one 
of the animals was shot by Montana state officials for wandering on to private land and another 
went missing (Flandro 2011). 
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Figure 6.1. Number of Yellowstone bison slaughtered by year (BFC 2008).  
The conventional explanation for why environmental nonprofits have failed in this case is 
a robust opposition. For example, Jeff Welsch (2011) communications director of the Greater 
Yellowstone Coalition blames failure on "a small but potent faction of Montanans and their 
stubborn resistance to allowing bison anywhere in the state." The Buffalo Field Campaign makes 
similar statements, blaming the Montana Department of Livestock as the primary culprit. The 
question is this a reasonable explanation for failure?  
It is clear that the Montana Department of Livestock controls the vast majority of power 
in this case (Cromley 2002b). On the surface, a robust opinion appears to be a reasonable 
explanatory factor. However, the lack of direct political power does not necessarily equate to 
failure. For example, on the issue of brucellosis in Wyoming, environmental groups were 
successful in closing three winter feed grounds in the Gros Ventre  River Drainage after a four 
year campaign.  In July 2005, the Greater Yellowstone Coalition, Jackson Hole Conservation 
Alliance, and Wyoming Outdoor Council held a public meeting in Jackson, WY where they 
presented a proposal to eliminate three winter feedgrounds in the Gros Ventre River Drainage.   
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The initial claims and counterclaims made by opposition groups was similar to the 
Montana bison case. Scott Groene, former Jackson representative of the Greater Yellowstone 
Coalition, claims “Wyoming is asleep at the wheel” (AP 2002). He argues that the unnatural 
concentration of elk at feedgrounds causes a higher prevalence of brucellosis among elk. Franz 
Camenzid, director of the Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance, states, “[i]f you don’t address 
feeding, you’re not addressing the core of the brucellosis issue” (AP 2005). Environmental 
groups were met by an equally robust opposition as in Montana. Terry Pollard, a member of the 
Wyoming Brucellosis Coordination Task Force, argued closing feedgrounds is “very premature 
and shouldn’t even be considered at this time” (ibid). Wyoming State Veterinarian Jim Lagan 
agreed. He states, “[a]ny abrupt change to feedgrounds could have severe consequences for 
ranchers.” (AP 2004c). 
The first few years of this project appeared to be a failure. Environmental groups were 
relying on the same two strategies in the Montana bison case: advocacy and litigation. Failure 
was blamed on a small segment of the ranching community. In 2008, the Forest Service 
reauthorized Wyoming’s winter feeding of elk for the next 20 years (Hatch 2008b). This was a 
setback for environmental groups whose goal was to completely eliminate the winter feeding of 
elk. Despite this, the reauthorization of winter feeding had a silver lining. The Forest Service 
excluded the three feedgrounds in the Gros Ventre from the reauthorization. That winter feeding 
of elk was discontinued on these feedgrounds in 2009 as a pilot project. A victory was achieved 
for the environmental community.  The success in this case appears to be the environmental 
groups effectively addressing the concerns of the ranching and outfitting community versus 
simply advocating for closure of the feed grounds.   
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The current strategies of the environmental nonprofits have not worked in the bison case. 
The primary alterative advocated by the environmental groups is to close grazing allotments or 
modifying the timing of them so buffalo and cattle do not overlap on the landscape. However, 
this does not address the full extent of the problem. Christina Cromley (2002b) argues that the 
principle problem is not the strength of the opposition, rather that this issue is fundamentally 
about human values and both sides are reliant on science to provide the answer. Both the 
problems ranchers and the environmental communities face need to be addressed for a long term 
solution. Cromley (2002b) finds that in the development of alternatives the environmental 
groups’ solutions have largely ignored the valid concerns of livestock producers. She suggests an 
alternative strategy that conservation groups can engage in to further their goals is 
environmentalists enhance economic viability of ranching and minimize threats from market 
pressures. This strategy working in the Wyoming feed ground case and has the potential to help 
inform action bison case. What will likely not work is continuing to rely on the same strategies 
utilized for over 15 years.  
The reliance on problem-blind strategies is an additional explanatory factor that can help 
us understand why environmental nonprofits might be challenged in meeting organizational 
goals. This factor falls outside the holy trinity (plus one) of environmental nonprofit failure, but 
is closely aligns with the conventional explanation of poor management. Poor management 
encapsulates inadequate strategic planning. The central difference between inadequate strategic 
planning and the reliance on problem-blind strategies is that being problem-oriented requires an 
organization to systematically analyze and define the problems an organization seek to resolve. 
Strategic planning may encompass this factor, but often does not. Being successful will require 
organizations to clarify their goals, identify the relevant trends, understand likely explanations 
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for what they see, make reasonable projections into the future, and devise alternatives that are 
both technically proficient and politically viable (Clark 2002). Environmental nonprofits often 
develop impressive technically proficient solutions that are not politically viable. Such solutions 
are not problem-oriented. For example, the proposal to prevent bison and cattle to occupy the 
same tracts of land is a technically proficient means of solving the bison-brucellosis issue, but 
remains unviable politically. In closing the winter feed grounds in Wyoming, the environmental 
community was able to meet both criteria.   
6.3 Foundation drag  
 
The traditional model of foundation giving is intuitive to most people. It starts with a 
charitable foundation selecting a nonprofit to which to donate money. The foundation then gives 
the nonprofit an unrestricted donation or earmarks the donation for a particular program of the 
nonprofit. The selection process by foundations can vary wildly from detailed quantitative 
analysis to simply giving money to a nonprofit that foundation believes in. The nonprofit then 
pursues their mission to the best of their organization’s ability. This model is likely intuitive to 
most people as it is the process individual use when engaging in philanthropy. It is most easily 
understood as giving away money.  
While intuitive, this model is not how most major foundations operate today. Over the 
last two decades, large foundations have made a shift in the way the view the recipients of their 
donations. In the traditional model of foundation giving recipients are viewed as grantees. The 
new model of philanthropy recognizes that foundations have goals too. This model views 
nonprofits as private contractors to carry out the foundation’s mission—not necessarily the 
nonprofit’s mission. In other words, grants from foundation (and large personal donors) now 
come with increasing significant strings attached as they are directed towards specific purposes.  
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There are a variety of explanations to why foundations have made this shift. Mathew 
Bishop and Michael Green (2008: 35) argue in their book Philanthro-capitalism: How the rich 
can save the world that individuals and foundations that focus on this new style of philanthropy 
“tend to be focused on results, the impact that their giving has.” In other words, foundations want 
measurable results for their social investments. Beyond results, foundations also view themselves 
in a privileged position to understand the dynamics of a nonprofit community. For example, a 
program officer for a large foundation that grants in Greater Yellowstone says her organization 
adopts the role of the comprehensive thinker for the whole Greater Yellowstone environmental 
nonprofit community. In a sense, she sees herself as orchestra conductors trying to see how the 
multitude of organizations and strategies fit together. A program officer at the Wilburforce 
Foundation made a similar remark, “if we don’t look at the big picture, who will?”  
There is a strong appeal to this line of thinking. Large donors are potentially able to keep 
nonprofits accountable. However, there are major implications for the effectiveness of 
conservation nonprofits. I call this pitfall foundation drag. The major challenge associated with 
foundation drag is mission creep; the goal of the foundation may subsume the goals of the 
nonprofit. This style of philanthropy can drag the priorities nonprofits away from the nonprofit’s 
mission and towards the foundation’s priorities. Dolnicar, Irvine and Lazarevski (2008) argue 
“public sector nonprofits face coercive, normative and mimetic pressures” by funders and that 
these pressures can lead to changes with a nonprofit organizational structure antithetical to the 
realization of the nonprofit’s mission. DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 155) describe foundation 
drag as institutional isomorphism, arguing that it is more pronounced when a nonprofit relies on 
a small donor base: 
The greater the extent to which an organizational field is dependent upon a single (or 
several similar) source of support for vital resources, the higher the level of isomorphism. 
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The centralization of resources within a field both directly causes homogenization by 
placing organizations under similar pressures from resource suppliers, and interacts with 
uncertainty and goal ambiguity to increase their impact.  
 
Conforming to intuitional pressures of other organizations (institutional isomorphism) is to be 
expected. However, the unintentional altering of organizational structure may be detrimental to 
the success of an organization meeting its objectives (Covaleski et al 1997; Dolnicar et al 2008).  
Foundation drag is particularly pronounced when donors are not grounded in the social context 
in which a nonprofit operates.  
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation provide us with an excellent thought experiment 
to help us understand foundation drag. In 2005, there were 71,095 active foundations in the 
United States granting $36.4 billion (Wing et al 2008).23 Gates Foundation gave just over $1.36 
billion in the same year (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 2007). This means The Gates 
Foundation’s accounts for more than 3.7% of the total foundation dollars donated in 2005. While 
we must applaud the extreme generosity of the Gates Family and Warren Buffet, their 
concentrated wealth in philanthropy has implications for the realization of nonprofit goals. In a 
2008 Wall Street Journal article, Melinda Gates points out that donating $20,000 to help “a child 
who needed a kidney” is “$20,000 that doesn’t go to buy life-saving vaccines” to children in 
developing countries (Mossberg 2008). The opportunity costs philanthropists make can have 
large social implications. We must ask who is best suited to make these types of social decisions. 
Is a foundation based in Seattle or a nonprofit working with children in developing countries 
likely have better knowledge on how to improve outcomes? We must consider the possibility 
that a foundation lacks the contextual knowledge to understand what might be the most 
appropriate value choices in a context in which they are unfamiliar. Similarly, a small nonprofit 
in  a developing country may not have the same access to experts or best practices that Gates 
                                                 
23 The most recent year for which data was available. 
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Foundation has at its disposal. While the answer is unclear, shifting all the power in a single 
direction is likely a recipe for disaster.  
While not the primary concern of foundation drag, abstraction of context has the 
possibility of entrenching poor solutions. We can see this through another short thought 
experiment. Imagine that you are a small nonprofit working in a developing country. Your 
nonprofit’s mission is to improve the health and welfare of children within your country. While 
working on an annual budget of $50,000 per year, your organization has determined that the best 
long-term strategy is to focus remedying nutrition deficiency in children and expecting mothers. 
However, one day a program officer from The Gates Foundation approaches you and offers you 
a $300,000 grant to buy life-saving vaccines for children. Would you accept their funding? Most 
nonprofit executive directors would likely accept this offer, as would I. However, the resulting 
outcome would likely to shift your organizational priories away from nutrition deficiency and 
towards vaccines. In other words, the foundation was able to drag your organizational focus 
towards the foundations priorities. While in our thought experiment one could argue that 
foundation drag did not negatively impact the nonprofit’s outcome, there are numerous examples 
of this dynamic hindering the effectiveness conservation outcomes in Greater Yellowstone.  
Foundation drag caused at least one nonprofit to shift their organization’s strategy in a 
direction for which they were ill-equipped to address. The director for this nonprofit bluntly 
stated that “funders are pushing their agendas.” He laments that “they [foundations] have ideas 
of what the solution should be, but seldom have an understanding of what it takes to implement 
such a solution.” He described that one of his major funders had a “revelation” and thought that 
local conservation groups should start working with county commissions in Greater Yellowstone 
as a strategy to achieve conservation outcomes. This foundation believes local politics is the way 
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forward on conservation in the West. While this may be a good strategy, a staff member at the 
nonprofit member admits that “our organization does not have the capacity or standing to talk to 
these politicians.” He furthered that while his nonprofit was sympathetic to the strategy, there are 
“much better positioned groups” to receive the funding. He described how this strategy was 
shifting the priority of his organization away from their major strength, GIS mapping. In a bout 
of self-questioning he stated “Are we going to reject the funding? Of, course not. Will we be 
successful? No.” 
In a similar situation of foundation drag, a nonprofit engaged in an innovative strategy to 
address wolf coexistence.24 This particular strategy had not been attempted before in Greater 
Yellowstone and showed promise as a means to reduce wolf depredation of livestock. After four 
years of implementing the project, a number of the staff members came to the conclusion that the 
program was too expensive and ineffective to justify continuing. A former staff member said, 
“we wanted to refocus our approach towards other means of coexistence.” The organization tried 
to shift its priorities. However, the initial prototype had built a loyal following among the 
organization’s donors. Another staff member claimed that one of their largest donors threatened 
to withdraw support for the nonprofit if the program was eliminated. The staff tried to convince 
the funder of the inadequacy of their program and the promise of a new innovation.  “We were in 
a bind,” stated the organization’s director. Faced with the choice of “funding and an ineffective 
program” and “no funding and no program…we chose to continue the program.” In other words, 
the foundation was able to drag the priorities of the organization away from achieving the  
nonprofit’s mission.  
                                                 
24 I am not identifying the strategy, as it will identify the organization and staff involved.  
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The general phenomenon of foundation drag does not just occur between foundations and 
nonprofits. The same general issue is seen between national conservation nonprofits and their 
field staff. A staff member of a major national environmental nonprofit remarked: 
National Office creates an alert. We vet it for accuracy. They are always pushing the limit 
of what we are comfortable saying. There is a conflict between what works for fund 
raising and what works on the ground. We are always factual our vetting, but sometimes 
the details on the ground are glossed over. 
 
This individual continued that the national office’s understanding of Greater Yellowstone is 
“different than ours.” He highlighted examples of the national organization making commitments 
for the regional Bozeman office, which “caused us to fundamentally change our [the field 
office’s] direction.” A staff member for another major environmental nonprofit spoke to how her 
field office drafted a “GYE [Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem] Strategic Plan.” She stated that 
this plan was the regional office’s best conception of realistic goals and strategies to employ. 
“The national office threw it away,” she complained and asserted “we now have a work plan that 
forces us to…address the wrong issues.”     
 Foundation drag is premised on the fact conservation nonprofits are interested in 
maintaining their funding streams. As such, they are vulnerable to coercion by major funders. Of 
course, foundations do not view themselves as coercive entities.  A program officer at a 
foundation that has funded over 35 of Greater Yellowstone’s NGOs states, “Foundations have 
missions and goals. We are constantly re-evaluating our priorities.” She continued that while 
nonprofits may not like the shifting priorities of foundations, deciding where to focus foundation 
resources is the foundation’s business. However, this mentality favors short-term foundation 
interests over long-term nonprofit interests and is another source of foundation drag.  
Many of my interview subjects complained that “donors constantly shift goals.” Another 
criticized that “foundations do not want to support the long-term work that is needed.” Another 
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environmentalist described this as “the petting zoo problem.” He explained that donor often want 
to work with you for a few years and find someone else to support “when they get bored.” He 
argued that keeping donors engaged requires you to adopt their ideas in your work. He states that 
this occasionally helps things, but usually negatively “shifts the focus of our work.” In other 
words, the direction of nonprofits is constantly pulled in different directions.  
Some nonprofits have innovated to address this problem. The executive director of one 
organization stated, “we have a broad mission by design. It allows us to pursue funding from 
diverse sources versus allowing funders to drive us.” However, he admits that this strategy 
makes evaluation of his organization difficult, because there is no clear goal. Foundation drag is 
also compounded the fear of upsetting donors. As one executive director stated, “you cannot talk 
openly with your funders about your failures.” He continued that the issue is especially sensitive 
when it was a funder derived idea. He continued, “Rather than let them know what worked and 
what did not, you need to focus exclusively on your successes.” Without a feedback loop back to 
funders, it is likely that bad ideas will continue in practice.  
 Foundation drag is another explanatory factor that lies outside of the holy trinity (plus 
one). While the drive for funding is cause of foundation drag, lacking resources and shifting 
priorities to acquire resources are distinct challenges.  One could argue this alternative 
explanation is captured by poor management. A manager should be able to resist the temptation 
of resources that shift organizational priorities. Since virtually every major foundation operates 
under the new model of philanthropy, such temptations are impossible to avoid. While it is easy 
to place blame on foundations and wealthy individuals for this institutional pressure, 
accountability lies on both sides of the table. We must acknowledge foundation drag is a 
significant challenge for the realization of nonprofit goals. Solving this challenge will likely 
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require that both foundations and nonprofits be attuned to foundation drag in pursuit of mutually 
agreed upon goals.  
6.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter set out to describe explanatory factors for nonprofit failure beyond the 
traditional explanations of wealth, power, and skill. Identity augmentation is the phenomenon of 
substituting personal goals for an organization’s mission. In particular, identify augmentation 
describes how personal goals related to affection and rectitude displace an organization’s agenda. 
In short, there is a difference between feeling good and doing good. Given that the nonprofit 
sector often relies on passionate donors and individuals, it is not surprising that in the pursuit to 
augment our sense of self-identity. Problem-blind strategies are the promotion and utilization of 
favored solutions by an organization versus the careful consideration what strategies would best 
address the problem the organization faces. Often when results do not meet expectations, 
organizations continue to use the same strategies and simply ‘try harder.’ When the wrong tool is 
selected for the job, trying harder will not help the nonprofit meet its goals. Foundation drag is 
the replacement of a nonprofit’s goals for those of a donor. While this may have a temporary 
effect, it can also shift the long-term priorities of an organization. This presents a major 
challenge when donors lack the contextual understanding of the problems a nonprofit seeks to 
remedy.   
The six alternative explanations outlined in this chapter and the pervious chapter 
(Parasitic organizations, cultures of meaning, homogenization, identify augmentation, problem-
blind strategies, and foundation drag) demonstrate that the holy-trinity (plus one) of conservation 
nonprofit failure are insufficient to explain why nonprofits fail. While these six factors help us 
understand the failure of conservation nonprofits in Yellowstone, we must remember that using 
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these six factors to augment the holy-trinity (plus one) will still not fully explain the inability of 
all conservation nonprofits to achieve their goals (Table 6.1). While some readers may be 
frustrated by the lack of a comprehensive list of explanatory factors for nonprofit failures, it is 
worth revising that the purpose of this manuscript, as outlined in chapter one, is to expand our 
critical understanding on why nonprofits fail. The purpose was not to highlight every problem 
that a nonprofit might face or fully replace conventional explanations. Rather, the central 
argument is that conventional wisdom is not sufficient to improve nonprofit performance.  We 
must learn to think differently.  
  Explanatory Factor Source of Failure Variable to Change 
Chapter 4 
Lack of Resources Internal to Organization Wealth 
Lack of Political Will External to Organization Enlightenment, Power 
Robust Opposition External to Organization Power 
Poor Management Internal to Organization Power, Wealth, Skill 
Chapter 5 
Parasitic Organizations Interorganizational  Affection, Rectitude, Respect 
Communities of Meaning Interorganizational  Affection, Rectitude, Respect 
Homogenization Interorganizational  Enlightenment, Skill 
Chapter 6 
Identity Augmentation Internal to Organization Affection, Rectitude, Respect 
Problem Blind Strategies Internal to Organization Rectitude, Skill 
Foundation Drag External to Organization Affection, Wealth, Power 
 
Table 6.1. Summary Table of Explanatory Factors for Environmental Nonprofit Failure. 
 
Success is defined as an organization’s ability to meet or make progress towards its 
formally defined goals. Such evaluation does not require that the organization has already met its 
desired outcome. Rather, this criterion conservatively defines success as making progress 
towards formal goals. The key to determining success or failure is determining the appropriate 
measures of progress. Since the goals of most nonprofits are not amendable to single quantitative 
metrics, those of us who are interested in evaluating performance must look to multiple 
indicators to suggest if an organization is on target. Using such criteria creates three potential 
evaluative outcomes. First is unqualified success. In such a case, all indicators demonstrate 
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progress towards formal goals (or that the goals have been met). Second is mixed results. This 
indicates nonprofits can still likely improve upon the current outcome. The final outcome is 
failure. In this case, trends indicate that trends are unaltered or, in the worst case scenario, 
moving in the wrong direction.  
 The ultimate test for explanatory factors is the ability to modify outcomes on the ground 
(Brunner 2006). Status quo performance, as defined by the four goals evaluated in chapter three, 
suggest that current explanations for failure are lacking (Table 3.3). In three out of the four goals, 
all indices suggested that trends related to success are moving in the wrong direction. Detractors 
of this definition of success argue that slowing down negative trends is a sign of progress. I 
agree. For example, the successful small-scale implementation of co-existence strategies may 
improve carnivore conservation in the long-term. However, success is measured by the high-
order goals of a nonprofit. High-order goals are akin to keeping a ship afloat. If the ship is 
sinking, plugging a small hole is not necessarily an indicator of success. When a vessel ends up 
on the bottom of the ocean, despite minor repairs, the high-order goal is a failure. We need to see 
the ship rising, not sinking. In Greater Yellowstone, we need to see the signs of progress 
translate into a reversal of higher-order trends towards nonprofit mission statements. To date, 
that has not occurred.  
The alternative explanations provided in chapters five and six create force us to think 
differently about nonprofit failure. These explanations are not meant as a perfect substitute for 
convention.  Rather, the implication is that the perspectives of environmental nonprofit managers 
are often sufficiently narrow to restrict the scope of choices available to them in increasing their 
organization’s performance. Creating the conditions for success will require us expand our 
viewpoints. We need find better ways to repair the ship. There are instances in where the 
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manager may not have the requisite training to move beyond convention. However, institutional 
pressures beyond a manager’s control often restrict a manager’s ability to move beyond 
traditional explanations for failure. The next chapter outlines alternatives that may help nonprofit 
managers improve their organization’s performance.  
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Chapter 7: Building a Stronger Future in Greater Yellowstone 
A traditional story in the social sciences is the drunkard’s search (e.g. Kaplan 1964; . The 
fable describes a man who lost his house keys one dark evening after leaving the local pub. The 
man begins frantically searching them under a streetlamp. A passerby stops and begins watching 
the drunken man hunt for the lost keys. After a while she asks the man “Is this where you 
misplaced your keys?” The drunk replies, “No.” She responds, “Then why search here?” His 
answer, “This is where the light is!” The drunkard’s search is used to describe the concept of 
bounded rationality. Bounded rational argues that imperfect information, limits to human 
cognition, time constraints, and other factors fundamentally limit our abilities to make perfect 
decisions (Lippmann 1965; Simon 1991; 1996). Often the critical features necessary to solve a 
problem lie outside of our ability as humans to understand them. Bounded rationality, in contrast 
to perfect rationality, suggests that optimal solutions are far from the norm in human decision 
making. The best we can do is to expand the light on critical features that may help us in our 
continued question to make better decisions as individuals, organizations, and society (Brunner 
2006).  
Consistent with bounded rationality, in 1971, Harold Lasswell (65) observed that “the 
tendency of every group is to narrow its frame of reference, chiefly because quick and easy 
individual payoffs so frequently come by adding minor and rather obvious amplifications to the 
field of common reference. Hence the focus of attention needs to be directed to neglected areas.” 
This manuscript’s purpose is help focus light on to neglected areas on why nonprofits fail. 
Conventional explanations for nonprofit failure—the holy trinity (plus one)—largely address 
institutional incentives surrounding power, wealth and skill. In many contexts, these explanations 
are useful tools to help nonprofit improve their performance. However, these factors cannot fully 
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account for the reasons nonprofits fail to meet organizational objectives. This analysis suggests 
that a range of other factors influence the way nonprofits operate. For example, affection and 
respect—being liked by your peers and social network—can help explain why nonprofits stray 
from achieving organizational objectives. Cultures of meaning and identity augmentation 
describe how these factors can affect the realization of goals in the conservation nonprofit 
community and within individual organizations. In addition to values, the holy trinity (plus one) 
also fails to account for the dynamics between nonprofits in stifling progress towards 
organizational goals.  
This chapter seeks to provide suggestions for improving nonprofit performance in 
Greater Yellowstone by encouraging nonprofit managers and funders to look beyond convention. 
To revisit chapter three, effective nonprofit performance is defined by an organizations ability to 
meet or make progress towards their formally defined goals. Formal goals are the foundation of 
nonprofit organizational performance as these objectives represent the organization’s contract 
with the American people through the auspices of the Internal Revenue Service. This chapter 
first highlights three conventional alternatives suggested by the Greater Yellowstone nonprofit 
community to boost performance and demonstrates that these alternatives lack the capacity to 
address the fundamental factor contributing to failure. They maintain a narrow frame of 
reference. I subsequently discuss three additional alternatives aimed at helping nonprofits 
address an expanded set of explanatory factors. These alternatives are encouraging innovation, 
prototyping, and goal modification. 
7.1 Conventional solutions 
In my interviews, many suggestions on how to improve nonprofit performance surfaced 
from nonprofit staff, directors, and funders. However, three solutions emerged as the most 
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popular. The first is to focus on improving nonprofit efficiency. This solution is increasing the 
amount of services rendered per dollar spent by a nonprofit. The Greater Yellowstone 
Conservation Organization Inventory (2009) confirms that Greater Yellowstone nonprofits see 
this as the most important means to improve nonprofit effectiveness in a survey asking 
environmental nonprofits what are the most important solutions to organizational challenges. The 
second solution advocated to improve performance is to engage in mergers and acquisitions. This 
solution is similar to the first suggestion, as mergers are a means to improve organizational 
efficiency. There is an important difference. Unlike simply improving inner-organizational 
efficiency, mergers require the involvement of multiple nonprofits by definition. This 
complicates the efficiency process. The third solution is to improve collaboration both within the 
environmental nonprofit community and with non-traditional conservation partners. 
While these three solutions do not represent all means to improve nonprofit performance 
suggested in my interviews, they represent the most popular ideas advocated by the Greater 
Yellowstone environmental nonprofit community. The purpose of briefly examining these 
solutions is not to dismiss them as potential means to improve nonprofit performance. Indeed, 
these solutions will likely prove useful if applied appropriately. Rather, the purpose is to 
continue to demonstrate that primary solutions advocated will not address the alternative 
explanations articulated by this manuscript. Focusing on these solutions does not solve the 
challenges Greater Yellowstone’s environmental nonprofits face in achieving their 
organizational goals.  
7.1.1 Focus on efficiency 
It is hard to argue with efficiency as a solution to improving nonprofit performance. The 
central premise of efficiency simply is doing more with fewer resources. Depending on the 
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context this could mean purchasing more land or buying conservation easements for reduced 
prices. Similarly, efficiency could mean minimizing administrative costs within a nonprofit or 
increasing the number of citizens reached in an educational campaign without raising 
expenditures. The idea is to free up resources so that they can be utilized in other ways by the 
organization.  
The key feature is to recognize that efficiency focuses on reducing cost in relation to a 
particular goal. This makes the central challenge determining the appropriate goal to focus on. 
For example, more efficiently communicating with a nonprofit’s membership base references 
communication with membership as the goal. Improving efficiency in this context may mean 
shifting from paper mailings to cheaper email communications, assuming the same number of 
individuals are reached. With low-order organizational goals (specific tasks), such as 
communication with membership, in efficiency measures are often relatively easy to measure 
progress. However, efficiency becomes more difficult to measure with higher order goals such as 
mission statements. Efficiently achieving carnivore coexistence may mean reducing the costs of 
a program currently implemented or finding new strategies to achieve the same goals for less 
money. Efficiency is hard to calculate when you are making tradeoffs between vastly different 
strategies such as litigation or land acquisition. The fact that higher order goals tend to be more 
difficult to measure biases efficiency towards lower order goals.  
This issue is compounded by the fact those advocating for efficiency often do so without 
a particular goal in mind.  For example, the director of a small Greater Yellowstone based 
foundation stated that her aim was to “improve efficiency” in the system. She stated that she 
does not care how organizations do this, as long as “they do a better job for less money.” 
Similarly, the executive director of a regional think tank agrees stating that the purpose of 
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efficiency is to “free up money for other uses…it doesn’t matter how it is done [within a 
nonprofit].” The fundamental assumption of improving efficiency as a means to increase 
organizational effectiveness is that more resources are likely to improve organizational 
performance.  However, the question becomes, “Is freeing up resources likely to seriously 
improve Greater Yellowstone’s conservation nonprofits’ abilities to leverage greater 
performance?” 
Financial resources are an invaluable factor in contributing to nonprofit success. Without 
money, nonprofits are unable to even attempt to achieve their organizational mission. Of course 
increased funding and efficiency of resource use are important factors for nonprofits to consider. 
Chapter three argued that while more money would certainly help, the environmental nonprofit 
community in Greater Yellowstone is well funded. There are few regions in the world where 
conservation nonprofits can boast a communal annual budget of $150 million per year. As such, 
it is difficult to argue that marginally improving efficiency will result in major gains in nonprofit 
effectiveness.  There are simply too many resources available for the community to use a lack of 
resources as a scapegoat. While efficiency is a helpful idea, it is not a serious solution in solving 
the challenges nonprofits face.  
 Additionally, improving financial efficiency will not help solve the six alternative factors 
highlighted in this manuscript. For example, improving resource use will not address 
conditioning factors which are centered on affection and respect; Identity augmentation and 
cultures of meaning fall into this category. Similarly, doing more with less will not help 
organizations evade parasitic organizations from syphoning off resources or prevent goals from 
being altered by foundation drag. Nor will the solution of efficiency prevent the homogenization 
of strategy. The explanatory factor most likely to be affected by improved efficiency is problem 
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blind strategies. If a nonprofit is able reduce its use of resources in utilizing a particular strategy, 
it may be able to expand the organization’s reach. However if those strategies are problem blind, 
the result is doing less with more. In other words, if a nonprofit engages in strategies unlikely to 
achieve the organization’s formal goals (problem-blind), then increasing the efficiency of a futile 
strategy will likely net no effect. 
 To reiterate, the purpose of briefly analyzing this solution (and the remaining two) is not 
to dismiss it from our toolbox in increasing organizational effectiveness. Rather, the purpose is to 
acknowledge that this popular idea for improving nonprofit performance does not address the 
alternative explanations for nonprofit failure highlighted in the manuscript. Focusing on 
improving organizational efficiency is a task in which all nonprofits should engage. Doing more 
with less is a straightforward way to leverage greater effectiveness. The danger is relying on this 
solution as the primary means to improve performance when poor resource utilization is not the 
primary means for nonprofit failure.  
7.1.2 Mergers and acquisitions 
Mergers are a popular idea—particularly among funders—to increase the effectiveness of 
environmental nonprofits. The idea is simple: by consolidating two (or more) organizations you 
are able to increase efficiency by reducing costs related to management. For example, nonprofits 
have large expenditures associated with payroll and accounting. These costs are high upfront, but 
decline substantially with each additional employee within the organization. By consolidating 
two nonprofits with similar missions, it is possible to reduce this type management cost and 
redirect the savings towards programmatic expenditures. In other words, consolidating has the 
potential of creating more bang for your buck. 
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While a well-meaning idea, empirical experience in Greater Yellowstone demonstrates 
that mergers in practice are problematic for environmental nonprofits. In the 125 years that 
conservation nonprofits have operated in Greater Yellowstone, conservationists could only point 
me towards three examples of attempted mergers. The outcome in all three cases was similar—
the mergers degenerated into virulent conflict between the two organizations and the merger 
ultimately failed.25 In fact conflict was so nasty that the individuals I interviewed who were 
involved in these cases were reluctant to speak to the details. As one individual said, “I don’t 
want to resurface past wounds.” However, a generalized account of the three cases is as follows: 
Over a family dinner, a mother and son who were board members of two different Jackson Hole 
based environmental nonprofits were discussing the programmatic overlap between 
organizations. These individuals saw an opportunity for improved resource efficiency, and began 
exploring the possibility of a merger between their respective boards. After building a coalition 
of supportive board members, active merger discussions ensued. When the boards shared the 
proposal with staff members, the situation polarized with staff of both organizations actively 
lobbying board members against a merger. An individual who was involved in one case stated 
the ultimate result was “hurt feelings and burnt bridges.” In another case, the results were more 
troubling from a staff member’s perspective. She lamented the loss of staff who “quit to make a 
point.” 
 From a resource allocation standpoint, according to those involved, all the three examples 
of failed mergers in Greater Yellowstone would have improved resource efficiency within the 
organizations. From a programmatic standpoint, it appeared that consolidating expertise would 
potentially have made these organizations more effective at meeting their goals. When I asked 
                                                 
25 There are likely more examples of failed mergers in the Greater Yellowstone conservation community. However, 
most discussions of mergers are held closed doors. These three cases are unique in that the proposal to merge 
organization surfaced in the public realm.  
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what accounted for these failures, the answer was consistent across cases. Those involved 
blamed conflicting personalities and the egos of specific board members and staff. The 
implication was that if these individuals were not involved in the merger everything would have 
gone smoothly. Perhaps this is the case. However, cultures of meaning and identity augmentation 
help us understand why mergers of environmental nonprofits are difficult.  
 Cultures of meaning suggest that individual gravitate towards organization with which 
they identify. Identifications largely consist of how people related to key symbols or stable 
patterns of practices within a group (Clark 2002). For example, symbols within an environmental 
nonprofit may include the founder (an organizational hero) or a particular species the 
organization is fond of protecting. Stable patterns of practices might include how aggressive an 
environmental nonprofit pursues advocacy or litigation. In at least one of the failed mergers, the 
“ego battle” between merging staff was, in part, related to insecurities of key symbols. The 
functional battle was over which organization’s founder was a more appropriate figure to inspire 
the merged organization. In another merger attempt, the fight was over whose organizational 
strategies were more effective. Such examples are not ego battles. They are legitimate conflicts 
of maintaining organization identity. Staff members are invested in maintaining the identity of 
the organization for which they work. Failure to account for identity augmentation is a recipe for 
disaster. 
From a functional standpoint, acquisitions provide a similar outcome as a merger. 
However, there has been much less resistance to this course of action. There is significant 
overlap of employment history between conservation nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone. The 
Greater Yellowstone Conservation Organizational Inventory Survey (2008) found that Greater 
Yellowstone conservation nonprofit employees worked for an average of 2.6 conservation 
166 
 
nonprofits in the region over their employment history. This is suggestive that while staff 
identifies with the nonprofit that employs them, identities are not fixed. In fact, through my 
interviews, at least six executive directors spoke to how they intentionally “poach” exceptional 
staff members from other organization. In one case, an executive director hired five individuals 
from the same nonprofit within a six month period. While not a true ‘acquisition,’ when staff 
comes willingly they are more amenable to shift their organizational identities.  
7.1.3 Collaboration 
Over the last 10 years there has been a significant push for increased collaboration in 
Greater Yellowstone as a solution to increase the effectiveness of environmental nonprofits. 
Conservationists advocate for this solution on two levels. The first is that increased collaboration 
needs to occur between environmental nonprofits. The second is that increased collaboration 
needs to occur between environmental nonprofits and “nontraditional” partners. Nontraditional 
partners refer to people and groups that do not share the social or political orientation of 
conservation nonprofits. There is the general assumption that working with other groups will 
increase the likelihood of achieving conservation outcomes.  
There is a strong rationale for engaging in collaborative efforts. The purpose of 
collaborative efforts is to build understanding, exchange ideas and practices, build decision 
support, coordination across jurisdictional boundaries, and develop the capacity to address future 
challenges (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000). Many practitioners and academics seek collaboration 
as a productive means to improvement conservation outcomes. Indeed, this is likely the case. 
However, a principle challenge with collaboration within the environmental community is 
exacerbating problems associated with communities of meaning. This is not an argument against 
collaborative efforts. In contrast, we must acknowledge that collaboration among likeminded 
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individuals has the potential to further reinforce the environmentalist cultural identity. This has 
the potential to continue to create a deeper political divide than actually exists between 
environmentalists and their opposition. Conscious effort need to be made by environmental 
groups to avoid this challenge.  
While we must be watchful of this theoretical concern, broad collaboration within the 
Greater Yellowstone nonprofit community is lacking. An employee of the Jackson Hole 
Conservation Alliance states, “We have tried different ways to get together and work, but they 
have largely been failures. Even the premier national groups cannot do this. We typically fail due 
to competition for money.” Similarly, an employee for the National Parks Conservation 
Association states that “There is little collaboration in the region. We all operate in our silos. 
Conservation here is more adversarial than anywhere else I have worked.” A former Sierra Club 
employee states, “It is an old boys’ culture.” She argued that if you are not part of the inner 
circle, “it is difficult to get people to work with you.” A Nature Conservancy employee states, 
“There are big rifts in the conservation community; we have very difficult questions we must ask 
ourselves [if we wish to work together].” These statements should not be taken as outright 
dismissals of collaboration in the region. There are many successful examples of conservation 
nonprofits working together. Chapter three discussed this dynamic in more detail. However, the 
key point is that collaboration within the Greater Yellowstone nonprofit community has yet to 
live up to its promise in the eyes of many conservationists.  
Collaboration with nontraditional partners minimizes the special interest challenge 
associated with cultures of meaning, as multiple interest groups are at the table. Indeed, this is 
the principle argument within the Yellowstone nonprofit community for collaboration with 
nontraditional partners. For example, an employee of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition states 
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that “The public does not trust us. There are strong negative stereotypes of green 
organizations…we are always in a handicapped position.” This individual continued that 
environmental groups need to work with the ranching community to “build trust” as a means to 
reduce the influence of those who oppose environmental outcomes and build nonpartisan 
solutions. Similarly, an employee of another Bozeman based nonprofit argued that collaborating 
with the opposition “is the only way…to develop lasting solutions.” 
While collaborative efforts are a promising means to improve nonprofit performance, this 
solution only addresses one of the six major alternative explanatory factors for nonprofit 
performance. This is not a direct critique of collaboration. Rather, my point is to highlight that of 
the three most popular solutions advocated in my interviews only one solution directly addresses 
the six alternative explanations for nonprofit failure. In other words, the solutions we currently 
attempt to employ are unlikely to solve the full range of problems environmental nonprofits face.  
7.2 Alternative solutions 
The purpose of reviewing popular conventional alternatives is not to dismiss these 
strategies outright. Rather, it was to demonstrate that these alternatives are not likely sufficient to 
leverage greater effectiveness within the Greater Yellowstone nonprofit community. This section 
provides three alternatives nonprofits can engage in to help move beyond convention.   
7.2.1 Encouraging innovation  
The principle argument in this manuscript is that the Greater Yellowstone nonprofit 
community—while diverse, well-funded, and passionate—is not considering a broad enough 
range of explanatory factors to increase conservation success in the region, despite that these 
organizations are uniquely suited to do so. We can, and should, expect these organizations to do 
better. Currently, the alternative explanatory factors demonstrate that institutional pressures 
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narrow the scope of choice for conservation nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone. Actively 
encourage innovation is a means of improving the realization of conservation outcomes by 
expanding the options available. Peter Drucker defines innovation as a “change that creates a 
new dimension of performance” (Hesselbein 2010: 11). These changes can be technical, such as 
devising a new system to keep wolves separated from livestock. Innovations can also be social, 
such as changing the behavior of citizens. We must remember, however, that innovation requires 
“bringing something new into use” (Mohr 1969). It is vital that conservation nonprofits in 
Greater Yellowstone find way that environmental nonprofits can change to create new 
dimensions of performance. This requires us to look outside of the light of conventional wisdom 
and utilized other factors. 
Often when we think of an innovation, we assume that the technology or practice can be 
applied in a range of contexts. While these types of innovations occasionally surface, the vast 
majority of innovations must be applied with careful consideration of the details in a particular 
case.  Garry Brewer and Peter deLeon (1983: 283) reminds us that “one person’s innovation 
could be another’s destruction.” When ideas are implemented in practice, the facts and 
particulars of the case are usually “far more complex…than anyone imagined” (ibid). Nothing 
can substitute for the practitioners understanding of the minute details and fine points of a 
complex technical and political situation. Rather than rely on expert innovation and diffusion to 
practitioners, I recommend two methods of encouraging innovation in the field: prototyping and 
a portfolio approach. Prototyping is geared towards changes nonprofits can make in improving 
their performance. A portfolio approach is a means for foundations and donors to encourage 
innovation in the system.    
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Prototyping is a low stakes strategy nonprofits can engage in to developing a greater 
likelihood of achieving organizational goals. Prototypes, compared with major initiatives, tend 
focus on flexibility, continued learning, and creativity. This method differs from careful 
experimentation as it does not requires that all possible variables be identified from the onset. A 
key feature “of all prototyping is its provisional, improving, exploratory approach to a context.” 
(emphasis in original; Lasswell and McDougal 1992: 895). It is highly likely that the most 
effective strategies will not be employed from the onset, rather they will developed through 
experience. Prototyping “relies on decentralized decisions by groups that face variations on a 
common problem” (Brunner and Clark 1997: 54). Lasswell (1971: 71) states that a primary 
purpose of a prototype is to determine the “willingness among the most effective participants to 
give the innovation a fair test.” Prototypes do not guarantee a successful outcome. Rather, it is 
expected that the innovation will require continued modification until the program or technology 
is ready for broader implementation. They are “a way of finding out what practices work and 
why and how to diffuse them” (Clark 1999: 410). 
Prototypes require an initial goal for guidance. However, this strategy for improvement 
does not rely on a formal plan of action. As unexpected challenges and opportunities arise in 
addressing the problem, prototyping allows the practitioners the flexibility to adapt the unfolding 
details. Rather than a major initiative or organizational campaign, a prototyping allows 
nonprofits to test strategies with minimal political visibility. The advantage is minimizing 
political resistance to an idea to see if it actually works in practice. If the prototype is 
unsuccessful, the small scale implementation will make it more likely that poor practices are 
terminated.  
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There are limited, but highly successful, examples of prototyping improving the 
realization of conservation outcomes in Greater Yellowstone. For example, the 2005 proposal 
(highlighted in chapter six) of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition, Jackson Hole Conservation 
Alliance, and Wyoming Outdoor Council to eliminate the winter feeding of elk in the Gros 
Ventre River Drainage is an example of a successful prototype. Rather than advocate for the full 
elimination of the winter feeding of elk, the original proposal was adapted as a means to test the 
concerns of all stakeholders. Similarly, coexistence strategies (highlighted in chapter five) 
engaged at the landowner levels are prototypes to determine the feasibility of minimizing 
conflict. 
 A Portfolio Approach requires a shift in the way donors view nonprofits. In general, 
foundations and private donors want to see a strong return for their investment. This is a fairly 
rational response, as most of us want to imagine that our donations have an impact. We are 
predisposed to fund success. However, supporting innovation will require that we expect and 
tolerate a certain level of failure by nonprofits. We can use the concept of portfolios in investing 
as an analogy for an alternative way to view the funding of nonprofits. Most professional 
investment managers suggest that investors develop a diversified portfolio of securities as a 
means to reduce risk to the investor assets. This is a strategy to help achieve the goal of 
maximizing the investor’s overall return. Among its advantages, diversification allows investors 
to participate in a limited amount of high-risk investments (with potential high pay-offs) without 
risking the complete realization of their financial goals.  
 This concept can be applied to nonprofits by arguing that some organizations, and 
programs within organizations, are riskier than others. For example, a conservation 
organizational strategy with a low-risk conservation pay-off is buying conservation easements or 
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land. As such, it is no surprise that land trusts account for approximately 65% of total 
conservation nonprofit dollars in Greater Yellowstone.26 In contrast, investing in a prototype is a 
much riskier conservation investment. But such innovations have the potential to drastically 
increase the realization of conservation goals beyond the status quo.  
Foundations try to take this approach by funding a diversity of organizations. However, 
from my interviews, it appears that little attention is paid to explicitly funding innovative 
approaches. Usually, foundations want to diversity by funding proven innovations. Proven 
innovations are no longer innovations—they are interventions (Lasswell and McDougal 1992). 
Foundations have the potential to drastically alter the conservation landscape by spending limited 
dollars to explicitly fund innovative ideas, perhaps by calling for innovation improvement grants. 
If single foundations do not want to take on this risk, there is room for a collection of 
foundations to form an innovation fund. Private donors, due to the scale of their donations, will 
have a much more difficult time explicitly funding innovation. The creation of a fund may open 
the opportunity for small donors to have an additional impact.  
There are a number of regional models that can be used to create an innovation fund. In 
the last 20 years there has been an increase in collective fundraising opportunities for private 
donors in Greater Yellowstone. Efforts include the Community Foundation of Jackson Hole, 1% 
for the Tetons, Yellowstone Park Foundation and the Bozeman Area Community Foundation. 
These organizations aggregate the donations of smaller individuals and distribute the funds to 
projects deemed worthy.   
7.2.2 Community based initiatives  
                                                 
26 This number is derived from the percentage of income received by the 34 nonprofits that exclusively focus on 
Greater Yellowstone.  
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Community based initiatives are an innovation that show promise to leverage greater 
effectiveness in Greater Yellowstone’s nonprofits. A community based initiative is comprised of 
individuals with different perspectives who “interact directly with one another over a period of 
time, in an effort to resolve an issue in the place where they live (Brunner 2002: 7).  These 
initiatives are “defined by a shared territory that is local in scope and includes many different 
interests” (Ibid 2002: 250). By focusing on issues at a local scale and through face-to-face 
interaction, participants are more likely to build a shared responsibility for the outcomes within 
their community. Community based initiatives focus on developing a multi-interest group, as 
opposed to a single special interest group. By working together, it is more likely that all 
participants will be able to advance their common interests (Brunner and Steelman 2005). This 
has the potential to created lasting outcomes for the diverse interests involved. However, it is 
important to understand that no set formula or prescriptive model exists for how a community 
based initiatives should operate. Rather, community based initiatives are a means for different 
interests to “directly engaged on another over a period of time in an effort to resolve their 
differences over an immediate issue” (Brunner and Colburn 2002: 201).  
Regional environmental nonprofits are well positioned to help foster an environment 
conducive of such initiatives. The fact that many environmental nonprofits are predisposed to the 
solution of collaboration with nontraditional partners suggests that strong potential exists. 
However, the concept of a community based initiatives should not be confused with 
collaborative conservation (or collaboration defined more broadly). While substantial overlap 
exists between the concepts, collaborative conservation prioritizes the interests of the 
environmental community over the interests of other individuals and groups within the 
community. Community based initiatives do not place priority for conservation outcomes over 
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others in the community. Rather, a community based initiative seeks to “integrate their separate 
interests in possible or balance them if necessary through new policies” (Brunner and Steelman 
2005: 19). This devolution of power to the broad community may be unpalatable to some 
conservationists, as there is no guarantee that the community will advance the conservationists 
desires. The advantage, however, is that if advanced the initiative’s outcome will likely be 
broadly supported by the community.  
There are a number of successful examples of community based initiatives operating in 
the Northern Rockies. The premier regional example is the Blackfoot Challenge Initiative in the 
Blackfoot Valley, MT. This community based initiative has been incredibly successful at finding 
common ground amongst historically warring interests on a number of issues. The Blackfoot 
Challenge was initially formed by a limited group of landowners who wanted to protect their 
community’s land for future generation, but now includes a highly diverse group of landowners, 
private firms, nonprofit organizations, and government agencies. The group’s website purports 
(BF 2006): 
Cooperation. Trust. Consensus. Three words guide the Blackfoot Challenge. Here, 
private landowners take the lead and public agencies follow in a shared goal-to keep large 
landscapes intact and rural lifestyles vital. What's our secret to success? Focus on the 80 
percent that folks can agree on and not the 20 percent that might divide us. Leave egos at 
the door and wear a Blackfoot Challenge hat in our meetings. Listen well, don't rush and 
find the common ground before acting.  
 
Through working as a community initiative the Blackfoot Challenge was able to reduce grizzly 
bear conflict by 93% between 2003 and 2009 through coexistence strategies. This outcome met 
the interests of ranchers by minimizing livestock losses and other negative impacts bears cause 
landowners. Additionally, this outcome met the interests of environmentalists by reducing the 
likelihood that bears would be killed.  Additionally, within 15 years the Blackfoot Challenge 
reported “1,500 acres of wetlands and 15,000 acres of native grasslands…and nearly 45,000 
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acres of private land have been protected with perpetual conservation easements” (Nambisan 
2008: 8). 
 Another example of a regional community based initiative is the Sustaining Jackson Hole 
in Teton County, WY. This initiative was formed by two regional nonprofits, the Northern 
Rockies Conservation Cooperative and the Charture Institute, as a means to address the 
increasing challenges Jackson Hole faced in the form of increasing population, wealth, and 
politics in Teton County. The initiative defined its purpose as identifying “the qualities we, as a 
community, would like to leave for future generations of Jackson Hole visitors & residents” 
(Charture 2011). This initiative formed working groups focused on a variety of topics including 
the arts, economy, environment, recreation, social services, and transportation. A number of the 
partners from Sustaining Jackson Hole formed a new foundation called 1% for the Tetons, based 
on Patagonia, Inc.’s program 1% for the planet. The Teton’s fund aggregates donations from 77 
local business (and growing), who all commit to contributing one-percent of their total 
organizational revenue to the foundation.  One-percent for the Tetons then disperses funds to 
local nonprofits that are engaged in projects that address the concerns developed by Sustaining 
Jackson Hole’s working groups (One-Percent for the Tetons 2010). The fund has dispersed 
nearly all of its funds to local environmental nonprofits working on local projects that directly 
benefit the community. Despite this type of proven track record in the Blackfoot and Jackson 
Hole, community based initiatives are largely ignored by environmental nonprofits as a means to 
secure their interests.   
Community based initiatives can directly address a number of the alternative 
conditioning factors. For example, ‘communities of meaning’ describes how group 
identifications tend to abstract one’s political opposition to mere caricatures of reality. 
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Community based initiatives have the potential to broaden the perspectives of the individuals 
involved through face-to-face interaction. For example, in the summer of 2005, the Bridger-
Teton National Forest began the revision of their forest management plan. Rather than engage in 
the traditional model of public comment, the Forest Service undertook a new comment system 
based, in part, on small group discussions that forced divergent interest groups to work together. 
At the end of the public comment meeting in Moran, WY, one of the most traditional outfitters 
said to one of the most extreme environmentalists “I didn’t know we have so much in common.” 
The environmentalist replied with “me either.” Community based initiatives are geared at 
fostering this type of dialog.  
7.2.3 Goal modification 
The central thrust of my analysis relies on the foundation that nonprofits should be 
evaluated on the basis of their formally defined goals. The highest order goals of an organization 
are found in the organizational mission and vision statement. Detractors to this style of analysis 
will argue that nonprofit pursue a range of legitimate goals beyond what is contained in the 
mission statement. Indeed this is true. In contrast to formal goals, effective goals are the goals a 
nonprofit actually pursues. This analysis highlights a number of situations where nonprofits 
pursue effective goals over the formally defined goals of the organization. For example, 
foundation drag is replacing the formal goals of a nonprofit with the effective goals of a 
foundation. Similarly, identity augmentation substitutes the effective goals of an individual for 
the formal goals on the organization. Those opposed to an appraisal based on formal goals will 
argue that the effective goals—what an organization is actually attempting to achieve—should be 
the basis for appraisal. 
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I agree that effective goals are legitimate pursuits for a nonprofit.  For example, 
increasing in fundraising or organizational membership are legitimate (and necessary) goals for a 
nonprofit to operate. These effective goals are rarely integrated in the formal goals of an 
organization making these effective goals potentially irrelevant criteria for appraisal based on my 
methodology. However, this is a naïve understanding of how I suggest organizations should be 
appraised. All organizations (and individuals) operate within a hierarchal framework of goals. 
For example, I may have goals related to career advancement (such as promotion) and personal 
recreation (learning to ski well). At any given time, I may value achieving one of these goals 
over the other and devote more time and resources obtain my favored outcome. While 
individuals rarely need to make formal goal commitments, organizations do so in the form of 
mission statements. As argued in chapter three, the mission and vision statement of a nonprofit is 
a formal contract with the American people to pursue those ends. In exchange for pursuing their 
formal goals, these organizations enjoy certain exemptions from the law such as tax-exempt 
status.  Nonprofits must pursue what they formally claim to seek.   
A key feature we must acknowledge is that hierarchal goal frameworks are dynamic and 
unstable over time. For example, as an individual I may place greater emphasis on the goal of 
getting promoted at my job versus increasing my skiing ability over time. I am not locked into a 
permanent goal structure. While nonprofits are required to state their formal goals publicly, these 
organizations are similarly not constrained to a permanent goal hierarchy. The mission and 
vision statements an organization commits to are dynamic and change over time. A primary 
recommendation for improving nonprofit effectiveness is to revise a nonprofits’ formal goal 
statement to meet its current effective goals. This allows nonprofits to meet their social contract 
and be transparent in their purposes to the American people. 
178 
 
On the surface, the suggestion to revise a formal goal statement may seem nothing more 
than a symbolic gesture. While symbolism is involved, shifting the formal goal statement to 
reflect the effective goals of a nonprofit creates the opportunity for an organization to move 
away from problem-blind to problem-oriented strategies. Problem-oriented strategies require 
systematic and realistic organizational appraisals. At the most basic level, an organizational 
evaluation is fundamentally learning about the way we work as a means to do better. Goals are 
the foundation of any evaluation. An evaluation cannot occur without determining what is 
objective being sought. By determining goals, it makes it possible to select criteria to measure 
progress towards or away from goals. If the improper goals are selected for appraisal, little will 
be learned. 
Unfortunately, goal clarification is a difficult task. Quite often goals are determined after 
the fact or made sufficiently broad to capture the widest range of possible participation within an 
organization. Determining goals as a means to bolster the image of an organization, for example, 
does little for meaningful evaluation. Similarly, crafting the broadest possible mission statement 
allows for little insight the function of an organization. By explicitly clarifying and committing 
to an organizations highest order effective goals, an organization is more likely to learn how to 
improve its performance.  
Unfortunately, there are strong incentives against goal clarification. As discussed in the 
section on foundation drag, many nonprofits find it difficult to talk about their failures with their 
funders. A former employee of American Wildlands states that most “people don’t want to 
appraise their organization.” He continued that the standard rationale vocalized is that “we have 
too many obligations.” In reality, he argues it is “we don’t want to know the answer.” An 
employee of The Nature Conservancy agrees. He states that “monitoring and self-evaluation are 
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shunned by the nonprofit community.” He argues that beyond the typical explanation of “we 
don’t have the resources or time,” the primary motivation is that environmental nonprofits “fear 
to highlight failure.” Rather than see evaluation as a means to improve performance, these 
individuals imply that people tend to fear bad results. However, without taking the risk to 
evaluate organizational performance the likelihood of improving outcomes is nonexistent.   
7.3 Conclusion 
The single most important concept for nonprofit mangers and funders to acknowledge in 
improving conservation outcomes in Greater Yellowstone is that nonprofits must broaden the 
range of available options to them. Greater Yellowstone’s conservation nonprofits have an 
impressive record in securing positive environmental outcomes over the last 120 years.  With the 
vast resources available to the conservation nonprofit community we can continue to expect 
better performance in the future. The available resources not only include the substantial 
financial available to the community, but the hundreds of dedicated conservationists who are 
passionate about the region and want to continue to secure a healthy future for Greater 
Yellowstone. The knowledge and experience of these practitioners must be leveraged for greater 
success. The current strategies employed by these organizations, unfortunately, are not enough to 
secure the future these organizations desire. Similarly, utilizing current strategies and simply 
“working harder” will also be insufficient. As Walter Lippmann (1915: 51) once wrote, "Where 
all think alike, no one thinks very much."” The key for Greater Yellowstone’s conservation 
nonprofits is to break free of conventional thinking in an explicit effort to innovate.   
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Chapter 8: Implications for Environmentalism, Democracy, and Yellowstone 
Chapter one asserted that there is an ongoing battle in American Environmentalism to 
answer two simple questions: What is an environmental outcome? And, what are the best means 
to achieve those outcomes? While some environmental advocates might purport to hold the 
correct answer to these questions, the reality is the answers will continue to be negotiated by 
environmentalists—and society—over time. There is no enduring or singular correct answer; the 
answers will continue to develop as society progresses. This social evolution does not paralyze 
us from improving outcomes. Rather, those of us who care about the environment are responsible 
for contributing to answering these questions in the context of our time.  
The formal goals of environmental nonprofits give us a window into current thoughts on 
what constitutes a pro-environmental outcome. This manuscript does not address the normative 
question of what the formal goals of environmental nonprofit should be. Rather, this analysis 
uses the formal goal statements of environmental nonprofits as a partial indicator of the 
environmental movement’s answer to this question. I take the formal commitments of these 
organizations at their word. By doing so, it opens up the possibility to start answering the second 
question. Given the current goals of environmentalism in the United States, what are the best 
means to achieve them?  How can environmental nonprofits do better? 
The central message of this manuscript is that environmental nonprofits in Greater 
Yellowstone are artificially and unnecessarily restricting the scope of choices available to them. 
By doing so, these nonprofits are less likely to achieve their current and future goals. Many 
members of the nonprofit community are locked in convention with limited possibilities of 
finding new ways forward. This conclusion is supported by a number of experienced 
practitioners in the region. A conservation planner for The Nature Conservancy stated, 
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“Yellowstone is where it all started…[despite this] we’ve really been surpassed in how we think 
of conservation.” “We have not evolved as a conservation community,” he states, “it is time for 
change.” The previous chapter discusses how environmental nonprofits in Greater Yellowstone 
might do better. This chapter discusses broader implications these findings for American 
environmentalism and democratic practice.  
8.1 American environmentalism  
Environmental nonprofits often portray themselves as of saviors of the natural world. 
These organizations claim to be in a privileged position to ‘speak for the trees.’  In effect, these 
organizations seek to give voice to nature in political and policy processes. Environmentalists 
often believe that their positions transcend politics; despite the reality politics are inherent in the 
social negotiations of environmental outcomes and strategies. While their right to hold this 
privileged position in our society is occasionally questioned by those outside the movement (e.g. 
Huber 1999), a more fundamental challenge for environmentalists is addressing the concerns of 
critical lovers of the environmental movement.  
We must remember that the dynamic to question environmental outcomes has been 
constant since the birth of American Environmentalism. Early wise-use conservationists (e.g. 
Gifford Pinchot and Teddy Roosevelt) battled preservationists (e.g. John Muir and Henry 
Senger) over the appropriate uses for our public lands, with both sides of the debate asserting 
that their strategies and desired outcomes for environmental protection were superior to the 
other. Since that time, the most ardent environmentalists have maintained a sense of moral and 
strategic correctness in their opinions, often fundamentally dismissing those with divergent 
opinions.  
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Many environmentalists have great disdain for members of the environmental movement 
who do not share their vision of the future—or definition of what it means to be ‘environmental.’ 
For example, David Brower’s shows us his contempt for compromising environmentalists when 
he states, “polite conservationists leave no mark save the scars upon the Earth that could have 
been prevented had they stood their ground” (Scheuering 2004). Mark Dowie (1999: 256) 
believes that “without fervor in the ranks” the large national nonprofits “cannot formulate a 
vision” for environmentalism. Such individuals believe that grassroots activism hold the true 
vision for the future. Other critics argue that retreating to an exclusive vision of 
environmentalism is a mistake. Adam Werbach (2004, pp.16-31), former president of the Sierra 
Club, alleges: 
….the ability of environmentalism, as a language, an ideology, a set of practices, and 
network of institutions, cannot deal with the most pressing ecological challenges facing 
the planet….the environmental movement is not prepared, nor does it have a plan, to 
fight the enormous battles we face… 
 
Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus (2004: 6-10) of the Breakthrough Institute agree: 
…it is hard not to conclude that the environmental movement’s approach to problems and 
policies hasn’t worked particularly well….What the environmental movement needs 
more than anything else right now is to take a collective step back to rethink 
everything….We concluded that the problem wasn’t with environmental leaders so much 
as with their conceptual models, policy frameworks, and institutions. 
 
These three individuals have declared that environmentalism “dead” and proclaim that the way 
forward is to build a new progressive ideology that integrates environmental values with other 
political concerns of American citizens. The central challenge they articulate is that “for too 
long, environmentalists have believed that their cause—protecting nature—to be so transparently 
right that they have thought little about their failure to appeal to deeply held national aspirations” 
(Nordhaus and Shellenberger 2007: 65). To them, improving environmentalism is not about the 
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fervor of the believers, but rather the pragmatics of integrating the environmental agenda with 
other interests in society.  
This dissertation sought to use the Greater Yellowstone system as a microcosm for 
understanding the challenges of larger environmental movement. While the region is unique in 
its biophysical features and bureaucratic landscape, the challenges Greater Yellowstone’s 
nonprofits face are shared with environmental nonprofits beyond Yellowstone. The vast majority 
of critical lovers of the environmental movement, such as above, are experienced practitioners 
who are passionate about making a difference. Their appraisals are the result of experience of 
working within environmental nonprofits. However, such appraisals have rarely taken the form 
of systematic empirical study. Rather, they are the informed opinions of some of the worlds’ 
leading environmental practitioners. Mac Chapin (2004: 3), director of the Center for the Support 
of Native Lands, agrees: 
It has been the case for some time that the large conservationists are not accountable to 
anyone, and that far too little is known about what is really happening in the field. In 
particular, we don’t know whether the large-scale, science-based programs that appeal so 
much to funders are really achieving conservation goals. We also have little sense of 
what works and what doesn’t work in what circumstances. 
 
This analysis aimed at contributing to our knowledge of environmental nonprofits through a 
systematic empirical appraisal of the Greater Yellowstone nonprofit community. There are 
several broad implications for environmentalists in the context of previous critiques.  
The most fundamental lesson for environmentalists is that despite the environmental 
movement’s expansion in size, the perspectives of environmentalists have narrowed. While most 
modern environmentalists romanticize past leaders as visionaries (which they were), the more 
important reality is that the power of past environmentalism stemmed from its diversity in 
ideological perspective. Rachel Carson, John Muir, Aldo Leopold, and David Brower are 
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important figures in environmentalism’s history, but the notion many modern environmentalists 
have is that these individuals fostered a revolution against mainstream society. 
“Environmentalism was never particularly counter cultural,” but rather the product of middle-of-
the-road political thought (Nordhaus and Shellenberger 2007: 30). American Senators came up 
with the idea for the first Earth Day. The most important environmental laws were bipartisan and 
signed by a republican president—Richard Nixon. The Endangered Species Act was passed by 
Congress in 1973 with amazing voting record in the Senate of 92-0 and 355-4 in the House. The 
National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA; 1970), the law requiring that all major federal 
decisions to have an Environmental Impact Statement, passed the Senate unanimously and the 
House 372-15.  The Clean Water Act (1972) shared a similar fate with a 52-12 record in the 
Senate and 347-23 in the House. Environmentalist can hardly imagine such strong popular 
support for major environmental laws today. These outcomes were not about fervor in the ranks. 
They were about meeting the needs of all Americans.  
 Since the 1970s, both membership and the total number of environmental nonprofits in 
the United States surged. There are more than 10,000 environmental nonprofits in the United 
States with a moving membership base of 12 to 20 million Americans. While these groups were 
a  relatively weak organizational force in the 1970, today’s top 50 most wealthy environmental 
nonprofits command an annual budget of more than $3 billion. In the last 30 years, this growing 
community has splintered into a movement in support of one political party (USSEPWC 2008). 
A movement that once received broad political support is no longer a bipartisan affair—despite 
the fact the majority of American’s claim to be in support of a clean and healthy environment. 
The environmental movement has narrowed to an exclusive special interest.  
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 While this narrowing is troubling from a political perspective, the Greater Yellowstone 
experience suggests that the issue goes beyond party affiliations. Environmental nonprofit 
managers are utilizing a restricted set of conceptual tools that limit the likelihood of achieving 
their desired outcomes. This is exactly the complaint of critical lovers such as Nordhaus, 
Shellenberger, and Werbach. These individuals have called for a reframing of environmental 
politics from a discourse of limits to possibility. While their diagnosis is helpful in rebranding 
environmentalism, we need to go beyond their call. Challenges such as identify augmentation, 
cultures of meaning, and homogenization require us to expand our viewpoints and embrace a 
diversity of views within the environmental movement. Rather than hold the perspective that 
there is a true voice for American environmentalism—a correct perspective to hold—we must 
open up to the idea that the multiple viewpoints makes environmentalism stronger. Conflict and 
disagreement within environmentalism has been with us from the start. Rather than seek a 
uniform voice, we need to embrace continued dissent and disagreement.  
Maintaining the environmentalist identity is just as important as securing environmental 
outcomes. A chief roadblock in the way of expanding environmental viewpoints is to recognize 
that environmental nonprofits serve the important social function of maintaining individual 
identities. This includes the “good feeling” donors and members have for contributing to a 
nonprofit. It also consistent with the rectitude based standpoint of staff members who have 
chosen a career path of making a better world. In other words, nonprofits help reinforce a sense 
of identity and meaning for the individuals involved. It is a means to differentiate oneself from 
the masses and at the same time develop a community of likeminded individuals. 
Environmentalism has become just another special interest group precisely because those 
involved have a need to differentiate themselves from other people in our society.  
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While many critical lovers suggest that we need a culture shift within environmentalism 
in order to leverage greater effectiveness, identify augmentation and cultures of  meaning suggest 
that is will be a long uphill battle.  Changes to the status quo are always met with resistance. 
With a nonprofit community of 10-20 million individual members and a  multi-billion dollar 
organization industry, shifts in culture may be too much to ask. The 2005 firestorm within the 
environmental community over the “Death of Environmentalism” is evidence that proposed 
changed threatens the identities of many environmentalists.  
Abraham Kaplan (1963: 10) once wisely wrote “that there can be agreement on policy 
without agreement on…underlying philosophy.” The key for innovators is finding a way to 
support the current identities of environmentalists, while at the same time finding ways to change 
practices. Community based initiatives that address the real problems people face of the ground 
are one means of achieving this end. This may seem contradictory to the previous implication. 
However, it is not. We must expand the perspective of the broad community, without directly 
threating the identities of those resistant to change.  
 Environmental nonprofits must not shy away from public goal commitments. There is a 
generalized trend of environmental nonprofits failing to clarify exactly what they are seeking. 
For example, in chapter six I highlighted the fact few environmental nonprofits can articulate 
what overarching outcome they seek in the wolf case. Individuals can articulate that they ‘want 
to win a lawsuit’ or that they ‘want to reduce the number of wolves killed.’ However, they 
cannot articulate why this is important beyond ‘I care about wolves and I need to do something 
about it.’ This general pattern is systemic within the environmental nonprofit community. There 
are a number of reasons why nonprofits are reluctant to make their desired outcomes explicit. 
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The primary factors are rooted in organizational insecurities. Insecurities range from fear of 
negative appraisals in the eyes of funders to a fear of an insufficient member base.    
Critical lovers of the environmental movement have made calls against the politics of 
limits. That is, there is a longstanding paradigm within American Environmentalism that 
suggests saving the environment must be based on preventing actions from harming the 
environment. The narratives that are woven into this paradigm “are premised on the notion that 
humankind’s survival depends on understanding that ecological crises are a consequence of 
human intrusions on Nature, and that humans must let go of their consumer, religious, and 
ideological fantasies and recognize where their true self-interest lies” (Nordhaus and 
Shellenberger 2008: 130). The critical feature is that humans must be prevented from impacting 
nature. The concept of prevention is a fuzzy at best, as it give the public no clear commitment 
about what environmentalists stand for. Critical lovers argue that without a positive public vision 
for the future, environmentalism will continue to thin as a special interest.  
The Greater Yellowstone experience suggests that environmental nonprofits need to 
make clearer goal commitments to the public for an additional reason. The rise of critical lovers 
of the environmental movement over the past 10 years suggests that all is not well in 
environmentalism. There is a general sentiment that environmental nonprofits are not reaching 
their full potential. The evaluation of progress towards the goals of Greater Yellowstone’s 183 
environmental nonprofits confirms this suspicion. If it is unclear what you are trying to achieve, 
trying to improve performance is akin to playing a game of darts while blindfolded. Without 
knowing what you are aiming for improving efficiency or innovating new techniques will be 
futile.  Clear goals are the foundation of effective programs. The lack of explicit and well-
understood goal commitments opens up environmental nonprofits to the effects of parasitic 
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organizations, foundation drag, and the reliance on problem-blind strategies. Environmental 
nonprofits can do better. This starts with a specific commitment clarifying exactly what is to be 
achieved.  
Striving for a unified public is a fool’s errand. Two explanatory factors within the holy 
trinity (plus one) focus on the perspectives of ‘non-environmental’ individuals. The lack of 
political will centers conservationists educating or convincing the public of the infallibility of the 
environmental position. It as if environmentalists believe that marketing and education is enough 
to change environmentally damaging human behaviors. Similarly, the concept of the robust 
opposition attributes environmental failure to the inability to stand up to a bully. Besides 
increased funding, the concept centers on convincing the public of the errors of the oppositions’ 
ways.  
Chapter four discussed the complications of attributing failure to these factors. However, 
the fact remains that that most environmentalists seek to develop an environmentally responsible 
public. That is, convince the public that the environmentalist’s perspective is the correct way to 
view the world; that the environmentalism transcends politics and is in the interest of all 
Americans.  Yet, history has shown us on virtually every issue in modern society a unified 
perspective is an impossible task. Notwithstanding, policies are implemented and outcomes are 
changed in ways that meet the needs of many citizens. How can this be? The fact is a unified 
perspective or outlook on the world is not a perquisite for environmental outcomes. Too often 
those seeking environmental action “focus on trying to get everyone to think alike, forgetting 
that is how people act, not what they think, that in the end matters most” (Pielke 2010: 45). 
Focusing on pragmatic solutions that solve the problems of multiple interest groups has 
proven an effective means to build a stronger environmental future in Greater Yellowstone. 
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Community based initiatives, such as the Blackfoot Challenge and Sustaining Jackson Hole, 
have not sought to convince the environmental opposition of the infallibility of the 
environmentalist perspective. Rather, they focused on finding good solutions to empirical 
problems. That is focusing on solutions that are a technically proficient means of solving the 
problem, morally acceptable to the community, and politically viable in the context of rural 
America. The broader environmental movement can learn from such success by focusing on 
these three criteria of policy success.  
8.2 Implications for democracy 
The influence that nongovernmental organizations should have on American democratic 
practices has been contested since the founding of our nation. James Madison warned that 
special interest groups could negatively impact American governance and proposed constructing 
institutional means to limit their effects. Madison (1961: 26) asserted: 
Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, 
equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our 
governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival 
parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and 
the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing 
majority. 
 
Little has changed since Madison’s time. Claims are still rampant on how the influence of special 
interest groups negatively impacts our democracy. For example, in September 2008, Senator 
Inhofe (R-OK) released a report entitled Political Activity of Environmental Groups and Their 
Supporting Foundations (USSEWPC 2008). The senator argued environmental nonprofits are 
illegitimate stealth advocates for the Democratic Party despite the fact environmental 
organizations claim to serve public interests. Outside of the context of the environment, former 
Representative Pat Williams (D-MT; 2008) made a similar claim arguing that the National Rifle 
Association (NRA) had become a pawn of the far right and was inappropriately spending “hard-
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earned dues money on politics.” He lamented the influence of the NRA has on American 
politics. This is particularly striking as the Representative has a perfect voting record with the 
NRA in his 18 year career in the House. In October 2008, a series of articles in The Denver Post 
criticized the Colorado Democracy Alliance, insinuating impropriety among a collection of left-
leaning nonprofits. The author’s major argument was that Democrats were using “nonprofits to 
push politics” (Fender 2008a; 2008b). In a press conference during the economic crisis, President 
Obama (2008) argued that “we cannot sustain a system that bleeds billions of taxpayer dollars on 
programs that...exist solely because of the power of a politician, lobbyist, or interest group.” The 
President implied that special interest groups were a major cause of the economic crisis. Jeff 
Ventura, a spokesman for the chief administrative officer of the House, has even complained 
about the methods that special interest groups use to engage representatives. Ventura asserts, 
“advocacy groups are collecting e-mails and then shoving them into a system that was really 
designed for manual input, not for people to send us wholesale batches of thousands of e-mails at 
a time” (Krebs 2008). He argues that nonprofit advocacy groups overwhelm the politicians.  
The question in the face of such critics is: why focus on improving nonprofit 
performance? Despite the challenges interest groups pose in our democracy, the existence of 
interest groups is necessary for it to function. In Federalist 10 Madison (1961: 46) states “[t]here 
are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty 
which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the 
same passions, and the same interests.” Madison advised that destroying liberty is unreasonable 
if we wish to have political freedom, and that creating a uniform perspective is an impractical 
task. He asserted that the best we can do is moderate the negative effects of such groups. A 
number of modern democratic scholars agree, using numerous justifications to rationalize the 
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legitimacy of nongovernmental organizations in the democratic process (Douglas 1987; Dahl 
1983; Maloney & Jordan 2007). However, four major arguments are routinely invoked by 
democratic scholars.  
First, NGOs allow for increased participation of the public in policy decisions. Political 
parties and politicians need to consider and balance a multitude of interests in decision making. It 
is reasonable to assume that the primary interests of some citizens are poorly represented by their 
elected officials. Nonprofits can provide a voice to such citizens. Summarizing the argument, 
Grant Jordan and William Maloney (2007, p.25) assert, “the more interests [organized groups] 
actively advance their concerns, the more government has to adjust the policies to avoid 
opposition, and the more democracy there is.” Second, NGOs provide benefits to the public for 
which a democratic government is severely inhibited. James Douglas (1987, p.46) contends that 
“[t]he democratic state has to treat all its citizens equally, which is what we mean by equality 
before the law. Voluntary organizations are not similarly constrained.” In other words, NGOs 
allow a minority interest to offer services to the public that the majority are unwilling to provide. 
Third, NGOs add conservatism to public policy by inhibiting other organized interests from 
implementing rapid changes to the status quo. Dahl (1983, p.43) explains, “[e]ach of the major 
organized forces in a country prevents the others from making changes that might seriously 
damage its perceived interests.” This behavior guards against ill-informed, rash policy changes. 
Fourth, NGOs provide oversight to the state, which guards against the government subverting the 
will of the people (Dahl 1984). Dahl (1983, p.37) notes, “[to] prohibit citizens from organizing 
freely in order to make their views known to legislators and to other citizens would violate the 
criteria of effective participants and enlightened understanding, and it would mock the idea of 
final control over the agenda by the citizen body.” Nongovernmental organizations are critically 
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important to the functioning of our democracy. In a political system where it is difficult for the 
average citizen to have a voice, nongovernmental organizations are a means of securing the 
outcomes citizens’ desire outside of government.  
The narrow and cynical way to think about nonprofits is solely as a pressure group. 
Pressure groups are typically defined as an organization that believes in a particular cause and 
wants to influence on public policy outcomes, usually through swaying decision makers. We 
usually view such organizations as advocacy groups. This is the way much of the political 
science literature treats nonprofits (e.g. Douglas 1987; Maloney & Jordan 2007). If we define 
nonprofits as pressure groups, improving performance makes little sense from a system-wide 
perspective. Improving performance under such conditions is simply about outcompeting the 
opposition. However, nonprofits engage in a wide variety of activities beyond advocacy 
(Charnovitz 1997). Narrowly defining nonprofits as pressure groups is a mistake, as it limits the 
scope of choice available to solve social problems.  
The critical point is that leveraging greater nonprofit performance outside of the 
paradigm of pressure groups creates room for significant progress in improving both nonprofit 
and democratic outcomes. The lessons in this manuscript are likely to be applicable to nonprofits 
in other sectors. Expanding the range of available strategies, not directly fighting the status quo 
for organizational change, making explicit goal commitments, and realizing that outcomes can be 
achieved without widespread social transformation will benefit most nonprofits in the fulfillment 
of their desired future.  
Understanding the benefits of improving nonprofit performance in democratic practice is 
more complex, as any conversation will ultimately be informed by our differing definitions of 
democracy. However, a key feature in virtually any discussion of democracy is that common 
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interest outcomes—the public good—should usually be prioritized over exclusive special interest 
outcomes (Brunner and Steelman 2005). The tyranny of the minority should not dictate the 
future of the majority. Such ideas are well ingrained in American democratic practices. As such, 
we routinely see special interest groups appealing to the common interest as a means to rally 
support for their political perspectives. We have seen how democratic scholars justify the utility 
of interests groups: bestowing a voice to citizens, creating benefits outside of government, 
guarding against ill-informed decisions, and provide oversight to the state. However, how does 
improving a nonprofit’s performance go beyond finding ways to supplant the will of a minority 
over the majority? 
A key finding of this analysis is that the greatest room for leveraging new dimensions of 
nonprofit performance is moving beyond the conventional paradigm of nonprofit failure.  
Relying on explanatory factors, such as a robust opposition, directs our attention to outdoing the 
opposition; to be more effective, we must topple those against us. In contrast, the three 
alternative means to improve performance discussed in the previous chapter focus on ways that 
environmental groups can secure their interests and the interests of other members of the broader 
community. Treating policy outcomes as a zero-sum game is a recipe for continued failure. 
While there are situations where the desired outcomes of divergent political actors will directly 
conflict with each other, most political situations are amenable to solutions beyond advocating 
“yes” or “no” to a single policy choice. A third-way forward is obtainable on most issues where 
the non-exclusive special interests of multiple interest groups can be met.  
8.3 Environmental saviors  
The Greater Yellowstone is a global symbol for conservation. The region has a strong 
legacy of leadership in biodiversity conservation. The Yellowstone region is home to the world’s 
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first national park and the nation’s first national forest. The formation of the Greater Yellowstone 
Coordinating Committee in 1964 symbolized one of the first major efforts to manage large 
landscapes as an ecosystem across jurisdictional boundaries. With the reintroduction of wolves 
in 1995, Greater Yellowstone region become one of the last intact ecosystems in North America. 
These efforts are in no small part due the tremendous dedication of environmental nonprofits 
passionately striving to protect this region for future generations. From the Boone and Crocket 
Club’s efforts originating in 1887; to the Greater Yellowstone Coalition’s formation in 1983, to 
more recent establishment of Endeavor Wildlife Research in 2005—one trembles to think where 
we would be today without the leadership of these organizations.  
 The analysis contained within this manuscript is not an attempt to belittle the past efforts 
of Yellowstone’s environmental nonprofits. In fact, the purpose is quite the opposite. These 
organizations have provided an incredible service to the American people. Those of us who care 
deeply for Greater Yellowstone see a need for continuing to improve our community’s ability to 
secure conservation outcomes in the common interest. Environmental nonprofits have emerged 
as regional leaders to help the realization of this goal. However, we can—and should—expect 
more from these organizations. Greater Yellowstone’s environmental nonprofits can do better. 
While we will never have the precision to perfectly manage environmental nonprofits, we can 
improve on current strategies to leverage better performance in securing conservation outcomes.  
 Conventional explanations for nonprofit failure disproportionally focus on ‘the other.’ 
We routinely hear statements such as: They are not giving us enough money; the public does not 
care; the opposition is just too strong. Conventional strategies to remedy these challenges show 
little promise in lifting nonprofits to new levels of performance. The central premise of this 
analysis is that improving should begin with focusing on self-scrutiny and self-appraisal. Susan 
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Clark (2008: 216) argues that “many of our present leaders in greater Yellowstone are rich in 
experience but poor in theory—about both the challenges they and we face and the responses 
needed.” The implication is that leaders—in the nonprofit, for-profit, and government sectors—
are overwhelmed with challenges on a daily basis. For the nonprofit sector these challenges 
include attending public meetings, maintaining relationships with key decision makers, keeping 
up with the latest policies, fundraising, staffing, and all the while maintaining the energy to fight 
the next battles. Many individuals simply do not have the time to sit back and think.  
 Improving conservation outcomes will require environmental nonprofits to reach beyond 
their comfort zones and think critically about their fundamental assumptions and mental models 
of how the world works. This is the central challenge all environmental nonprofits face. The 
opportunity exists for Greater Yellowstone’s environmental nonprofits to once again be world 
leaders. These organizations are in a strong position to innovate more robust strategies for 
securing conservation outcomes. The way forward is developing solutions that solve the 
grounded problems of multiple interest groups. Alternatively, these organizations can maintain 
the status quo and continue to fall short of meeting their formal goals. The choice is theirs.     
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Appendix A: Goal statements 
  
The following are goals contained within the mission and vision statements of Greater 
Yellowstone’s conservation nonprofit community. The statements are modified (1) to remove 
any reference to specific organizations, (2) divided when the missions/vision statements 
contained multiple goals, (3) and slightly edited for readability when the previous changes 
created awkward phrasing.  
1. Advocate for responsible development & sustainable use of the natural resources (water, 
air, wildlife, & land) in Teton Valley, Idaho. 
2. Advocate for responsible, sustainable management of the wildlife, waters, and air quality 
of Wyoming's Upper Green, a vital portion of the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. 
3. Advocate for the protection of Montana's wildlife and its habitats. 
4. Antelope preservation and management through the development of supplemental water 
resources in selected areas where both the habitat and wildlife are being impaired by lack 
of this vital resource. 
5. Assist landowning families of the area in the conservation of agricultural, ranch, and 
natural lands in order to sustain and protect open spaces, watersheds, wildlife habitat and 
other ecological values for today's inhabitants and as a legacy for future generations. 
6. Assuring the vitality and welfare of wild Trumpeter Swan populations. 
7. Be a strong, unified voice for an ethic of conservation in Wyoming, focusing on birds, 
other wildlife, and their habitats, for the benefit of present and future generations. 
8. Be the leading source and teacher of wilderness skills and leadership that serve people 
and the environment. 
9. Be the repository for certain interests in real property owned by Teton County, WY, for 
the purpose of implementing the Scenic Preservation element of the Teton County 
Comprehensive Plan, and otherwise assisting in the preservation of the County's scenic 
resources and wildlife habitat. 
10. Bring market principles to resolving environmental problems.  
11. Bring people together to develop and implement innovative strategies for conserving wild 
places and wildlife. 
12. Bring people together who love this region to enhance and protect our unique 
environment. 
13. Build broad citizen support for conservation. 
14. Build leadership and involvement in government, in order to preserve and enhance 
Montana's air and water, open spaces, forests, and wildlife for future generations. 
15. Build on an interest in birds to promote the conservation of our natural environment 
through enjoyment, education, and action. 
16. Build the capacity of Montana's conservation and environmental community to advance 
conservation issues within the state's democratic process. 
17. Challenge practices of the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) which produces radioactive 
and hazardous air emissions. 
18. Change individual attitudes toward nature and help people imagine wildlife and humans 
living in sustainable interaction on both a local and a global scale. 
19. Connecting people and nature through education. 
20. Conserve bears and their habitat around the world. 
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21. Conservation - Restoring - Educating through Fly Fishing 
22. Conservation of nature.  
23. Conserve  open space, agricultural land, wildlife habitat and the creation of public trails 
in and around Gallatin County. 
24. Conserve agricultural and natural lands and to encourage land stewardship in the Upper 
Snake River Watershed for the benefit of today's communities and as a legacy for future 
generations. 
25. Conserve biodiversity by ensuring the persistence of imperiled species and their habitats. 
26. Conserve land for people to enjoy as parks, gardens, and other natural places, ensuring 
livable communities for generations to come. 
27. Conserve the wild turkey. 
28. Conserve, maintain, protect and restore the soil, forest, water and other natural resources 
of the United States and other lands; to promote means and opportunities for the 
education of the public with respect to such resources and their enjoyment and 
wholesome utilization. 
29. Conserve, restore and protect the unique fishery, wildlife and aesthetic qualities of the 
Henry's Fork watershed. 
30. Conserve, restore, and manage wetlands and associated habitats for North America's 
waterfowl.  
31. Conserve species and ecosystems by providing reliable scientific and policy information.  
32. Conserve species and ecosystems bringing people together to formulate and implement 
sound, effective conservation policies, and building support from an informed public 
through education and engagement. 
33. Contribute new knowledge toward improving the management and preservation of our 
natural environment by pursuing innovative, long-term research on key ecosystem 
components. 
34. Coordinate and fosters cooperation among Montana's environmental groups by arming 
them with the tools to inform, expand and mobilize their members as a more potent force 
in Montana's political landscape. 
35. Coordinate science-based effort to elevate the wolverine's management status through 
support and initiation of research, and to develop an information network for professional 
and public education. 
36. Create an enduring natural legacy for future generations through stewardship of all 
Wyoming's wildlife. 
37. Dedicated to responsible land stewardship in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, to ensure that 
human activities are in harmony with the area's irreplaceable wildlife, scenic and other 
natural resources. 
38. Defending and protecting the rich biodiversity and the public lands, streams, wildlife and 
clean air of the American West.  
39. Displace the use of petroleum in the Greater Yellowstone region's transportation sector 
by advocating the use of conservation in travel, alternative fuels, encouraging new 
technologies such as hybrid vehicles and reducing truck and bus idling practices. 
40. Educate our citizens as to the value of wildlife and its conservation. 
41. Educate the public about current conservation issues that affect Idaho's native flora and 
habitats. 
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42. Educate the public about the biology and habitat needs of the Rocky Mountain Bighorn 
Sheep and to encouraging the active stewardship of wildlife and wildlands. 
43. Educating Idahoans about the consequences of current development patterns and the 
alternatives to those patterns and engaging them in activities that encourage thoughtfully 
planned development and exemplary development policies. 
44. Encourage citizens to appreciate and empower citizens to defend native biodiversity in 
the Northern Rockies. 
45. Encourage the appreciation and conservation of the native flora and plant communities of 
Wyoming through education, research, and communication. 
46. Enforce and strengthen environmental laws on behalf of hundreds of organizations and 
communities. 
47. Enhance the economic viability of family ranches; preserving traditional rural community 
and family ranch values; ensuring productive agriculture through the protection of private 
property rights and open space, as well as maintaining healthy grasslands, wildlife 
habitat, and watersheds; working cooperatively with groups, agencies, and individuals 
who share our goals and commitment to the land. 
48. Ensure and perpetuate wild, free-roaming herds of buffalo (bison) in and adjacent to 
Yellowstone National Park.  
49. Ensure that both today's and tomorrow's generations will continue to enjoy clean water, 
natural beauty and have access to the Montana backcountry experiences. 
50. Ensure that future generations enjoy the clean air and water, beauty, wildlife, and 
opportunity for renewal that pristine forests, rivers, deserts, and mountains provide. 
51. Ensure the conservation of mule deer, blacktail deer, and their habitats. 
52. Ensure the future of elk, other wildlife, and their habitat. 
53. Ensures the legacy of our National Land Heritage by mentoring future generations of 
stewardship leaders in sustainable land management. 
54. Ensuring that grizzly populations are healthy and large enough to be viable in the long-
term, and that strong habitat protections are in place prior to removing the grizzly from 
the Endangered Species Act list. 
55. Establish common long and short-term management policies, goals, and objectives 
necessary for cooperatively managing and funding noxious weed activities across all 
jurisdictional boundaries in the Jackson Hole weed management area. 
56. Facilitate the free flow of information and enhance the capacity of citizens to make 
informed decisions about important public issues, in order to foster effective public 
participation in global civil society. 
57. Forge partnerships to protect America's legacy of land and water resources. 
58. Foster the public's understanding, appreciation, and enjoyment of Yellowstone National 
Park and its surrounding ecosystem by funding and providing educational products and 
services. 
59. Foster the science and art of natural resource conservation. 
60. Foster the science and art of soil, water, and related natural resource management through 
advocacy, professional development, and educational activities to achieve sustainability. 
61. Have local citizens, businesses, anglers, boaters, and conservationists all working 
together to permanently protect the best remaining free-flowing rivers and streams of the 
Snake Headwaters using the federal Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. 
62. Heighten environmental awareness. 
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63. Help conserve the natural habitats and open spaces that will ensure that the spirit of the 
West continues to thrive. 
64. Help people and wildlife coexist. 
65. Helping birds of prey through veterinary care, education, conservation and 
human/wildlife conflict resolution. 
66. Honor the legacy of traditional field rangers and wardens whose independence, initiative 
and spirit of adventure made us heir to the natural places and wildlife we enjoy today. 
67. Identify sources of human/wildlife conflict and creating effective, practical and 
affordable solutions and preventions. 
68. Improve the economic and social conditions through the conservation, utilization and 
development of the natural and human resources of the area. 
69. Improve the wetlands throughout the state, to provide habitat for waterfowl and other 
species. 
70. Increase the effectiveness of wildlife and habitat management in the Rocky Mountains 
through conducting vital wildlife research that is not being accomplished in a 
comprehensive manner by government agencies or private entities. 
71. Increase the effectiveness of wildlife and habitat management in the Rocky Mountains 
through increasing the public's awareness of and participation in natural resource issues 
through education and outreach programs that provide individuals with a greater 
connection to the natural world. 
72. Inform and inspire people to act on behalf of the West's land, air, water and inhabitants. 
73. Inspires Americans to protect wildlife for our children's future. 
74. Keep the ranching way of life in the Madison Valley Area.  
75. Keeping the world-renowned U.S. Northern Rockies ecologically intact by restoring and 
maintaining connections between key habitats for healthy populations of native wildlife. 
76. Long-term conservation of the Yellowstone grizzly bear and its habitat. 
77. Offer academically rigorous, field-based courses that: broaden the nature of a liberal arts 
education; teach critical thinking about social and environmental issues; foster 
understanding of and respect for natural and human communities; and cultivate a sense of 
place that encourages personal, social and environmental responsibility. 
78. Organizing Montanans to protect our water quality, family farms and ranches, and unique 
quality of life. 
79. Our mission is to champion environmental protection through the unique perspective of 
flight. 
80. Our mission is to protect the cougar throughout the Americas.  
81. Our mission is to protect the environmental quality of the Northwest. Build broad citizen 
support for conservation. 
82. Our mission is to support safe and healthy communities, sustainable economies, 
conservation of farm, forest and ranch lands, and protection of natural resources and 
wildlife habitat. 
83. Our mission is to systematically, rigorously, and comprehensively survey, assess, 
understand, and tell the story of the Yellowstone Country and its many life forms 
throughout the year. 
84. People protecting lands, waters, and wildlife of the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, now 
and for future generations. 
85. People working to conserve and protect the integrity of our environment and community. 
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86. Perpetuate of wildlife, wildlife habitat, and wildlife related recreational opportunities for 
sportsmen and sportswomen. 
87. Pioneer solutions to help people and predators co-exist. 
88. Preserve biological diversity 
89. Preserve open space and the scenic, ranching, and wildlife values of Jackson Hole by 
assisting landowners who wish to protect their land in perpetuity. 
90. Preserve the plants, animals, and natural communities that represent the diversity of life 
on Earth by protecting the lands and waters they need to survive. 
91. Preserve, conserve, and enhance both Pronghorn Antelope and their ecosystems. 
92. Preserve, protect, enhance, and restore Montana's rivers, water bodies, and their 
watersheds for their natural, recreational, and cultural values. 
93. Preserves Idaho's clean water, wilderness and quality of life through citizen action, 
education, and professional advocacy. 
94. Promote a healthy Wind River watershed, and by that, assist in restoring justice and 
health to our communities. 
95. Promote a trails and pathways connected community. 
96. Promote an awareness, understanding and appreciation of the natural world through 
quality educational experiences. 
97. Promote and facilitate non-motorized transportation and recreation options in Jackson 
Hole through program development, fundraising, advocacy, and fostering public-private 
partnerships. 
98. Promote and support sound management of fish and wildlife including public hunting and 
fishing on an optimum, sustained yield basis. 
99. Promote community decisions that respect the land and the people of the West. 
100. Promote environmental justice. We accomplish these goals by strengthening grassroots 
conservation networks; providing strategic communications, advocacy and other 
assistance to local conservation groups; and by helping to improve communications 
among those groups and other segments of society. 
101. Promote interest in native plants and plant communities, and collecting and sharing 
information on all phases of the botany of native plants in Idaho. 
102. Promote restoration, maintenance and perpetuation of native fish, wildlife and their 
habitat. 
103. Promote scientific understanding, informed dialogue, and collaborative approaches to 
resolving our region's most complex socioeconomic and natural resource challenges. 
104. Promote sustainable choices that protect the quality of the region's landscape and the way 
of life for present generations and those to come. 
105. Promote the development, conservation, and utilization of the water resources of 
Wyoming for the benefit of Wyoming people. 
106. Promote the educational and interpretive programs in Grand Teton National Park and the 
Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem.  
107. Promote the guardianship and provident management of big game and associated wildlife 
in North America and maintain the highest standards of fair chase and sportsmanship in 
all aspects of big game hunting, in order that this resource of all the people may survive 
and prosper in its natural habitats. 
108. Promote the moose conservation by educating the public, conserving habitat, and 
promote hunting and viewing moose. 
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109. Promote the protection and enhancement of wildlife habitat, the quality of wildlife 
management programs, and protect America's family heritage of hunting and fishing. 
110. Promote ways for our community to live compatibility with wildlife. 
111. Promoting and preserving winter wildlands and a quality human-powered snowsports 
experience on public lands. 
112. Protect America's wilderness and to develop a nationwide network of wild lands through 
public education, scientific analysis, and advocacy. 
113. Protect and enhance habitat, to perpetuate quality hunting and fishing, to protect citizen's 
right to use public lands and waters, and to promote ethical hunting and fishing. 
114. Protect and enhance Wyoming's environment and quality of life for future generations. 
115. Protect and restore all public lands and waters from the damage caused by dirt bikes, jet 
skis and all other off-road vehicles. 
116. Protect and restore forests, wildlands, watersheds and wildlife in the Northern Rockies 
Bioregion by participating in public land management decision processes.  Encourage 
citizens to appreciate and empower citizens to defend native biodiversity in the Northern 
Rockies. 
117. Protect and restore Montana's natural environment. 
118. Protect and restore North America's grizzly bear populations by conserving wildlife 
habitat. 
119. Protect and restore western watersheds and wildlife through education, public policy 
initiatives and litigation. 
120. Protect and revive wild places by promoting road removal, preventing new road 
construction, and stopping off-road vehicle abuse. 
121. Protect forest, grassland and aquatic ecosystems. 
122. Protect our public wild lands because present generations are responsible for ensuring a 
future of wild places for people and wildlife. 
123. Protect, restore and improve the rivers of Idaho and the communities that depend on 
them. 
124. Protecting Montana's wilderness heritage, quiet beauty, and outdoor traditions, now and 
for future generations. 
125. Protecting the environmental rights of all people, including future generations. Among 
these rights are clean air, clean water, healthy food, and flourishing ecosystems. 
126. Protecting the magnificent places, natural resources, and wildlife of this earth and to 
defending the right of all people to a healthy environment.  
127. Protecting wildlife and wild places in Wyoming and surrounding states, primarily on 
public land. 
128. Protection and enhancement of wildlife, wildland ecosystems, and our natural wonders. 
129. Protection of all native wild animals and plants in their natural communities. 
130. Provide a means whereby all people coordinate their efforts to accomplish these 
purposes. 
131. Provide a safe, permanent home to native wildlife that cannot survive in the wild, 
rehabilitate and return those that can, and to offer people a vivid first-hand experience 
with wildlife as an effective way to teach about conservation biology and the urgent need 
to preserve habitat through teaching, writing, and film. 
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132. Provide agricultural landowners with land conservation options to enhance their business 
planning to remain productive and independent today, and better prepared to pass on their 
tradition to future generations. 
133. Provide educational excellence in summer camp programming that fosters responsibility, 
honesty, integrity, cooperation, conservation values and creative problem-solving among 
the entire camp community, in an enriching, safe, western environment. 
134. Provide leadership for the conservation of Wyoming's soil and water resources, promote 
the control of soil erosion, promote and protects the quality of Wyoming's waters, reduce 
siltation of stream channels and reservoirs, promote wise use of Wyoming's water, and all 
other natural resources, preserve and enhance wildlife habitat, protect the tax base and 
promote the health, safety and general welfare of the citizens of this state through a 
responsible conservation ethic. 
135. Provide opportunities for discovering and exploring personal vision and purpose in our 
lives through retreats and workshops, community service programs, indigenous and 
contemporary ceremonies, and time honored tools for soulful living. 
136. Provide permanent protection for private lands that are ecologically significant for 
agricultural production, fish and wildlife habitat, and open space. 
137. Provide reliable information through innovative research and state-of-the-art conservation 
planning to foster ecologically sound management of wildlife and their habitats. 
138. Provides financial support for programs and projects which enhance, preserve and protect 
Grand Teton National Park's treasured cultural, historic, and environmental resources. 
139. Provides objective research, education, and technical advice to grassroots groups, non-
governmental organizations, regulatory agencies, businesses, and indigenous 
communities on natural resource issues, especially those relating to mining. 
140. Providing affordable mapping and geographic information technologies to environmental 
and community organizations in the Pacific Northwest and Northern Rockies. 
141. Providing citizens around the world share a right to timely, accurate, and unbiased 
information about the environmental, social, and economic issues that affect their lives.  
142. Providing educational programs and materials about natural history and ecology. 
143. Reinforce ecosystem viability through habitat conservation and education projects that 
build on available research. 
144. Represent activists, Indian tribes, local governments, and citizen groups who seek to 
protect and restore the forests, rivers, grasslands, wildlife, and human communities of the 
West through litigation.  
145. Restore and protect the natural heritage of North America by designing and helping 
create systems of interconnected wildlands that can sustain the diversity of life. 
146. Restore bison to Indian Nations in a manner which is compatible with their spiritual and 
cultural beliefs and practices. 
147. Restore landscape and watershed integrity. 
148. Restore rivers, eliminate water degradation, improve public land management and protect 
public access for responsible recreational use. 
149. Restore whitebark pine ecosystems. 
150. Restoring and protecting the natural environment of the Interior American West. 
151. Roster responsible environmental stewardship by increasing understanding and 
appreciation for the relationships binding humans and nature in the Greater Yellowstone 
region. 
228 
 
152. Saves wildlife and wild lands through careful science, international conservation, 
education, and the management of the world's largest system of urban wildlife parks.  
153. Secure the ecological integrity of the Wild Rockies Bioregion through citizen 
empowerment, and the application of conservation biology, sustainable economic models 
and environmental law. 
154. Serving as the political voice of Montana's conservation and environmental community.  
155. Stimulate and encourage scientific research and investigation in the fields of geology, 
zoology, botany, history, and related subjects in the Grand Teton National Park, 
Ecosystem, and the western portion of the United States. 
156. Strengthen leaders, organizations, and coalitions or networks that protect and conserve 
the Earth. 
157. Support our hunting heritage and to protect and promote laws that increase hunting 
opportunity and safety. 
158. Support, nurture, and connect collaborative natural resource groups. 
159. The creation of forums for the respectful exchange of ideas and perspectives in the 
pursuit of solutions to the region's difficulties. 
160. Through advocacy and education, work to preserve and restore the world-class rivers, 
diverse wildlife, landscapes, and outstanding beauty of Park County, Montana. 
161. Through land acquisition, sustainable programs, and leadership training, the Fund and its 
partners demonstrate effective conservation solutions emphasizing the integration of 
economic and environmental goals. 
162. To conserve, protect and restore North America's trout and salmon fisheries and their 
watersheds. 
163. To empower women, who historically have had little power in affecting environmental 
policy, to create an ecologically sustainable and socially just society. 
164. To encourage and empower citizens in opposition to the spread of industrialization in the 
Bridger-Teton National Forest,(BTNF); to stop drilling in the BTNF; to stimulate local 
citizen action; to engage federal agencies and political leadership; and to stop the rapid 
spread of energy exploitation that threatens ecologically important areas. 
165. To encourage the production of natural history programming around the world by 
providing nonfiction filmmakers and broadcasters with an international forum to conduct 
business, test new equipment, refine program production techniques, and continue to seek 
new and more effective ways to promote awareness and sensitivity to the conservation of 
wildlife and wildlife habitat around the world. 
166. To enhance wild sheep populations, promote professional wildlife management, educate 
the public about wild sheep and the conservation benefits of hunting, encourage fair 
chase hunting, and protect sportsmen's rights - while keeping administrative costs to a 
minimum. 
167. To ensure the conservation and blacktail deer and their habitats. 
168. To equip young people with the skills and values to be vigorous citizens who improve 
their communities and environment. 
169. To explore, enjoy, and protect the wild places of the earth; To practice and promote the 
responsible use of the earth's ecosystems and resources; To educate and enlist humanity 
to protect and restore the quality of the natural and human environment; and to use all 
lawful means to carry out these objectives. 
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170. To further educational and community-based efforts which demonstrate the 
interdependence of human culture and ecology. 
171. To generate, manage, and grant funding for projects which environmentally benefit the 
future of trout and fly fishing by annually sponsoring a three-day event uniting 
enthusiastic fly fishers from around the world with premier regional guides who all 
endeavor to celebrate the joy and spirit of the sport during the fishing, social, and 
fundraising activities of the event, and who throughout the year, promote that same joy 
and spirit of fly-fishing and the future of trout. 
172. To preserve, conserve, and study Montana's native plants and plant communities. 
173. To promote access and stewardship in the Upper Snake River Watershed through 
education, partnerships, and outreach. 
174. To protect and enhance America's National Park System for present and future 
generations. 
175. To provide education, legislative advocacy, and grassroots support for wildlife and 
wildlife management based on sound scientific and sociological principles. We are 
committed to ensuring individual as well as institutional accountability for wildlife 
conservation. By building partnerships, networks, and coalitions with others, we can 
preserve protect and enhance wildlife populations and wildlife habitat for future 
generations. 
176. To provide extraordinary outdoor adventure experiences that inspire financially 
disadvantaged children and young adults to dream, to see beyond their current 
circumstances, and ultimately succeed in building a healthy, happy, and productive life. 
177. To safeguard the Earth: its people, its plants and animals, and the natural systems upon 
which all life depends. 
178. To stop the slaughter of Yellowstone's wild buffalo herd, protect the natural habitat of 
wild free-roaming buffalo and native wildlife, and to work with people of all Nations to 
honor the sacredness of the wild buffalo. 
179. To strengthen, support, and coordinate weed management efforts in Montana in 
accordance with the Montana State Weed Plan. 
180. To understand and explain issues of growth, change, and sustainability in resort and 
national park gateway communities. 
181. To work proactively to give humans an understanding and a respect for grizzlies as an 
indicator of the health of other species, as well as the ecosystem in which we all live. 
182. Transplant disease-free wild migratory buffalo into public lands on the Big Open in 
Phillips and Valley Counties in conjunction with the Canadian National Grasslands in 
southern Saskatchewan through the Bitter Creek Corridor. 
183. Understanding the nature of ecosystems through collaborative science and education in 
the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. 
184. Unite businesses dedicated to preserving a healthy environment and shaping a prosperous 
and sustainable future for communities in the Yellowstone-Teton region. 
185. Using the best available scientific knowledge and advancing that knowledge where we 
can, we work to preserve the diversity and abundance of life on Earth and the health of 
ecological systems by: * protecting natural areas and wild populations of plants and 
animals, including endangered species; * promoting sustainable approaches to the use of 
renewable natural resources; and * promoting more efficient use of resources and energy 
and the maximum reduction of pollution. We are committed to reversing the degradation 
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of our planet's natural environment and to building a future in which human needs are 
met in harmony with nature. 
186. We seek to preserve our unique natural heritage the public will articulated by the 
Wilderness Act and Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. 
187. We...strengthening grassroots conservation networks; providing strategic 
communications, advocacy and other assistance to local conservation groups; and by 
helping to improve communications among those groups and other segments of society. 
188. Work cooperatively with farmers, ranchers, and other landowners to develop incentive-
based agreements that benefit landowners, streamflows and communities. 
189. Work together so that Montana ecosystems will continue to nourish birds, other wildlife, 
and the human spirit for future generations. 
190. Work with communities throughout the Rocky Mountain West and across the country to 
reduce the social, economic, and environmental problems caused by oil and gas 
development. 
191. Work with detection dogs to benefit science and conservation. 
192. Working to ensure sustainable human communities, using law, science and education in 
partnership with other non-profit groups in order to promote the public interest. 
193. Working to protect and restore wild grizzly populations and their habitat in the lower 48 
United States and Canada. 
194. Works for clean water, healthy streams, and abundant fisheries in Teton Valley. 
  
